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SUMMARY OF THE DISSERTATION
This dissertation addresses a key variable determining the threat posed by terrorist groups. It relates
the threat posed by terrorist attacks to how capable a terrorist group is to carry out attacks. As such, it
links the threat not to the willingness of a terrorist group to conduct attacks but to its ability to do so. I
maintain that for any active terrorist group the willingness to commit attacks is a necessary requirement.
A terrorist group’s capability, in contrast, depends on a variety of internal and external factors. Study-
ing how differences in those endowments or constraints induce varying capabilities offers a tangible
approach to understand the threat posed by a specific terrorist group.
I argue that in order to conduct attacks, a terrorist group needs resources. This dissertation discusses
different aspects of how terrorist groups generate resources. Access to resources and a terrorist group’s
ability to manage resources helps to explain variation in the behavior of terrorist groups. To develop
my argument I focus on the economic activities of a terrorist group, claiming that a terrorist group,
just like a firm, needs to efficiently exploit its opportunities. With this argument I turn the attention
to the economic activities of a terrorist group in preparation of the attack and away from the attack
itself. I argue that terrorist groups acquire resources from interacting with their environment. The
resource allocation is affected by the organizational structure as it determines whether a terrorist group
can manage its resources efficiently. Thus, I highlight two steps of the resourcing process. One step
focuses on the environment of terrorist groups and another highlights group-internal processes. I argue
that both steps act independently from each other and interdependently.
I put my argument to three empirical tests analyzing the behavior of terrorist groups as a result of
external environmental conditions and group-internal factors. First, I investigate why terrorist groups
adopt either a centralized or a decentralized structure depending on environemental and group-internal
conditions. Second, I assess to what degree external and internal factors can accurately predict a terrorist
group’s involvement in organized crime. Finally, I analyze the effect of a terrorist group’s social capital
and managerial capacity on its operational capability individually and jointly.
The clandestine nature of terrorist groups introduces non-trivial challenges in terms of data collec-
tion. In order to carry out large-n cross-sectional analyses on a global scale, I utilize a variety of existing
data sourced from published data by other terrorism researchers. I enrich this collection of data by cod-
ing original data. The organizational structure and a terrorist group’s involvement in organized crime are
manually coded using publicly accessible information. The type of weapon a terrorist group uses in its
attack approximates the operational capability of a terrorist group. The social capital of terrorist groups
is operationalized with the position of a terrorist group within the cooperation network of 205 terrorist
groups. To that end, I create a network of cooperating terrorist groups and calculate network measures
to assess a terrorist group’s access to social capital.
Chapter 1 motivates the research question addressed in this dissertation and discusses central theor-
etical and empirical contributions. Chapter 2 reflects the relevant literature as a foundation to understand
terrorist groups as economic entities that can be affected by market conditions and managerial capacit-
ies. In chapter 3, I develop the theoretical argument. Chapter 4 is the first empirical chapter. In line
with my argument, I find that the environment affects the likelihood of a terrorist group to adopt a cent-
ralized organizational structure. Additionally, I find ideology to have an effect as well, illustrating that
both external and internal factors affect which organizational design a terrorist group adopts. In chapter
5, I utilize an inductive machine learning approach using a random forest classifier to test previously
discussed environmental and organizational determinants of a terrorist group’s involvement in organ-
ized crime. I find that organizational variables out-perform environmental ones in terms of predictive
capacity. Group size and ideology are the most influential variables for leveraging accurate predictions.
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In chapter 6, I analyze the influence of a terrorist group’s social capital and managerial capacities to
efficiently allocate resources by assessing the effect of a terrorist group’s network position and its organ-
izational structure on the operational capability. I provide evidence for an independent impact and an
effect of a terrorist groups network position moderated by its organizational structure. I find that terrorist
groups benefit from cooperating with terrorist groups that are well connected themselves.
My research shows that in order to analyze the economic activities of a terrorist group external
and internal factors cannot be separated. Group-internal dynamics condition a terrorist group’s external
activities. The ideology and size of a terrorist group predict its involvement in organized crime. The
organizational structure influences the operational output of a terrorist group by mitigating the effect
of social capital. The organizational structure itself is also affected by a terrorist group’s ideology,
repressive conditions in the state it operates in, and societal conditions a terrorist group needs to address
in order to mobilize sustained support.
The findings of this dissertation have important policy implications. By turning the attention to
the economic activities of a terrorist group, this dissertation offers crucial and actionable insights for
counter-terrorism researchers and practitioners. By focusing on the resourcing of terrorist groups we
learn more about what a group is actually able to do. This approach disentangles the willingness of a
terrorist group to commit terrorist attacks from its actual prowess. As counter-terrorism strategies that
focus on undermining and destroying the ideology of terrorist groups are failing, tailoring a strategy to
cut the supply of resources might be more promising to manage the terrorist threat.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and research question
Anecdotal evidence suggests that some terrorist groups have a specialized skill-set or product that they
exchange with other terrorist groups. They act in accordance with Ricardo’s theory of trade as they
offer their specialized good to trade it in exchange for missing resources to increase their competitive
advantage (Ricardo, 1951). The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) was very proficient in the
use of various explosive devices in urban settings (Ward and Hackett, 2003). The Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) on the other hand was well-skilled in guerilla warfare in remote country-
side settings. After the Colombian government increased the pressure on FARC in the early 2000s, they
needed to change their tactics and conduct attacks in cities. To gain the necessary know-how members
of FARC met with members of PIRA who trained them in using explosives in an urban environment
(Ward and Hackett, 2003). While FARC was trained in innovative tactics, PIRA received financial
benefits and the opportunity to test their weaponry in a contentious setting without endangering their
operation in Great Britain (Cragin et al., 2007). Michael Horowitz (2010) illustrates a similar case,
finding that Hizbollah uses its connections to other terrorist groups to export suicide tactics. He finds
that the probability for a terrorist group to adopt suicide attacks as part of their tactical repertoire does
not only depend on the connections that a terrorist group has, but also on its organizational capability to
incorporate the new operational and organizational requirements.
Both examples provide a narrative illustrating why terrorist groups engage in trade relationships
with other terrorist groups. The foundation of such trade relations is the dynamic of demand and supply,
meaning that for the shortage of a specific good there is another actor who supplies that good. Thus,
engaging in trade and market exchange has several advantages. Terrorist groups can make better use of
the potentially scarce and specialized resources they have. This allows them to exploit their comparative
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advantage enabeling them to conduct terrorist attacks with higher frequency or intensity. They can
access new technologies or know-how and improve their competitiveness in general, both against an
enemy government and other terrorist groups. Thus, resources affect what a terrorist group manages
to do. The ability of how often it can conduct an attack, whom it attacks and how it can carry out the
attack is determined by its resources. Consequently, terrorist groups pose a significant threat only if they
manage to generate the resources needed to carry out an attack.
While the example of cooperation between PIRA and FARC cooperating focuses on the exchange
relationship between terrorist groups, the example of Hizbollah hints at the importance of internal group
dynamics. This leads to the research question of this dissertation: How do terrorist groups generate
resources and how is the process of mobilizing resources affected by external exchange relationships
and internal organizational dynamics?
This dissertation addresses this question by studying the effects of resource generation as the inter-
play between internal and external factors on terrorist groups’ involvement in organized crime and on
their attacks. In their resourcing process terrorist groups combine internal (specifically allocation) and
external (specifically acquisition) factors. Allocation refers to the distribution of resources through the
organizational structure. Acquisition is analyzed with a focus on involvement in organized crime and
inter-organizational cooperation between terrorist groups. In this dissertation, I study terrorist groups
as an entity similar to business enterprises that face additional restrictions due to their illegal and vi-
olent output. I apply insights from the management literature and organizational theory to learn more
about the performance of terrorist groups. A systematic combination of inter- and intra-organizational
dynamics and exchange relationships is a novel approach and adds to the status quo of research.
It is important to understand the resourcing process of a terrorist group, as it is part of the preparation
for an attack. These preparatory activities of terrorist groups leading up to an attack do not only stretch
over a long period of time and make up the majority of what a terrorist group actually does, but also
affect the danger emanating from a terrorist group. The terrorist attack itself is merely the observable
tip of the iceberg that is the sum of a range of activities including fundraising, recruiting, training, and
the development of specialized skills. Only if terrorist groups manage to resource their activities the
threat becomes a reality, because “terrorists cannot live on idealism alone and even if their services do
come cheap, they need to eat and to find ammunition for their guns” (Vittori, 2011, p. 13). Adopting
a perspective that puts the economic activities of a terrorist group at the center of attentions allows
researchers and practitioners to understand the resource flows of terrorist groups. As a consequence of
such an understanding, economic activities can be disturbed reducing the range of activities a terrorist
group can master (Winer and Roule, 2002).
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1.2 Main theoretical argument
In this dissertation the focus is on the resourcing process of terrorist groups as an incremental feature
that determines their behavior. The core premise is that not all terrorist groups are equally capable of
inflicting harm on their enemy. I argue that, at a minimum, terrorist groups are constrained by their
resources. Their access to resources and their ability to use resources introduces variation among the
abilities of terrorist groups.
I propose that the differences in terrorist groups’ actions vary significantly due to the variation in
their resourcing process as resources are a necessary component for all attacks. I argue that the process
of acquiring and allocating resources is influenced by a terrorist group’s interactions with other actors on
the illicit market and the organizational structure of the terrorist group. This reasoning is in line with the
resource-dependence theory of legitimate business enterprises (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). I claim that
much like firms, terrorist groups are dependent on the resources that are available in their environment
as well as their capacity to extract and use those resources.
I pursue an interactive approach accounting for the fact that terrorist groups do not exist in a vacuum.
They form relationships with other actors to trade assets for mutual benefit based on the market principles
of demand and supply. This logic assumes that both the location of a terrorist group on the overall market
and its organizational endowments affect its attacks. Depending on their market position and structural
capacity to allocate resources some terrorist groups are better equipped to access and use resources more
efficiently. While the exchange with other actors in their environment allows terrorist groups to tap into
their resources and, as a consequence, increases their operational repertoire, the organizational structure
of a terrorist group influences how well they can process these resources to use them in an attack. I argue
that centralized groups are better equipped to coordinate their assets than decentralized groups.
I utilize a network approach that views organizations to be embedded in inter-organizational rela-
tions that are consequential for their activities. Instead of just focusing on dyadic exchange models, the
network perspective highlights the effect of both direct and indirect relations between organizations. I
demonstrate that a terrorist group’s position affects its behavior. The network approach is enriched by
focusing on the structural embeddedness of a terrorist group, combining it with the attributes of a ter-
rorist group. I investigate the effect of organizational structure as one such attribute. The organizational
structure determines how efficiently exchanges can be handled within an organization. Thus, an organ-
izational structure that minimizes transaction costs, i.e., costs that relate to ‘frictions’ of transactions,
allows terrorist groups to allocate resources more efficiently. I theorize that organizational structure is
an intervening variable that moderates the effect of resource acquisition on a terrorist group’s activities.
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1.3 Empirical approach
Empirically, I expect a terrorist group’s performance to vary in relation with its ability to mobilize
resources externally (acquisition) and its ability to manage resources internally (allocation). I expect to
observe that terrorist groups design their organizational structure to match their contextual challenges
in their foundational year. I test this central argument by using different methodological approaches.
I present methodological solutions and operational approximations to measure clandestine behavior of
terrorist groups.
One inherent problem of research on terrorist groups and their behavior is their clandestine nature.
The need for secrecy surrounding terrorist groups and their activities yields challenges for researchers
in terms of availability and reliability of data. Information about the internal dynamics and inter-group
relations is difficult or nearly impossible to gather, presenting challenges of incomplete or inaccurate
data. To empirically test the theorized relationships, I present cross-sectional evidence, which is enriched
by multiple detailed case examples. The most reliable information about terrorist groups that can be
observed stems from their attacks. I assume that terrorist attacks are a valid indicator for the resources a
terrorist group has (as is explained in chapter 2).
I combine information from various cross-sectional databases allowing me to use evidence on a
global scale. I utilize the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and the RAND Database of Worldwide
Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI), which collect systematic information on terrorist attacks and their per-
petrators since 1970. They provide data on the terrorist groups involved in an attack and the weapons
they use to conduct the attack. To assess the context in which a terrorist group operates I use inform-
ation on the country level that can be collected on a global scale. Young and Dugan (2014) apply a
similar approach locating a terrorist group within a primary country. I use their data allowing me to
attribute characteristics of the country as covariates affecting a terrorist group’s behavior. Country-level
information is available in a number of databases or hand-coded where this information was not readily
available. Concerning organizational factors, I source information form event-data created by Gaibul-
loev and Sandler (2013). Since information is on the attack level, I aggregate the necessary information
to the group level, allowing me to translate observable information from attacks to attributes of the
perpetrator.
In order to study the exchange relationships between terrorist groups, I employ social network ana-
lysis. Analyzing cooperation between terrorist groups through a network perspective allows me to focus
on the social structure that a terrorist group is embedded in. I evaluate the behavior of a terrorist group by
analyzing structural dynamics that are the result of connections between terrorist groups. The network
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approach displays exchange relations between terrorist groups and other actors. It enables the empirical
assessment of the resource exchange between terrorist groups. As such, it is useful for understanding
the acquisition of resources from the environment. Especially in the case of terrorist groups, whose
activities are mostly clandestine and their internal structure opaque, a structural approach offers insights
based on a more credible depiction of reality than approaches that rely only on matching attributes to
behavior. Two of the most important variables are original data from hand coding. The involvement in
organized crime is coded for 183 and the organizational structure for 144 terrorist groups.
I test the empirical implications of my argument with deductive (chapters 4 and 6) and inductive
(chapter 5) research designs. In chapter 5, I assess a terrorist group’s involvement in organized crime
utilizing an inductive machine learning approach using a random forest classifier. With this approach, I
deviate from the deductive analyses of the other chapters. While this method does not allow me to un-
pack a causal relationship between predictors and outcome, it is a useful tool for testing and developing
theories. To explore the substantive relationships, I use cross-validation to estimate the out of sample
accuracy of the prediction model.
1.4 Plan of the dissertation
This dissertation studies terrorist groups’ acquisition and allocation of resources in seven chapters. The
remainder of chapter 1 discusses the theoretical and empirical contributions of this dissertation. Chapter
2 provides a strategic definition of terrorism and conceptualizes terrorist groups as economic entities. It
describes the market model of terrorism highlighting the importance of mobilizing resources to explain
the behavior of terrorist groups. It provides a synopsis of previous literature on this topic and concludes
with a discussion of previous conceptualizations of the organizational structure of terrorist groups.
Chapter 3 describes the economic market of terrorism by developing a comprehensive theory of re-
source acquisition and allocation. It links the performance of terrorist groups to their ability to extract
resources from their environment through cooperation and their ability to allocate those resources in-
ternally. It provides an original definition of resources and opens up the “black box” of a terrorist group
focusing on the effect of a terrorist group’s organizational structure.
Chapter 4 presents the first of three empirical applications. I analyze how the organizational structure
a terrorist group adopts is affected by the group’s environment. In line with the argument, the analysis
shows that the organizational design a terrorist group adopts depends both on the external conditions
and on factors internal to the group.
Chapter 5 explores the determinants of terrorist groups’ involvement in organized crime. Terrorist
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groups become involved in organized crime predominantly to increase their financial revenues, which
allows them to increase their tactical repertoire. Utilizing an inductive machine learning approach,
this chapter evaluates previously identified factors that drive terrorist groups’ involvement in organized
crime. The findings suggest that organizational factors out-perform environmental factors concerning
their importance for predicting out-of-sample cases of criminal activity.1
Chapter 6 investigates the relationship between resource acquisition and allocation on the operational
capability of terrorist groups. Conceptualizing acquisition as the social capital of terrorist groups and
allocation by their organizational structure, this study combines external and internal determinants of
terrorist groups’ capability. I identify a separate effect and also a moderation effect of organizational
structure on terrorist groups’ operational capability.
Chapter 7 summarizes the main findings. It concludes by highlighting the main contributions and
implications of this dissertation for understanding terrorist groups’ behavior resulting from a mixture of
internal and external factors. It discusses some opportunities for future research.
1.5 Central contributions
1.5.1 Theoretical and conceptual contributions
The market model of terrorism
In this dissertation, I focus on the economic activities of terrorist groups going beyond the attack as one
of their most commonly studied features. I focus on the economic market of terrorism, where short-term
considerations of securing the supply of resources are key. With their activities on the economic market,
terrorist groups alter their tactical repertoire enhancing what they can manage to do. The characteristics
of the supply market provide opportunities and constraints for a terrorist group’s behavior as they shape
the terrorist group’s ability to conduct operations, to acquire resources, and to evade counter-measures.
They shape the organizational structure of a terrorist group, as it needs to adapt its internal governance
to the external preconditions. They also shape the opportunities for terrorist groups to collaborate with
each other or to engage in organized crime. With this approach, I focus on the opportunities that terrorist
groups have to carry out violent activities. Considering that no terrorist group can carry out attacks if
it does not have the opportunitiy to do so, my work can inform counter-terrorism strategies to focus
not only on undermining the ideological narrative but also on limiting a terrorist group’s opportunities
regarding supply markets.
1This chapter is based on a paper that is co-authored by Clayton Besaw (One Earth Future Foundation, Broomfield, USA)
and is published in the Journal of Quantitative Criminology.
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The resource-based view of the terrorist group
In this dissertation, I develop a resource-based view of the terrorist group integrating management lit-
erature and terrorism research to customize concepts from the management literature to the context of
terrorism. I conceptualize terrorist groups as economic entities employing the rationale of a business.
By focusing on business activities, I highlight the importance of resources. I develop a theoretical model
of a) the resource generation process, and b) the effect of resources on the behavior of terrorist groups.
To that end, I conceptualize the mobilization of resources as a combination of external (acquisition)
and internal (allocation) processes. In order to identify mechanisms how resources are handled within
this two-step process, I make two distinct contributions. First, I provide an original classification of re-
sources based on their tradability. Second, I contribute to the organizational perspective (?)on terrorism
by opening up the “black box” that is the terrorist group. Considering how difficult it is to investigate
internal dynamics of clandestinely operating groups, approximating resource allocation through the or-
ganizational structure of terrorist groups is an important step towards extending our understanding of the
inner workings of those groups. This understanding can be transferred to the study of other clandestine
groups, such as rebel groups, militias, or criminal entities.
1.5.2 Empirical and methodological contributions
Integrating various datasets with original data
Quantifying the behavior of terrorist groups is a difficult undertaking. Reliable large-n information is
scarce and available mainly on the event level. A lot of terrorism research is actor- or event-driven, is
investigating a specific phenomenon (i.e., suicide terrorism or cyber-terrorism) or a specific region, and
is often employing case studies a research design. I adopt a quantitative large-n design on a global scale.
I integrate existing databases and aggregate event-level data with group-level data if necessary. Based on
an original operationalization and coding of four variables that are crucial to my analysis, I add unique
information to the existing data sources. First, I code the organizational structure of terrorist groups
as either centralized or decentralized based on three features (leadership, functional differentiation, and
centralized command and control). Second, I code a terrorist group’s involvement in organized crime
capturing whether a terrorist group is involved in the trafficking or production of drugs, the trafficking
of weapons or humans, whether they launder money, or a combination of those. Third, I operationalize
the cooperation between terrorist groups as their co-presence in an attack that I further develop as an
original measurement using social network analysis. Finally, I contribute to the debate about adequately
measuring the performance of terrorist groups, by approximating the operational capability of a terrorist
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group with the actual weapon used in an attack. Those variables are integrated into an original dataset
that can be utilized in future research.
Combining social network analysis with deductive null-hypothesis testing
The main hypothesis of this dissertation states that terrorist groups acquire resources from interacting
with their environment and allocate the resources internally more or less efficiently, depending on their
organizational structure. In order to test this relationship Social Network Analysis (SNA) is the most
suitable analytical method. Using SNA to study the behavior of terrorist groups is helpful, as it does
not take the individual terrorist group out of its context but conceptualizes the behavior as the result of a
terrorist group’s interactions with other actors. The position of a terrorist group within the entire network
of terrorist groups determines its access to resources influencing what it is able to do. SNA allows me
to combine patterns of interaction with individual attributes. As such, I integrate measures indicating
the network position from a preceding network analysis with covariates measuring group attributes or
environmental factors in a deductive regression model.
Inductive machine learning classification of involvement in organized crime
In chapter 5, I use an inductive machine learning approach to analyze terrorist groups’ involvement in
organized crime. I use a random forest classifier that uses an ensemble of individual decision trees to
produce out of sample predictions of whether a terrorist group has engaged in organized crime. I argue
that the random forest classifier outperforms the deductively driven logistic regression model due to its
ensemble method and the absence of strict functional form assumptions. Especially in the field of quant-
itative terrorism studies, where measures are victim to incomplete data and measurement bias favoring
openly accessible information, relying on regression models may violate model assumptions. To unlock
the “black box” of the random forest algorithm and to address matters of causal inference, I examine
three aspects of the random forest: a) k-fold cross validation explores the efficacy of individual predict-
ors, b) measuring the importance of variables indicates which variable affects the predictive accuracy
the most, and c) partial-dependence functions visualize the relationship between predictor and outcome.
This analytical approach provides rigorously tested preliminary evidence for further theory building and
future deductive hypothesis testing.
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Terrorism in the broader context
This chapter locates terrorism in the broader context of political violence and provides a definition of
terrorism as I use it in this dissertation. I consider terrorism to be a political strategy actors choose to
further their agenda. I start with a discussion of this strategic conceptualization before I elaborate its
implications on the tacticals of terrorists activities. I proceed to discuss the rationality of terrorism, which
I assume to be guiding terrorists behavior. Following a synopsis of the definitional debate, I present my
working definition of terrorism and introduce my conceptualization of terrorist groups as economic
entities. I introduce my original market model of terrorism. I use this model to highlight the importance
of focusing on the economic activities and the resources of terrorist groups to better understand the
terrorist threat. I argue that we need to focus on the external opportunities and constraints as well as
internal organizational dynamics of terrorist groups to understand why terrorist groups act the way they
do. I conclude this chapter with a discussion of previous work focusing on the organizational structure
of terrorist groups. Subsequent chapters build on the literature discussed here.
2.1 Terrorism as a political strategy
The concept of terrorism is contentious. Established scholarly conceptualizations of sub-state terrorism
tend to focus on two dimensions. First, terrorism is defined as a specific tactic that manifests itself as
the discriminate and indiscriminate use of violence against non-combatants (Crenshaw, N.d.; Hoffman,
2006; Jongman and Schmid, 1988; Kalyvas, 2004). Second, the use of violence by terrorist organ-
izations takes a political and social purpose while seeking to intimidate a larger audience beyond the
immediate victim(s) (Hoffman, 2006; Laqueur and Alexander, 1978; Sandler and Enders, 2007). Ter-
rorism is coercive, as it makes others act or refrain to act in a way they would not do otherwise (Asal
and Rethemeyer, 2008). Terrorism is a strategy that helps terrorists to achieve their political goals (Kydd
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and Walter, 2006). A strategy is a plan on how to best achieve a political objective, whereas a tactic is
the means through which this objective is to be achieved. A goal could be regime change, the strategy
used to pursue this goal may be to provoke the enemy government into an overreaction, and the tactic
considered most effective might be the use of suicide attacks on civilian targets.
The debate surrounding the definition of terrorism highlights the need of locating terrorism within
the spectrum of political violence. Studying the overlap between civil war and terrorist tactics, terrorism
is conceptualized as a tactical tool (Page, 2015; Stanton, 2013). The dominant strand of literature does
not view terrorism as distinct but rather as one tactic among many employed within a violent conflict
(e.g., Asal, Ackerman and Rethemeyer, 2012; Ganor, 2002; Goodwin, 2004, 2006; Moghadam, Berger
and Beliakova, 2014; de la Calle and Sa´nchez-Cuenca, 2015; Tilly, 2004). This approach includes the
entire range of contentious activities that have different costs and benefits attached to them. Therefore,
all violent activities may potentially be employed by all kinds of actors as a means to communicate
their objectives to the opponent. In the tactical sense, terror is used in the context of a wider campaign,
most likely as one alternative of contentious behavior among many (Goodwin, 2004). Actors choose it
because they deem the benefits to outweigh the costs rendering terrorism as the relatively more attractive
option to choose from the repertoire of contentious behavior (Abrahms, 2008; Tilly, 1995). Additionally,
a clear distinction between the types of political violence is often difficult due to amorphous properties of
actors and that different types of political violence are nested together. Their goals and strategies could
be fairly similar. For example, both terrorists and insurgents are non-state actors that may seek to coerce
the opposing government to make territorial changes or governmental reforms. According to Freedman
(2007, p. 325) the objective of insurgency is “to undermine the morale of the state’s forces, through
constant harassment and ambush, so that their capability deteriorates as support for the insurgency grows
to the point where it is possible to mount a direct challenge and defeat them in battle.”
The distinction between terrorism and insurgency is that the former use an indirect targeting strategy,
while the latter use direct confrontation to fight for their objective. Terrorists and insurgents operate
covertly and use hit-and-run tactics to minimize the costs of the fight, for it is more difficult for the
opponent to detect them (O’Neill, 2005, p. 35). Conventional armies may not be apt to engage terrorists
or insurgents with the same means, weakening their position in the conflict (Arreguı´n-Toft, 2001). While
insurgents attack members of the state and armed forces seeking direct confrontation, terrorists attack
civilian targets indiscriminately (Crenshaw, N.d.; Lane, 2010). The identity of the victim is negligible
as long as it is part of the enemy audience. The victim is usually just one representative of the wider
target audience. Terrorists attack the population based on the calculus of exerting an indirect effect on
the governments of those societies.
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This tactic of attacking civilians is rooted in two reasons. First, it stems from a position of relative
weakness as the terrorists lack the military capacities to directly engage with the government forces.
Second, targeting civilians or non-combatants is a strategic choice, since civilians are assumed to have
a lower tolerance for violence (Freedman, 2007, p. 325). Civilians demand a secure environment. They
put pressure on the government to provide security. In cases of terrorist attacks, the fear to be victimized
can be utilized by terrorist groups.
In sum, the purpose of terrorism is twofold. It aims at coercing the enemy government into conces-
sions. It does so by increasing the pressure on the government by targeting the civilian population. To
increase this effect terrorists are relying on relatively sophisticated methods of communication. Jenkins
(1975, p. 15) claims that “terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead.” This still
holds considering the energy that the so-called Islamic State (IS) puts into marketing streaming videos
of their operations online. Terrorists need the media attention to increase their impact. It is widely re-
cognized that terrorism is not just about the act of violence itself but just as much about the threat of
violence hovering over a society. Terrorism is deliberately aiming to have far-reaching psychological
repercussions beyond the actual target. In that sense, terrorism is like theater (Combs, 2016).1
Terrorists need to attract attention to their grievances to “stir up the masses, force the people out
of their age old sleep, [and] show them clearly that there exists a force which is fighting against their
enemies and protecting their interests” (Nikolai Bukh, quoted in Hardy, 1987, p. 212). The intent is to
motivate supporters to fight and convince them that the cause is just, while at the same time provoking
and demoralizing the opponent. It captures the belief that a well-placed bomb is effective in stirring
up a revolutionary sensation and a willingness to break the status quo within the population (Freedman,
2007, p. 316).
This discussion highlights the conception of terrorism as a tactic that is employed strategically to
further political or militaristic goal. Terrorism as a strategically used tactic is defined by the relationship
with the opponent (Kydd and Walter, 2006; Neumann and Smith, 2005; Abrahms, 2006; DeNardo,
1985; Pape, 2003; Crenshaw, 1988, 1990). A terrorist group calculates the expected reaction of its
opponent to its activities. Given its expectation a terrorist group uses a specific tactic that is assumed
to render the greatest benefit. They need to tailor their activities towards a stronger opponent intended
for coercion. Their activities are meant to change the opponent‘s attitudes and behavior. Without this
intention of affecting the target‘s behavior, the activities are not strategic (Freedman, 2007, p. 320).
Usually, a terrorist group needs to rely on few resources to accomplish their goals (Arreguı´n-Toft, 2001;
1As the director Alfred Hitchcock points out, “there is no terror in the bang, only in the anticipation of it.” Actors using
terrorism have certainly adapted this cinematographic element.
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Crenshaw, N.d.; Freedman, 2007).
2.2 Rationality of terrorism
The strategic framework implicitly assumes that terrorists behave rationally, both individually and col-
lectively. The assumption of rationality is crucial. If terrorists behave consistent with a rational calculus,
the knowledge of their beliefs and preferences can help to understand, analyze, and ultimately better
predict their behavior. This can inform counterterrorism activities to be more effective. While popular
perception might point to the perspective of terrorists being “a bunch of crazy dudes that like to blow
stuff up” (Forest, 2012, p. 1), this perception does not seem to hold under closer inspection. Terrorist
attacks are premeditated and follow careful planning. When making decisions grounded in rational reas-
oning, terrorists consider the perceived benefits, evaluate the acceptability of risks and of expending the
necessary resources required for a successful operation, and consider their available information about
their options (Berrebi, 2009). Rationality of actors is an assumption often made by researchers to better
understand and classify the behavior of actors. Rationality can be determined by objective and subjective
factors, allowing researchers to limit the notion of strict rationality under specific circumstances. While
the concept of rationality can remain an academic assumption, empirical patterns can lend support to
terrorists and terrorist groups to act rationally, lending it credibility and empirical usefulness.
Every conceptualization of terrorists as rational utility maximizers needs to allow room for misper-
ception and miscalculation (Simon, 1982). Simon (1982) defines the concept of bounded rationality,
which opens up possibilities to evaluate strategic calculations in light of situational and human con-
straints. Misperceptions and wrongly defined preferences can result in miscalculations. Terrorist groups
may lack the ability to gather sufficient information or their leaders may be cognitively biased by precon-
ceptions or predefined stereotypes. Physical exhaustion in battle situations, emotions, or short decision
times may also lead to miscalculation (Crenshaw, 1990, p. 13-15). These circumstances can help to
explain terror attacks, which are not beneficial to the overall objective of the group.
Every terrorist group needs to cater to a specific audience and have a clear goal, which they com-
municate to their audience. The type of the attack and the target of the attack must not have counter-
productive effects that may undermine potential support and legitimacy. For example, al-Qaeda (AQ)
debated over the reach of their violent Jihad and whether they should focus on the ‘far enemy’ or the
‘near enemy’ (Sageman, 2004). While many of their constituency supported their fight against the West
in general and the U.S. and Israel, in particular, they did not support attacks on other Muslims in their
countries and the fight against the near enemy. Thus, AQ had to consider the consequences of their
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attacks for them to sustain their supporting constituencies.
Besides Herbert Simon (1982), several scholars developed theories on how to explain seemingly
irrational rationality. Caplan (2000, 2006) contents that the notion of strict individual self-interest is
too narrow and that useful rational models need to reconcile individual selfishness and collective group
preferences and expectations. Other theories account for the importance of individual values (Weber,
1978), or pride and recognition instead of strict self-interest (Vershney, 2003), or cases when collective
objectives trump individual interests (Schelling, 1966).
In general, there are three levels of rationality (Caplan, 2006, p. 93). In the weakest sense, activities
are considered to be rational as long as they are used to achieve predetermined goals. In the stronger
manifestation of rationality actors choose actions based on stable utility functions and while consider-
ing the constraints facing them. Rational actors are assumed to maximize their utility in light of the
constraints they face. Conceptually, utility functions summarize the factors that affect an actor‘s over-
all well-being. Those factors can include intangible psychological or social rewards that need to be
understood to explain terrorism with a rational lens. In the strongest sense, actors always respond to
incentives and behave according to rational expectations, that is, they are capable of clearly defining
their preferences in a strict rank ordering. They need to have sufficient and correct information to do so.
Ample empirical evidence suggests that terrorists behave rationally both on the operational level and
on the strategic level (Berrebi and Lakdawalla, 2007; Montalvo, 2011; Pape, 2005; Gambetta, 2005).
This highlights the empirical relevance to apply the rational framework to analyzing terrorists behavior.
If the notion of rationality were an academic assumption alone, we would not observe patterns of cost-
benefit calculation and ordered preferences.
Operationally, both the timing and the target are not randomly chosen (Berrebi and Lakdawalla,
2007). The identity of the individual victim is not very important as a target is chosen for its sym-
bolic gesture. The individual is victimized as a member of a specific target audience in general. The
target is chosen after considering its value combining attractiveness, feasibility, accessibility, and cost
(Benmelech and Berrebi, 2007). The timing of attacks also follows rational reasoning. Attacks can oc-
cur before elections affecting the political discourse in a country (Montalvo, 2011) or in certain intervals
to increase the threat level and fear within a society.
On a tactical note, several scholars have discussed the rationality of suicide attacks (Gambetta, 2005;
Pape, 2005). Accounting for success rate, target value, and attention, suicide attacks are the rational
tactical choice. Suicide bombers are the ultimate smart bomb. They can penetrate security parameters
with relative ease, can detonate only when the target is present, create extensive media attention, and
bestow authenticity upon the perpetrators (Gambetta, 2005, p. 264).
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There are many statements that underline the objective of reaching one’s goals by using violence.
Terrorist attacks, for example, are intended to increase the economic hardship of the enemy, making it
harder to sustain counter-initiatives or offer prosperity. In the video AQ released in 2004, Osama bin
Laden refers to their fight in Afghanistan and their plans, saying that, “We, alongside the mujahideen,
bled Russia for 10 years, until it went bankrupt and was forced to withdraw in defeat. (...) So we are
continuing this policy in bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy” (Whitaker, 2004). That strategic
thinking, linking means to an end, are not empty statements by ideological leaders becomes evident
in empirical patterns and trends. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) show that the attacks by Euskadi Ta
Askatasuna (ETA) had a significant impact on the economy in the Basque country.
In sum. terrorists and terrorist groups should be assumed to act rationally. They are rational in the
sense of their actions being consistent with their goals. Their utility might not be restricted to self-
interest but transcend the individual in favor of group benefits. Terrorists’ rationality might also account
for future payouts. The utility concept applied here includes more than selfish material self-interest and
immediate payouts (Mill, 1879). Given the preferences and surrounding state of the world, terrorists act
in reasonable ways (Berrebi, 2009).
Accounting for a rational calculus of terrorists and terrorist groups allows for a better understanding
and categorization of terrorist groups’ behavior. Especially when analyzing the economic activities of
terrorist groups, a rational conception is useful. Business transactions are rarely emotional and random,
but serve a strategic purpose of increasing ones capabilities to ultimately put pressure on the opponent
and communicating to the respective constituencies. The resource acquisition and allocation of terror-
ist groups is based on their opportunities and preferences making the rational framework applicable.
The resource generation of terrorist groups needs to be considered in light of its benefits and costs for
achieving their goal.
2.3 Terrorism – a definitional debate
This section addresses the question of what terrorism is and how it should be defined. What do we
mean when we talk about terrorism? And what makes an organization a terrorist group as opposed
to another violent group? The definition of terrorism and consequently that of a terrorist group is a
contentious issue among researchers as well as practitioners. Prone to many challenges and points of
perspectives no clear-cut definition is available. I build on this discussion to provide a working definition
for terrorism and terrorist groups that forms the basis of the theoretical argument and empirical tests in
this dissertation.
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One problem of defining terrorism is that there are many definitions that sometimes complement
or compete with each other. In research and in practice acts of violence are increasingly labeled as
terrorism. The blurred usage of the term terrorism is leading to conceptual confusion and ambiguity,
ultimately affecting appropriate behavior in the face of terrorism and effective response. International
counter-terrorism coordination is severely hampered by the fact that different countries adopt different
and divergent definitions of terrorism and persons committing terrorist activities. This highlights the
need to decide on a specific definition that allows the results and conclusions drawn from the analysis to
be compared with other studies. What some states may call terrorism another country may call a fight
for freedom and against oppression. Yasir Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO), highlights this conundrum in his address to the UN General Assembly in 1974 when he states
“the difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the reason for which each fights. For
whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation of his land from invaders,
settlers and the colonists, cannot possibly be called a terrorist” (Hoffman, 2006, p. 26). Considering that
the evaluation of what might constitute a just cause is bound by subjective opinion, it is not surprising
that there is no internationally recognized definition of terrorism.
This is not only an international problem. Even within one state, different government institutions
use different definitions. Within the U.S. government, for example, there are different definitions. The
U.S. State Department defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated
against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence
and audience” (quoted in Whittaker, 2003, p. 9). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) uses a
different definition, where terrorism is the use of serious violence against persons or property, or the
threat to use such violence, to intimidate or coerce a government, the public, or any section of the public
in order to promote political, social or ideological objectives (Gearson, 2002, p. 9). These definitions
include criteria such as motivation and nature of the perpetrators, target selection and coercive strategy.
Brian Jenkins (1980, p. 1) writes, “What is called terrorism (...) seems to depend on one’s point
of view.” The term terrorism is very much an instrument of political debate itself. It implies a moral
judgment as much as it increases ones own legitimacy. Empirical analysis, however, requires a tangible
and objective definition for unbiased results. The following section elaborates the academic debate
surrounding terrorism and results in a working definition of terrorism that is objective, tangible, and
empirically useful.
Jongman and Schmid (1988) have collected over 100 definitions of terrorism that are most often
used in research, highlighting the elusiveness of the concept. Scholars discuss the degree to which
groups use terrorism, the possession of territory, the nature of their victims, as well as their motivation
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(Asal, Ackerman and Rethemeyer, 2012; Sanchez-Cuenca and Aguilar, 2009). Terrorists distinguish
between the actual target of their violence and the wider audience they want to communicate with. By
attacking civilians, terrorists spread fear trying to indirectly gain their political goals. Terrorist attacks
need to be distinguished from acts of communal violence such as riots (de la Calle, 2007; Wilkinson,
2004). While riots are spontaneous acts of contention, terrorism is a long-term organized challenge
against the state (Sanchez-Cuenca and Aguilar, 2009). This definition also sets terrorism apart from
civil war, where the main actors are guerillas fighting to achieve their goals by engaging their opponent
directly. In terrorism the perpetrators attack civilians indirectly pressuring the government (Sambanis,
2004).
A definition is only as good as it is empirically useful. Empirical research requires definitional
clarity since its results and conclusions need to be interpreted and compared to other studies. Only
then can a study provide new insight. Otherwise the results add to an already hardly comprehensive
field of research, or are even repetitive. Including too many elements into the definition leads to too
many moving parts making it difficult to empirically pin down a terrorist act (Young and Dugan, 2014).
Young and Dugan (2014, p. 6) argue that maximalist definitions confuse how the definitions relate to
other concepts. They illustrate that definitions including, for example, the innocence of victims should
exclude any attacks on military targets thus excluding attacks like the one on the USS Cole in 2000 or
the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon 1983 (Young and Dugan, 2014, p. 6). Other scholars
label attacks against the military personnel, which is not actively engaged in combat operations at the
time, terrorism. While it is necessary to exclude definitional elements that lead to empirical confusion,
a minimalist definition is also problematic since it fails to sufficiently distinguish between dissimilar
events (Goertz, 2006; Munck and Verkuilen, 2002).
This debate highlights several aspects. One aspect deals with the definition of actor attributes versus
the definition focusing on the action itself. Several scholars claim that considering terrorism as a strategy
and tactical choice provides more insight than focusing on organizational attributes (Tilly, 2004). Given
that several terrorist organizations morphed into political parties or social movements or the other way
around, a distinction based on actor attributes may not provide enough clarity needed for empirical
analysis (Crenshaw and Robinson, 2010).2 Further, it highlights that terrorism is a doctrine gaining
its political effectiveness through the propaganda by the deed aimed at generating fear and coercive
violence, as well as a tactic targeting indiscriminately both to complement other types of violence but
also to set it apart from those.
2Examples for such organizations are African National Congress (ANC), Irgun, or Hamas that adopted (or partly adopted)
a strategy of peaceful political participation.
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2.3.1 A working definition of terrorism
The definition of terrorism and terrorist groups that I use throughout this dissertation needs to build on
this debate. It requires clear characteristics to develop a theoretical framework and to allow rigorous em-
pirical testing. To be able to explore mechanisms of resource acquisition and allocation, the definition of
terrorism and terrorist groups needs to be grounded in the strategic rationale of actors who use terrorism.
Therefore, this chapter concludes the synopsis of the contentious debate around definitional issues of
terrorism with a working definition of terrorism and terrorist groups. It leads to conceptual constraints,
which I make in this dissertation in order to restrict the sample of actors to which this analysis primarily
applies.
In this dissertation terrorism is defined by the nature of the act rather than by the nature of the
perpetrator. I define terrorism as the deliberate use or threat of violence for political purposes against
non-combatants to spread fear among the target population. Terrorist groups use attacks to mobilize
support for their cause among the sympathetic part of the population.
The use of terrorist activities is a political strategy. Whether the political inspiration is nationalistic,
ethnic, religious, separatist, leftist, or rightist, the actors seek to change the political order in a more or
less fundamental way (Goodwin, 2006, p. 2030). It is set apart from activities that pursue economic
gains. Criminal organizations, for example, are not considered a terrorist organization, as their objective
is not a political one, but to maximize their revenue (Makarenko, 2004a). Many terrorist organizations
are involved in criminal enterprises as a means for revenue generation. This is merely a means to sustain
themselves and their political campaign, but not the end in itself.3 The Italian mafia, for example, are
not considered terrorist actors. While they have large political influence and use violence to further their
goals, their aim is not to overthrow the political, economic, or social order. A political strategy can in-
clude, for example, the fight for a socialist revolution, a separate geographical territory, the abandonment
of immigration, or the introduction of Sharia law.
While terrorism is always inherently political it is also about power. Terrorists act very much Clause-
witzian as they regard terrorism to be the continuation of politics by other means.4 Terrorists pursue
power to put pressure on the enemy government, change power relations and over time improve their
bargaining position to coerce the government into concessions.5 They deliberately use violence to affect
the decisions and actions of their opponent. Their use of violence is a signal of their commitment and
3This mechanism is explored more detailed in chapter 5.
4Carl von Clausewitz famously proclaimed war to be the continuation of politics by other means (Clausewitz, Howard and
Paret, 1976)
5 Kydd and Walter (2006) identify five political objectives: regime type, territorial control, policy change, social control,
and status quo maintenance.
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ability to increase the costs imposed on the enemy population.
Terrorism also has a psychological effect. Terrorists are the weaker actor in asymmetric power rela-
tions with the opponent government. Therefore, terrorists consciously employ the use or threat of viol-
ence against civilians provoking fear among the population. By threatening civilian lives and security,
terrorists aim to put pressure on the government. They strategically provoke their enemy into overreact-
ing and making mistakes that result in increasing support for the terrorist’s cause (Fromkin, 1975; Kydd
and Walter, 2006). Kydd and Walter (2006) illustrate provocation with the example of ETA. ETA was
faced with extreme countermeasures ultimately evoking more sympathy among the population.
Their actions are also meant to mobilize their own constituency to support their cause and organiz-
ation (Kydd and Walter, 2006). Their activities reflect not only the need to pressure their opponent but
also the need to communicate with their supporters. IS, for example, is inspiring individuals and small
cells of individuals all over the world to conduct attacks that are relatively easy to manufacture (Zoli,
2017). IS benefits in two ways by using tactics that are relatively easy to emulate. First, it manages to
spread fear among its enemy population provoking societies and governments into actions they would
probably refrain from otherwise. Second, it motivates sympathizers and followers to conduct similar
attacks in the name of IS. My working definition of terrorism focuses on the violent activity rather than
on the actor, on the political strategy to pursue power and to pressure the opponent using means of asym-
metric confrontation with the terrorist group being the weaker actor. This definition provides clear-cut
indicators for developing my theoretical framework but also for selecting the empirical cases on which
I test my theoretical implications.
I restrict the application of this definition to non-state actors using terrorism. I exclude state actors
to omit large-scale oppression of society or parts thereof using methods that instill fear and anxiety
within a population (Hoffman, 2006, p. 15). Faced with the uncertainty of their security and freedom the
population is literally ‘terrorized’ by the state. As the modus operandi is very different, combining both
state and non-state terrorism in one empirical analysis might very well lead to biased and misleading
results, since conceptual and empirical ambiguity conflates distinct phenomena.
Oftentimes, authors do not provide a systematic definition of a terrorist group but rather assume it
implicitly to be clear to the reader. The analytical purpose of this dissertation requires a definition of a
terrorist group that considers the organizational intricacies. This perspective is not a new one. Martha
Crenshaw (N.d.) advocated the organizational perspective on terrorism and terrorist group decision-
making. She argues that the decision to use terrorism instead of some other tactic can be attributed to
internal dynamics of the organization (Crenshaw, N.d.). This dissertation contends that internal dynam-
ics are important for explaining the degree of violence used by a specific group. To that end, I see the
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terrorist group as an economic entity focusing on the organizational dynamics of the terrorist group as it
engages in activities to generate revenue and enhance their performance. By doing that, I aim to better
understand terrorist behavior accounting for such organizational differences. In the following I discuss
the economic conceptualization of terrorist groups. This serves as a foundation to develop my original
market model of terrorism, where the differences in economic activities introduce variation between
terrorist groups’ activities and the threat they ultimately pose.
2.3.2 Terrorist groups as economic entities
I conceptualize terrorist groups as economic entities. This approach aims at opening up the “black box”
that is a terrorist group, contributing to the understanding of how organizational and operational de-
cisions are constrained by features of the organization and its economic activities of generating revenue
by engaging with their environment. Underlying my general argument is the assumption that what a ter-
rorist group does on the economic market affects their political outcomes. In that respect a terrorist group
is an illicit economic enterprise. Much like any kind of firm, it is concerned with delivering a good, for
which it needs the resources to produce it and the means to promote it. In less abstract terms, terrorist
groups want to conduct attacks to further their political objective. They need to promote their attacks to
their audience, which consists of their enemy population but also their supporting constituency. To be
able to deliver these attacks, terrorist groups need to generate resources to have the money, material, or
people needed for their operations. Assuming that an attack is the sum of a terrorist groups motivation
and ability, this conceptualization focuses on the activities affecting a terrorist group’s ability to carry
out an attack. The relevance of an economic approach to terrorism is clear. Christina Liang (2015) por-
trays the Islamic State as a modern business enterprise, whose strength lies in the fact that it possesses
its own means of income generation and financing. Focusing on the resources and economic activities of
terrorist groups offers a tangible approach to explaining differences in group behavior. Given the covert
intricacies of terrorist organizations, identifying motivational nuances is significantly more challenging
and prone to error.
My premise is that terrorist groups act similar to business enterprises (Horowitz, 2010; Jackson,
2001; Zelinsky and Shubik, 2009; Shelley, 2014). The conceptualization of terrorist groups as an eco-
nomic entity not unlike a regular firm allows researchers to tap into a broad literature investigating firms’
market interactions (Lavie, 2006; Stuart, 2000) or management decisions. Assuming that terrorist groups
are subject to similar opportunities and constraints, when it comes to their resourcing activities as legal
firms or illegal criminal actors, enables a wider perspective whilst zooming into the “black box” that is
a terrorist group.
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Horowitz (2010, p. 39) examines the diffusion of suicide tactics between terrorist groups, comparing
terrorist groups to businesses that have a set of expertise and products to offer. Their product range
includes attacks of various types, ranging from armed assaults, hijackings, or crashing a car into a crowd
of people. By comparing terrorist groups to businesses, Horowitz can tap into the literature of product
innovation (Henderson, 1993; Rogers, 1995) and diffusion models (Lee and Strang, 2006; Simmons,
Dobbin and Garrett, 2006). He makes a considerable contribution to the better understanding of why
terrorist groups adopt specific tactics. Adams (1986) analyzes how a terrorist group’s financing strategy
affects how long a terrorist group survives. He finds that those groups that managed to morph into
an entity that resembles multinational corporations are the most persistent over time. He was the first
to conceptualize terrorist groups as a business model. His research shows that terrorist groups that
mange to utilize the international monetary system and develop mechanisms inside their organization to
access the globalizing market live the longest.6 Both Horowitz and Adams focus on the consequences
of economic activities of a terrorist group. They highlight the importance of analyzing the behavior of
terrorist activities using an economic perspective.
Only few researchers conceptualize terrorist groups as a business enterprise. Louise Shelley (2014,
p. 175) focuses on the business strategy of terrorist groups analyzing “their approach to product mix,
professional services, cost-benefit analyses, tax strategies, supply chains, market dominance, strategic
alliances, competitive advantage, targets of opportunity, and innovation and the use of technology.”
She finds that terrorist groups engage in various means of revenue generation motivated by the same
logic that drives firms to enlarge their range of services and products. She studies terrorist groups that
engage in criminal activities as a way to increase their funds. She notes that “obtaining, maintaining,
and expanding access to funding [...] are some of the core concerns for terrorist groups. Just like any
business, without the capital needed to operate, terrorist groups cannot continue to maintain and train
personnel, obtain weapons, and launch attacks” (Shelley, 2014, p. 178). Without the necessary resources,
a terrorist group cannot conduct the attacks it likes to do. Shelley’s work identifies the business side of
terrorism.
Zelinsky and Shubik (2009) capture the business models of terrorist groups and classify them as
hierarchies, franchises, brand strategists, or venture capitals. They derive those different types by focus-
ing on operational characteristics of the terrorist group and on the mode of its resource generation. They
differentiate terrorist groups based on their degree of centralization on both dimensions. Zelinsky and
Shubik Zelinsky and Shubik (2009) highlight the relationship between the organizational design and the
6The groups that survived the longest in his analysis are the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO).
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resourcing requirements. Terrorist groups have different degrees of control over resources depending on
their organizational structure. This point is developed in chapter 3 of this dissertation. Here it is im-
portant to note the theoretical and empirical advantages to systematically conceptualize terrorist groups
based on their economic activities.
According to Zelinsky and Shubik (2009) a terrorist group falls in a respective class depending on
how it structures its decision-making process and supply of resources. Depending on how the degree
of centralization varies on both dimensions, terrorist groups are either hierarchies, franchises, brand
strategists, or venture capitals. Hierarchies are centralized in their decision-making process and their
resource generation (Zelinsky and Shubik, 2009, p. 3). Hierarchies have one central entity that decides
which operations to plan and carry out and the same entity organizes the supply of the necessary re-
sources. This has advantages and disadvantages. Zelinsky and Shubik (2009, p. 3) state that because
of this dual centralization hierarchies can undertake long-term projects but also require a high level of
bureaucracy to ensure decision-making, since all information and skills are concentrated at the top and
need to be communicated through the ranks. They provide several examples: Hezbollah and PIRA both
have centralized control over resources and operations.
Venture Capital terrorist groups have decentralized operations but centralized resources. While these
groups are financed by a central source they have little control over operations, isolating individual cells
of the group. Information and knowledge is distributed and difficult to retain in the overall organization.
Zelinsky and Shubik (2009, p. 4) define AQ in the mid-1990s as such a Venture Capital group being
financed by the core organization but with the cells being left at their own discretion concerning their
operations.
Franchises combine centralized operations with decentralized resources. While franchises are good
at disseminating strategic blueprints, the individual cells are left to finance themselves and allocate the
resources needed for an attack. Zelinsky and Shubik (2009) do not provide any examples for this type
of terrorist group, but some IS related attacks in Europe can be linked to such a Franchise setup. People
affiliated with IS coached the attack in Wurzburg by a man attacking people in a regional train in July
2016. However, the attacker was responsible to allocate the resources he needed for the attack. While he
was recommended to use a car for an attack similar to the one in Nice just a few days earlier, he opted
for an ax and knife because he did not have a drivers license (Garbe and Kaempf, 2016).
Brand type terrorist groups have both decentralized operations and decentralized resources. Those
groups rely on ideological self-identification, have no central authority defining a common strategy,
they have no institutionalized communication between cells, and every cell is left to allocate their own
resources. Zelinsky and Shubik (2009, p. 4) provide the example of the Earth Liberation Front (ELF).
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However, it is difficult to talk of an organization when it comes to a brand, since the attacks are merely
inspired by the brand that is the ELF. There is no coordination and no coaching. These attacks can also
be observed in relation to IS where people who are about to commit a shooting assume allegiance with
IS to gain more impact. Oftentimes, this connection consists only of ideological sympathy instead of
some tangible connections to members of the group.
This section has discussed relevant issues of defining terrorism and terrorist groups. Many studies
only implicitly define terrorist groups as actors that use terrorism. The conceptualization of terrorist
groups as economic entities enables a focus on their economic activities that allow them to sustain them-
selves. It allows focusing on the business rationale of terrorist groups. They can capitalize on political
opportunities and economic opportunities. I build on the conceptualizations by Adams (1986), Zelin-
sky and Shubik (2009), and Shelley (2014), who all devised typologies of terrorist groups as business
entities. I extend their research as I focus on how terrorist groups manage to maximize their strategic ad-
vantage given a specific environment. I capture the behavior of terrorist groups as a function of available
resources.7 In the following section I discuss the literature relating the behavior of terrorist groups to
their resource endowments. I develop my market model of terrorism distinguishing the political and the
economic market of terrorism, arguing that the first relates to a terrorist group’s willingness to engage in
violence, while the second relates to its ability to do so.
2.4 A market model of terrorism
Terrorist groups conduct attacks on civilians in order to promote their political goals. Each attack is the
consequence of a terrorist group’s willingnesss and ability to carry out an attack.8 The threat, which a
terrorist group poses, therefore, depends on both its motivation and its capability to stage an attack. Both
dimensions also affect the intensity of an attack (Cragin and Daly, 2004). Hoffman (1998, p. 157) states
that the way terrorist attacks are executed reflects the aims and the motivation of the terrorist group, fits
its resources and capabilities and considers the audience(s) the attack should communicate a message
to. Figure 2.1 illustrates the logic of my market model of terrorism.
I claim that the motivation and capability of terrorist groups can be explained by borrowing from
7This dynamic is also discussed regarding the behavior of other actors (McCarthy and Zald, 1977).
8Individual terrorists can also carry out attacks. The extent to which there is a lone attacker that is truly independent from
any organization is contentiously discussed in the literature (Gill, 2015). While individuals can carry out attacks, most attackers
have been in contact with members of an acknowledged terrorist group or are inspired by terrorist groups’ calls to conduct
attacks (i.e., Garbe and Kaempf, 2016; BBC, 2016; Spiegel, 2016). Still, it is true that individuals can conduct terrorist attacks
completely on their own. The general logic also holds for those people. The threat they pose depends on their willingness and
their ability to carry out an attack. In this dissertation the focus rests on intra- and inter-organizational dynamics of terrorist
groups and their consequences. Therefore, I focus my attention on the terrorist group instead on individuals.
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Figure 2.1: A market model of terrorism
theories of trade and market economics. Using these approaches accounts for the fact that terrorist
groups do not exist in a vacuum, but constantly interact with their environment.
Terrorist groups have two audiences with whom they openly engage via their actions. Each terrorist
group communicates with its target population and with its support population. While it fights the first
one, it tries to evoke sympathies and support from the second one.
For their interaction with their audiences, terrorist groups are motivated by various causes (Forest,
2012; Valentino, 2014; Piazza, 2011; Crenshaw, N.d.). Forest (2012) defines such causes to be mobilized
by so-called preconditions and triggers. Those preconditions and triggers provide a context in which
terrorism is more likely. Terrorists use them to justify their need to use violence in order to pursue their
respective goals. Preconditions capture the ‘things that are’ (Forest, 2012, p. 61). These can be certain
grievances, i.e., the perception that something is wrong, or they include so-called facilitators that can
provide individuals or organizations with opportunities to engage in terrorist activities (Forest, 2012).
While grievances can capture things like inequality or discrimination within a society, a space safe from
persecution or the access to weapons can facilitate terrorist groups use of violence. Triggers on the
other hand are ‘things that happen’ (Forest, 2012, p. 61). They are specific actions, policies, or events
that enhance the perceived need for action within a particular environment. Those can be, for example,
the erosion in the security environment, a sudden regime change, or a coup. Propagandists of terrorist
groups seize upon those events to enhance the resonance of their ideology. It is important to note that
preconditions and triggers can affect each other. As such, grievances and facilitators that are already
present can fortify the effect of the propaganda.
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While Forest (2012) discusses the abilities and opportunities of terrorist groups to engage in violent
acts, he provides no intuition on how terrorist groups can systematically vary depending on their ability
to capitalize on those different preconditions. His discussion remains on factors that motivate individuals
and organizations to engage in terrorism. I build on his research and focus not on the willingness to fight
but on the ability to do so and, thus, is captured by the motivational pillar of my market model.
While much research focuses on this motivational aspect and the political market of terrorism, ter-
rorist groups also need to mobilize the resources needed to carry out attacks and to pose a significant
threat to their opponent. I maintain that terrorist groups need to act on what I call the economic market
of terrorism (captured in the economic pillar of my market model). Here they interact with other actors
in their environment to exchange resources and trade surplus. Terrorist groups can access resources,
which are possessed by other actors. They can access technologies and know-how, which affect their
capability to conduct attacks and survive as an organization. The economic market requires maintaining
its clandestine features for a terrorist group’s operations not to be disrupted and its performance main-
tained. The political market, however, thrives off the publicity of terrorism and terrorist groups.9 While
the political market influences what a terrorist group wants to do, the economic market affects what a
terrorist group can manage to do. This dissertation focuses on the economic market of terrorist.
The success on the political market depends on a terrorist group’s success on the economic market.
Only when a terrorist group performs well in both markets it poses a viable threat. With their activities
on the economic market, terrorist groups can alter their tactical repertoire as a function of accessible
resources. Their economic activities influence what they can manage to do, thus, interlinking both
markets. Terrorist groups wish to shape the political, social, and economic (Hoffman, 2006) lives of
their target population. To achieve changes on the political market, terrorist groups need to be viable
actors on the economic market.
Assuming there are terrorist groups that want to carry out attacks, their ability to do so hinges upon
their ability to mobilize resources. The process of generating resources depends on external exchange
relationships and on internal organizational dynamics. The theoretical and empirical approach of this
dissertation combines both dimensions.
This dissertation focuses on the exploration of a terrorist group’s capability to conduct an attack. I
proceed to describe the intricacies of economic exchange relations of terrorist groups. The characteristics
9This is in contrast to organized crime. While terrorism and organized crime both rely on hidden economic transactions
between and within organizations, criminal actors do not publicize their activities to mobilize support and boost the level of
fear within society. Their violence is immediate, intended for the victim, and not intended to raise awareness to a specific cause.
This is not to say that targeted killings by criminal actors do not foster the fear in their direct opponents. In fact, criminals use
violence strategically to keep their members in line (Gambetta, 2000). However, this fear effect is restricted to members or
benefactors of the crime.
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of the economic market provide opportunities and constraints for a terrorist group’s behavior as they
shapes its ability to access and use resources. They influence the organizational structure of a terrorist
group as it needs to adapt its internal governance to the environmental preconditions and they determine
the opportunities for terrorist groups to collaborate with each other and become involved in organized
crime.
2.4.1 The economic market of terrorism: The behavior of terrorist groups as a function
of resources
This section discusses previous research that explores the threat posed by terrorist groups as a function
of their resources. Terrorist groups need to carry out attacks that further their objectives to spread fear
among the population and to coerce their opponent into concessions. They also need to sustain their
organization preferably over an extended period of time. To do that terrorist groups need resources. As
James Adams (1986, p. 251) puts it, “After all, terrorists cannot live on idealism alone, and even if their
services do come cheap, they need to eat and to buy ammunition for their guns.” Understanding how
terrorist groups go about in procuring the necessary resources is a significant step in understanding their
behavior.
While terrorism research can draw on insightful case studies of terrorist group financing and re-
sourcing more broadly (Gunaratna, 2002; Johnston et al., 2016) as well as on studies of different types
of resources to fund terrorist operations (Byman, 2005; Farah, 2004; Horgan and Taylor, 1999, 2003;
Jayasekara, 2007), little systematic attention has been paid to the processes of resource allocation of
terrorist groups. Studies have analyzed the impact of specific resources on the performance of terrorist
groups, such as the existence of sanctuary (Connable and Libicki, 2010), strong leadership (of the Army
and Corps, 2007), a compelling ideological narrative (Bin Hassan, 2006), or the probability of procuring
specific technical resources, such as weapons of mass destruction (Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008). Jodi
Vittori (2011) and Louise Shelley (2014) highlighted the importance to ‘follow the money’ in order to
learn more about the organization and the behavior of terrorist groups. After 9/11 there have been sev-
eral studies analyzing AQ in great depth (Bergen, 2002; Farah, 2004). Other case studies revolve around
PIRA (Adams, 1986; Holland, 1987; Horgan and Taylor, 1999, 2003) and its use of criminal activ-
ities and connections to other terrorist groups such as the Colombian FARC. The Palestinian Hamas
(Levitt, 2006), the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (Jayasekara, 2007), or Hezbol-
lah (Levitt, 2007) have also been studied. While the first two receive substantial Diaspora support,
Hezbollah is greatly financed by Iran. Those studies highlight the various funding opportunities and de-
scribe the type of activities those terrorist groups conduct to resource their operations. They analyze the
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interactions of the terrorist group with other actors in its environment. While those studies rely on the
description of individual cases, their findings inform my theoretical framework. They provide extensive
insight into the process by which terrorist groups generate revenue and procure resources. They link a
terrorist group’s activities to their strategies of resourcing and the success or failure of these strategies
to a terrorist group’s activities. Their strategies depend on internal group-dynamics and external condi-
tions. However, those studies of individual case examples do not develop a general theoretical model of
the resource generation process or the effect of resources on the performance of a terrorist group, which
is the goal of this dissertation. I argue that understanding patterns of the resourcing process is useful for
understanding the behavior of terrorist groups.
Colin Clarke (2015, p. 1) defines the process of terrorist resourcing “as the process of raising, storing
and moving funds obtained through legal or illegal means for the purpose of terrorist acts or sustaining
the logistical structure of an insurgent organization.” While Clarke focuses his argument on monetary
resources, this dissertation widens the scope to include the entire range of financial, material, and cognit-
ive resources. Steve Kiser (2005) breaks down this resourcing process in the stages of earning, moving,
and storing the money. Both approaches combine external processes of resource acquisition and internal
processes of resource allocation. Kiser (2005) applies his framework to the study of AQ, explaining its
behavior by the group’s ability to acquire and manage resources.
Jodi Vittori (2011) applies the framework by Kiser (2005) of acquisition, storing, and moving to
various kinds of tangible and intangible resources. She accounts for the fact that the choice of resourcing
strategy does not only depend on the groups’ leadership discretion but also on the opportunities provided
by the environment of a terrorist group.
Vittori identifies seven categories of terrorist groups based on how terrorist groups acquire, move,
and store resources:10 1) Lone wolves are individuals who act upon a specific grievance and identify with
a particular ideology that is guiding their behavior. They are disconnected from a wider organization and
receive little or no external support. Such terrorists are often difficult to distinguish from a person going
on a rampage. As such, the person attacking people at a shopping center in Munich in the summer of
2016 was a single person possibly motivated by right-wing ideology (Hoben, 2018). 2) State-sponsored
terrorist groups receive almost all their funding from a state sponsor, who then uses the terrorist group
to further its own foreign policy objectives. States supporting terrorist groups enlarge their resources
(Byman, 2005; Quillen, 2002). Thus, states can have a “force multiplying effect” (Hoffman, 1999).
Hezbollah is a terrorist group that is greatly supported by Iran and oftentimes labeled as a proxy organ-
10Those are ideal types. One terrorist group might fall into more than one category. While this may blur the boundaries of
the categories, it still informs about the capabilities of terrorist groups. Knowing about a terrorist groups resource portfolio is
useful to be informed about what behavior to expect.
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ization of Iran (Levitt, 2013a). 3) Franchises are groups that employ a diversified resourcing strategy.
They may still have one or few major sponsors, but they do not rely solely on one strategy but combine
multiple ones. PIRA combined multiple sources of income covering both the legal and illegal spectrum
(Horgan and Taylor, 1999, 2003). 4) Popularly supported terrorist groups have multiple smaller and
dispersed donors, such as Diaspora communities in various countries. PIRA also relied on the support
of Diaspora communities, highlighting the fact that a terrorist group can fall into more than one category
(Horgan and Taylor, 2003). The Red Army Faction (RAF) also relied greatly on popular support (Vit-
tori, 2011, p. 10). 5) Shell states are terrorist groups that are strong enough to take over the monopoly
of violence from the state in a specific region. They can use this territory to exploit it for resources and
sanctuary. In the past the Peruvian Shining Path was such a shell state organization (McCormick, 1988).
IS also managed to control a significant amount of territory and to exploit the resources to its benefit
(Liang, 2015). 6) State sponsoring terrorist groups share the power with a state authority. They have
achieved a sufficiently high level of resourcing and capabilities, which urges a state to share its power in
exchange of services of the group. In Palestine both Fatah and Hamas provide social services and state
like capabilities consolidating their power in the region (Usher, 2006). 7) Transnational corporations are
terrorist groups that expertly utilize the globalized economic system for their resourcing purposes. They
trade both legal and illegal goods through global channels. Several terrorist groups manage to utilize
the globalized economic system to facilitate their resource generation. Examples are Hezbollah (Levitt,
2013a,b), PIRA (Horgan and Taylor, 1999, 2003), or IS (Liang, 2015; Johnston et al., 2016).
Vittori (2011) notes that over their lifespan terrorist groups can change between the categories. For
example, they can start as a lone actor and then receive more popular support over time. Shelley (2014)
argues that terrorist groups mix different strategies for maximal profit. The conceptualization of a terror-
ist group’s resourcing process as an institution is an important step forward in developing a systematic
classification of terrorist groups based on their resourcing strategy. Also, the focus on resourcing as a
multi-step process of external acquisition and internal storing and moving in conjunction with environ-
mental contingencies is a valuable approach. However, the literature so far falls short in explaining why
some groups are more apt in moving and storing than others.
Several studies discuss the external support, which a terrorist group can receive. Examples are stud-
ies on the support by local communities (Johnston et al., 2016), states (Byman et al., 2001; Byman, 2005;
Gerges, 2005; Levitt, 2007; Richardson, 2006), Diasporas (Byman et al., 2001; Levitt, 2007; Richardson,
2006; Smith, 2007), charities and NGOs (Basile, 2004; Mascini, 2006; Smith, 2007), organized criminal
groups (Asal, Milward and Schoon, 2015; Metz and Millen, 2004), or other terrorist groups (Asal et al.,
2016; Horowitz and Potter, 2014). Those studies assess the connections a terrorist group has to other
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actors in its environment, highlighting their importance for the generation of resources. They discuss
various types of support, which can be provided by different actors. Their findings indicate that terrorist
groups depend on the resources provided by other actors and that they may adjust their performance
depending on the available resources.
I argue that what a terrorist group does and what can be observed in the attack is a function of
the resources a terrorist group has. I build on the work by Colin Clarke (2015), who analyzes how
insurgent groups fund their activities. He identifies them to be engaging in activities that are part of
both grey and dark economy (Clarke, 2015, p. 2). The concept of grey economy captures a combination
of licit and illicit activities used by terrorist groups for material gain (Clarke, 2015, p. 3). While some
activities might be perfectly legal, other aspects of the funding activity are illegal. Oftentimes, the
boundaries between legality and illegality are fuzzy, complicating the monitoring by outside entities
and challenging law enforcement. Activities that can be grouped into grey economy are funding by
Diasporas, donations made through charities and NGOs, fraud such as identity theft, installing legal
businesses as front companies for illegal activities and money laundering. Since the legal parts of those
activities regularly interact with the illegal parts, they are difficult to detect and counter. As such, people
might make honest contributions to charities hoping to help the misfortunate, or people send money to
their family members not knowing that the same channels are used by terrorist organizations to move
money.
The dark economy captures all those activities that are entirely illegal. Oftentimes those activities
involve violence or the threat of violence (Clarke, 2015, p. 8). Those activities include kidnapping for
ransom, armed robbery and theft, counterfeiting and smuggling and trafficking operations, extracting
natural resources, or extortion. Some research suggests that terrorist groups lose their ideological pur-
pose the more they engage in criminal funding activities (Cornell, 2007). However, various examples
suggest otherwise. PIRA has engaged in various criminal activities (Horgan and Taylor, 2003) ranging
from counterfeiting, smuggling, and money laundering to armed robbery and theft. They did not lose
their political purpose, however, enabling them to rely on ample popular support. This allowed them to
rely also on continued Diaspora funding.
Weinstein (2007) investigates how access to economic and social resources affects insurgents’ aptitude
of attacking civilians, thereby focusing on the effect of specific resource endowments on the behavior
of groups using violence. Weinstein’s work is influenced by the literature on social movements, which
finds that those movements that are able to mobilize resources are more likely to succeed (Freeman,
1979; McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Resources are important for a group being able to achieve its goals
(Alimi, 2003). Boyns and Ballard (2004) provide one of the first studies that links resource constraints
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to the behavior of terrorist groups. Enders and Sandler (2005) find that a terrorist group’s resources
influence both the scale and the frequency of attacks. Oots (1986) claims that small and medium sized
terrorist groups are likely to be deadlier in a specific attack. He argues that large groups require a sub-
stantial amount of resources to maintain the organization. Those resources cannot be allocated towards
a particular attack.
In chapter 3 I develop a more detailed model of the resourcing process. This also includes a classi-
fication of resources that can be procured in exchange relationships. I argue that the resources need to
be managed efficiently in order to have an effect on a terrorist groups behavior. I discuss the challenges
to cooperting between terrorist groups that might hamper the resource exchange between them. After
that I focus on the organizational structure as one feature of an organization that shapes the efficiency of
resource management.
2.4.2 The challenges to cooperation between terrorist groups
While the previous section conceptualizes cooperation between terrorist groups and elaborates on the
benefits of cooperation, terrorist groups that work together are a rare event. Usually they work alone.
Asal et al. (2016) argue that cooperation between terrorist groups is rare, because the costs are high due
to “(a) the expenditure of resources involved when groups with different goals had to negotiate terms of
collaboration; (b) personality-based and ideological disagreements among the parties that would make
working in a coalition difficult; and (c) the increased security risks from a joint action, since the total
number of actors with knowledge of operations has increased.” Kinsella (2008, p. 3) similarly argues
that cooperation between terrorist groups involves high transaction costs due to high levels of uncertainty
and incomplete information. Both statements highlight the danger and the risks for a terrorist group
that cooperates with another terrorist group. Additionally, they state that establishing and maintaining
cooperation requires resources. Establishing cooperative relationships between terrorist groups includes
risks. Those risks stem from the self-interest of the actors and their propensity for opportunistic behavior
(Williamson, 1981). It is rational for a terrorist group to try and maximize its own benefits at the cost
of the partner. While states or firms draw contracts that include punishments for such behavior, terrorist
groups usually do not base their cooperative relationship on a written and binding contract. In addition,
terrorist groups face constant pressure from counterterrorism initiatives threatening their operational
capabilities and their existence (Bacon, 2014; Bapat and Bond, 2012; Moghadam, 2017; Oots, 1986).
External pressure on the organization and internal dynamics produce challenges to cooperation, which I
will elaborate in the following paragraphs.
Bargaining theory explains that making credible commitments is a crucial requirement for cooper-
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ation (Fearon, 1998). This requires terrorist groups to signal their partner the intention of honoring
promises and obligations (Bacon, 2014; Bapat and Bond, 2012). In the legal context of states and busi-
ness corporations working together, institutions ensure that both parties respect the rules of cooperation.
However, in the illicit realm of terrorist group cooperation no such regulations exist to enforce commit-
ment and punish non-compliance (Bacon, 2013; Karmon, 2005; Moghadam, 2017). This leads to mu-
tual distrust, opportunistic behavior, secretive operations and an overall lack of transparency (Bapat and
Bond, 2012; Karmon, 2005). It is difficult to establish trust between cooperation partners without mech-
anisms to ensure accountability. Thus, both groups have the incentive to shirk from their commitment
(Moghadam, 2017; Shapiro, N.d.). The lack of trust can also increase the likelihood of misunderstand-
ings between two terrorist groups. Considering that the terrorist groups might have a different vision
or strategy, the interaction might be prone to misunderstandings (Shapiro, N.d.). This is particularly
problematic for terrorist groups, because any wrong decision and deviation from a plan can compromise
the operation as well as the terrorist group itself. Given the hypothetical scenario of operational cells
of two terrorist groups working together to carry out an attack, but with misunderstanding and distrust
between them, the operatives are prone to a behavior that might endanger the best plans.
Whenever one terrorist group cooperates with another to conduct a joint attack they lose independ-
ence. As in any cooperative arrangement a terrorist group may be forced to reach an operational or
strategic compromise with their partner. This decreased operational autonomy might stir the terrorist
group to become distracted or deterred from their primary objective and to become involved in activities
that might not be conducive to their overall goal (Bacon, 2013).
Deterring from one’s own goal and strategy to accommodate a cooperation partner can have a two-
fold consequence for a terrorist group. First, it can lose its own support base and splinter into various
factions, increasing dissent within the group and weakening the terrorist group as a whole. From the
perspective of a partnering group, such a group becomes a less attractive ally, because the operational
strength of the overall group and their reliability and trustworthiness decrease.11 This was the case for
the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) allying with AQ. While the EIJ was focusing to fight their local gov-
ernment in the name of Jihad, AQ followed the strategy of fighting the West. While the EIJ wanted to
restrain their activities to fight the ‘near’ enemy, AQ wants to fight the ‘far’ enemy. This led to dis-
content within the EIJ’s constituency followed by organizational splintering. Those that did not want to
plead allegiance to AQ favored an independent though smaller group fighting to oppose the Egyptian
government (Sageman, 2004).
11Splintering can also result in smaller but more cohesive entities. While they might be clear on the strategic direction of
their activities, they might be weakened in terms of their overall capacities.
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Second, it may affect the partner selection in the first place. Considering a strong in-group identity
and loyalty between the individual members of the group, it is difficult to generate trust to members
of other groups. This constrains partner selection.12 Thus, cooperation can decrease a terrorist group’s
operational autonomy, increase the risk of defection and splintering, and thus increase the group’s vul-
nerability.
Vulnerability increases also through the creation of new enemies and counter-terrorism pressure
(Bacon, 2013). Cooperation requires coordination and communication. This opens new opportunities
for counter-terrorism authorities to intercept messages or apprehend operatives. The more a terrorist
group relies on communication technology to interact with their partner the higher are the risks of inter-
ception. Modern communication technologies allow terrorist groups to coordinate their activities over
long distances providing them with valuable operational capabilities. But they also increase the risks.
Counter-terrorism authorities have the ability to tap into those transmissions and disrupt the organization
and their activities. Another risk stems from the higher number of people privy to details of a terrorist
group’s activities. This increases the possibility of security breaches (Oots, 1986). Forging an alliance
with AQ put the EIJ on the radar of the U.S. and their global war on terror. The EIJ was considered to
be a threat to U.S. interests. Before the alliance of AQ, EIJ was mainly facing Egyptian authorities.
Cooperation between terrorist groups provokes authorities and other terrorist group competitors. If
a terrorist group pledges allegiance to another group, disenfranchised factions might feel threatened or
sidelined. They need to uphold their legitimacy in the eyes of their constituency and may decide to fight
the competing terrorist group. In 2014 Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM), an Egyptian/Palestinian organiz-
ation operating in Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula became an official province of IS. As many supporters
of ABM were still set to follow the ideology of AQ, they split, formed independent organizations and
started to fight for supporters in the region (Stewart, 2016).
Cooperation between terrorist groups includes logistical costs. Every cooperative relationship re-
quires efforts to establish communication channels, opportunities to exchange material resources, or for
operatives to meet for training and planning. The higher the obstacles for establishing those things the
higher the logistical costs. As such, geographical proximity makes cooperation easier, whereas language
barriers make cooperation more difficult. Obstacles can include geographical or cultural boundaries, but
they can also include counter-terrorism pressure.
The reasoning presented above illustrates that cooperation can have a destabilizing effect on the
12This is the main argument of theories promoting ideology as a predictor of cooperation between terrorist groups. Several
scholars find support for this causal relationship (Karmon, 2005; Horowitz and Potter, 2014; Asal, Ackerman and Rethemeyer,
2012). While ideologies may provide some heuristics to establish trust, one-off cooperation to exchange operational resources
may not rely on them.
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organization, threatening its survival and success (Koza and Lewin, 1998). However, while coopera-
tion between terrorist groups is risky, the amount of cooperative relationships observable suggests that
the benefits of cooperation outweigh its costs at a non-trivial frequency. Whereas multiple obstacles
might challenge long-term alliances, one-off cooperation in joint events is less risky. I argue that ter-
rorist groups enter those engagements due to opportunity and expediency to supplement their existing
resources and to boost their operational capability.
2.5 Organizational structure in terrorism research
In this dissertation I focus on the organizational structure as a feature of terrorist groups that affects
their ability to manage resources. Before I detail this mechanism in section 3.4, this section provides a
synopsis of previous work acknowledging the importance of focusing on the organizational structure in
terrorism research.
The mere existence of resources is not enough to carry out a terrorist attack. It is important to
consider which factors shape a terrorist group’s ability to use the respective resources. I argue that the
organizational structure of a terrorist group is a crucial, yet understudied, factor influencing a terrorist
group’s resourcing process. Organizational features matter for the resourcing process as they determine
the terrorist group’s ability to access certain resources in the first place, and also how well the groups can
use those resources, i.e., how well they can “acquire, store, and move resources” (Vittori, 2011, p. 26).
Identifying needs of a terrorist group, the sources through which these needs are met, and the organiz-
ational dynamic of putting those resources to work should be the logical first step in understanding the
behavior of terrorist groups.
The organizational structure of terrorist groups has been discussed in the literature with increasing
interest in the recent years. The acknowledgement of the organizational structure as one factor that
influences the behavior of terrorist groups builds on the organizational approach explaining terrorism
by Martha Crenshaw (N.d.). Crenshaw’s approach suggests that terrorist groups are strengthened or
weakened by their own internal dynamics (Crenshaw, 2011, p. 74). She builds on work viewing social
movements in terms of their organizational cooperation and competition (Zald and McCarthy, 1980).
The study of organizational structure of terrorist groups can benefit from the comparison with other
types of organizations. Insights on terrorist groups can be informed by studies on insurgency groups
(Johnston, 2008) or non-violent protest movements or non-governmental organizations (Kahler, 2009).
Prior research additionally highlights the benefits of comparing terrorist groups to other types of
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illegal organized activities. Dugan and Gibbs (2009) compare terrorist and corporate crime organizations
to derive recommendations on how to better control each. Both types of organizations need to survive in
competitive and hostile environments. They find that both organizations adopt complex organizational
structures over time to survive.
The organizational structure of terrorist groups has been the explanatory variable in various studies,
often relating it to the performance of the groups (Abrahms and Potter, 2015; Heger, Jung and Wong,
2012). They find that the organizational structure shapes the target type as well as the lethality of
attacks. They find that centralized groups are more likely to attack civilians or to conduct more lethal
attacks. Other studies find that terrorist groups adjust their structure and activities in response to internal
and external pressure (Krebs, 2002; Sageman, 2004; Xu and Chen, 2008). Their results suggest that
terrorist groups isolate their members from each other to minimize the risk of failure if some members
are detected. Using the example of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon by AQ,
they provide evidence that the teams carrying out the attacks were kept separate until the last minute.
The pilots did not know who was trained to take over the plane. Every attacker was trained with a
specific skill-set. Those who learnt to pilot a plane were trained independently from the other attackers.
This is exactly what Osama bin Laden intended (Michael and Wahba, 2004). Group structure is used
as a proxy for leadership control in various contexts (Krahmann, 2003; Williamson, 1975), including
militant groups (Abrahms and Potter, 2015; Arquilla and Karasik, 1999; Chai, 1993; Stepanova, 2008).
Focusing on leadership control as the central comparative attribute, it is expected that more centralized
groups delegate less autonomy to subordinates (Galbraith, 1973; Pugh and Hickson, 1976). Other studies
analyze organizational factors determining network productivity and durability (Perliger, 2014), and find
that hierarchies are better at the production of violence than decentralized networks (Abrahms and Potter,
2015; Heger, Jung and Wong, 2012). Focusing more on the network perspective, the network structure
varies depending on the time to the attack (Helfstein and Wright, 2011; Morselli, Giguere and Petit,
2007; Xu and Chen, 2008) and they decentralize in order to protect themselves from disruption (Everton,
2012). Few longitudinal studies confirm this effect (Carley, Lee and Krackhaardt, 2002; Everton and
Cunningham, 2015).
Several studies analyze the need to remain clandestine to prevent disruption. They suggest that
covertly operating organizations need to maintain the balance between organizational persistence and
operational capacity (Asal, Milward and Schoon, 2015; Bakker, Raab and Milward, 2012; Stern, 2003).
This balancing act has been labelled as the multi-objective optimization problem of terrorist groups
(Lindelauf, Borm and Hamers, 2009). Simmel (1906) argues that secret societies have to organize to
conceal themselves and to protect their members from detection. Similarly, Erickson (1981) shows that
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secret organizations organize themselves to maximize security as a function of risk. Baker and Faulkner
(1993) follow that reasoning, showing that conspiracies prefer concealment to efficiency by adopting de-
centralized structures to protect the core members of the organization. Decentralized organizations are
harder to detect and disrupt since sparse connections limit their members’ exposure. Whereas these stud-
ies focus on maximizing secrecy, others highlight the need to maintain secrecy while ensuring efficient
operations (McCormick and Owen, 2000). The way terrorist groups manage to work out this balancing
act influences their resilience to disruption (Carley, Lee and Krackhaardt, 2002; Farley, 2003; Kinsella,
2008; Koschade, 2006; Magouirk, Atran and Sageman, 2008; Sparrow, 1991).13 While a decentralized
network structure increases secrecy, a bureaucratic hierarchical structure is more efficient in planning
and conducting operations (Shapiro, 2005). Shapiro (2007) provides an insightful perspective on the
internal dynamics of terrorist groups. Using principal-agent theory he argues that efficient allocation of
resources needs middlemen between individual financiers and the leadership of a terrorist group. He
postulates that terrorist groups need to implement strategies of auditing or punishment to decrease vul-
nerabilities and inefficiencies stemming from intricacies of the individual interactions between principal
and agent.
Laitin and Shapiro (2008, p. 223) find that terrorist groups move away from centralized control to-
ward a decentralized and flatter structure. This trend is most commonly attributed to the pressures put
on terrorist groups by the Global War on Terrorism. This finding is at odds with the pattern observed by
Shapiro (2005) that historically radical groups increased central control. According to the management
literature, organizations add complexity, i.e., the “degree of spread and segmentation in an organiza-
tional structure” (McKendall and Wagner III., 1997, p. 627), which allows them to grow functionally
and geographically. Thus, they adjust to a changing environment (Chandler, 1962). Also, novel com-
munication technology enables terrorist groups to connect and coordinate their activities over a larger
geographical span. It allows them to coordinate across a disconnected territory. Members of core IS
located in Syria can communicate with people located in Europe, coordinating their activities. This has
been the case for Sayfullo Saipov, who committed and attack in New York in the name of IS on October
31 2017 (Callimachi, 2017).
This discussion highlights the challenges of conceptualizing organizational structure systematically.
In most organizations there is some degree of centralization. The classification of terrorist groups as
centralized or decentralized may also depend on the level of analysis. For example, an individual mem-
ber might have to report to someone else. But overall, this hierarchy might only be present within a small
cell, which is operating independently from any control by a central authority. In that case, the terrorist
13Network disruption can be random or targeted. Different organizational structures favor different disruption strategies.
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group is showing high levels of decentralization, while the individual member might still experience a
high level of hierarchy.
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Chapter 3
The economic market of terrorism – a
theory of resource acquisition and
resource allocation
Scholars and practitioners recognize terrorist groups’ acquisition and allocation of resources as a multi-
step process (i.e. Clarke, 2015; Kiser, 2005; Vittori, 2011; Wittig, 2011). The U.S. government, for
example, conceptualizes the resourcing process in three steps: First, terrorist groups acquire and store
the resources; second, they move the resources to the cell that carries out the operations; and third, the
resources are used in the attack (Wittig, 2011). This process can be fast or slow, its steps can occur
simultaneously or over large time spans in between. These models depict the operational life cycle of
terrorism, as they exemplify the processes a terrorist group engages in to generate revenue to use in
attacks (Wittig, 2011). Those models view the terrorist attack as the consequence of a terrorist group’s
ability to translate resources into valuable supplies needed to produce attacks. They capture the context
in which a terrorist group interacts with other actors, from which they extract material, financial, and
cognitive support. They also depict the stages of the resourcing process from the initial acquisition of
resources to their final use in the attack.
Each terrorist attack has different operational demands that have to be met by the terrorist group’s
successful management and control of the supply of resources (Rudner, 2006). In this dissertation, I
show that terrorist groups interact with other actors in their environment to exchange resources. To com-
plete the process of resourcing, terrorist groups need to work with the resources within their organization.
I conceptualize this as a two-step resourcing process, with acquisition and allocation of resources as the
two steps. Acquisition captures the procurement of resources from a terrorist group’s environment and
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allocation the processing of resources within the terrorist group. I adopt the conceptualization of the
stage-like models exemplified above. In contrast to those models, I dichotomize the resourcing process
in those resourcing activities that occur outside organizational boundaries and those activities that occur
within an organization. As only limited information about these processes is available, this specification
is advantageous as it simplifies the theorized model.
The acquisition of resources captures all activities a terrorist group undertakes in order to access fin-
ancial, material, or cognitive resources from other actors. It includes a process of transferring resources
across organizational boundaries. A terrorist group requires external resources where it needs specific
resources to complement its own. That way terrorist groups can enhance their tactical repertoire and
performance. Increasing resources allows the terrorist group to act more freely as it is able to match
its goals with its capabilities.1 Relating back to the threat equation and the two markets outlined in the
previous section, terrorist groups that have the resources to match their political motivation are able to
sustain a more credible threat.
The allocation of resources captures many diverse tasks a terrorist group has to complete in order to
carry out a successful attack. It needs to assign available resources to specific tasks. The goal is to use its
resources efficiently, that is to increase the utility gained from the resources, while minimizing the loss
of resources and other related costs. A terrorist group that organizes its resource management efficiently
is likely to outperform terrorist groups, which are disadvantaged in terms of resource management. I
show that whether a terrorist group can accomplish the task of efficient resource management depends
on its organizational structure. By this logic, I explain the variation in terrorist groups’ behavior by the
variation 1) in their exchange relationships, and 2) in their internal organization.
Next, I explore terrorist groups as organizations. Understanding organizational dynamics is import-
ant to study how terrorist groups interact with their environment and what consequences such interaction
have. It also is the prerequisite of studying dynamics of resource allocation within the terrorist group.
3.1 Terrorist groups as organizations
The unit of analysis in this dissertation is the terrorist group. In this dissertation I conceptualize a terrorist
group as an organization, “in which groups and individuals with varying interests and preferences come
together and engage in exchange” (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, p. 26). This definition of an organization
1It is important to note that this correlation is relevant only for those kinds of terrorist attacks, in which resources are
used that are not commonly available and ready for everybody to use. Some attacks require only minimal resources that are
accessible to anyone. For example, an attacker can use a kitchen knife to stab people on the street, or someone can use a car
to drive into a group of people on the sidewalk. Those scope conditions refrain my theoretical model to be applicable to those
cases of terrorism that requires more resources than just widely accessible items.
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combines three aspects that require further elaboration. First, an organization consists of individuals,
who are a member of this organization. However, individual members can form a sub-group that is
also part of the organization. Such groups are often formed around functional tasks or inter-personal
relationships. In a terrorist group a functional task can be a specific operational unit carrying out attacks.
It can be a group of members responsible for technological developments such as building bombs or
acquiring funds. Sub-groups can emerge due to inter-personal bonds, such as friendships or kinship.
Terrorist groups often rely on recruits that join the organization through their social network of ties with
friends and family (Sageman, 2004). Those ties can persist within and across functional sub-groups.
Second, the definition highlights the varying interests and preferences of members. People join a
terrorist group for various reasons (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008). While preferences can diverge,
I assume that all members of the terrorist group pursue the same overall political goals. Inconsistent
preferences and intra-organizational power-relations can affect the behavior of the terrorist group. I
acknowledge these dynamics. However, I assume those not to be conflicting with the overall objective
of the terrorist group.
Lastly, the definition includes the notion of exchange. Exchange happens within the organization
and with other organizations. Focusing on the organization helps to explain structural and procedural
features within the organization. It emphasizes the distribution of power, tasks and communication
channels that characterize operational routines within an organization (Scott and Davis, 2014, p. 18).
It also helps to examine the interdependencies of various organizations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983;
Laumann and Knoke, 1987) and the organization’s interaction with the environment more generally
(Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Pugh and Hickson, 1976). While some researchers distinguish between
exchange processes within and outside an organization, both approaches apply a macro perspective on
organizations, rather than a micro perspective that focuses on the individual (Scott and Davis, 2014,
p. 18).
Approaches that consider an organization’s interaction with the environment rely on the underlying
assumption of organizations being ‘open systems’ (Katz and Kahn, 1966). Such systems rely on the
flow of personnel, material resources, and information from the outside (Scott and Davis, 2014, p. 31).
In an open system an organization’s members are assumed to have multiple loyalties and identities,
rendering the purposeful goal of the organization a result of constant negotiation (Scott and Davis, 2014,
p. 31). To sustain an organization, it is necessary to create emotional ties among the members to form
or reform cooperative relationships among them (Scott and Davis, 2014, p. 31). An organization is not
sealed off from external influences. Individual members of an organization can have connections to the
environment enabling the access to resources. Open system theorists have highlighted the “the ability
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of the organization (...) to exploit its environment in the acquisition of scarce and valued resources”
(Yuchtman and Seashore, 1967, p. 898). They promote the importance of an organization’s adaptability
and flexibility to survive in different environments. Those are paramount criteria for terrorist groups in
the light of dynamic challenges and opportunities in their environment.
Ties between members of an organization and entities in the environment can be very important in
acquiring resources and maintaining support. Research has identified ties to the criminal milieu (Basra,
Neumann and Brunner, 2016), to the local population (Bhattacharya, 2017), or Diaspora movement
(Horgan and Taylor, 1999) to be important providers of resources. Those inter-personal ties lay at the
core of all inter-organizational exchange relationships. However, for the sake of analytic rigor, I focus
on the interaction of the terrorist group with its environment on the organizational level rather than
on the individual level. This approach discounts individual motivations. The clandestine identity of
people participating in terrorist groups poses insurmountable challenges for researchers. Assuming that
members of a terrorist group share similar interests and a political purpose, the organization reflects those
interests in observable strategies and tactics. The organizational level of analysis illuminates terrorist
groups’ interactions with other organizations and the environment in general. Terrorist groups do not
exist in a vacuum. Their behavior and internal dynamics are affected by their contextual conditions.
Examining such terrorist group-environment relations is possible when focusing on the organization as
the unit of analysis. Conceptualizing terrorist groups as organizations allows focusing on both inter- and
intra-organizational relationships and how those affect the behavior of terrorist groups.
3.2 The performance of terrorist groups as a function of resources
To develop my argument I build on research in the field of strategic management and apply its findings to
terrorist groups. While terrorist groups face different challenges with regard to their economic behavior,
they still rely on resource endowments to stay competitive in the industry of terrorism. The industry of
terrorism includes all actors that are involved in carrying out terrorist attacks.2 Thus, economic theories
can help to explain the behavior of terrorist groups. I provide a synopsis of the strategic management
literature. This literature highlights the relevance of a firm’s resources for explaining its performance
and competitive advantage. I translate their findings to formulate a resource-based theory of terrorist
groups. The resource-based view of the firm focuses on the resource endowments of a firm, arguing that
it is the heterogeneity in those resources that determine a firm’s competitiveness (Barney, 1991; Peteraf,
1993). However, this approach only partly explains the resource acquisition in alliances. Therefore, I
2Aside from terrorist groups, such actors can, for example, include criminals and black market entrepreneurs, individual
supporters, violent non-state actors, or governments.
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expand the research focus on the organization’s interaction with other actors in its environment. I discuss
resource-dependence theory (RDT) (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and how it applies to the behavior of
terrorist groups. Dyer and Singh (1998) focus on relational resources that originate in those exchange
relationships. Such resources gain value through the exchange. As a consequence, firms can achieve a
higher profit in a relationship that they could have not achieved individually. The relational approach
draws on concepts stemming from social network theory, which emphasizes the importance of external
ties instead of only focusing on actor attributes. These ties transfer all kinds of resources, which influence
an actor’s behavior. By studying those networks, researchers can relate their structural attributes to the
performance of a single actor (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).
3.2.1 Conceptualizing the performance of terrorist groups
The performance of terrorist groups has been studied frequently, its conceptualization, however, remains
rather ambiguous. The performance of a terrorist group is often conceptualized as its organizational and
operational capability (Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008; Horowitz and Potter, 2014; Phillips, 2013; Young
and Dugan, 2014). Several authors have examined the role of terrorist groups’ capabilities and their
effect on attack features (Cragin and Daly, 2004; Jackson et al., 2005; Jackson and Frelinger, 2009).
Each terrorist group has to complete a plethora of functions to maintain its organizational survival but
also to ensure sustained operations.
Organizational and operational capabilities differ from each other. Organizational capabilities in-
clude a terrorist group’s ability to uphold organizational mechanisms to guarantee the survival of the
group as much as more specific abilities, such as the coordination and planning of attacks. Its de-
limitation from operational capabilities is sometimes vague and oftentimes not intended. Operational
capabilities are a terrorist group’s ability to produce attacks defined as the “threatened or actual use of
illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal
through fear, coercion, or intimidation” (LaFree and Dugan, 2007, p. 184). Previous work sometimes
uses the terms of operational and organizational capabilities interchangeable bypassing a clear and un-
ambiguous definition (Young and Dugan, 2014). I follow this practice arguing that while there might
be a difference between organizational and operational capabilities, by combining them theoretically
and analytically, a terrorist groups performance can be better evaluated comprehensively. I proceed to
use organizational capability and operational capability interchangeably. I define capabilities as those
abilities and functions that a terrorist group has to possess and fulfill in order to carry out successful
operations and maintain its organization.
Previous literature highlights the multiple dimensions of a terrorist group’s operational capability.
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Those studies commonly find the operational capability to be reflected in the intensity and complexity
of the attack. They analyze the survival of terrorist groups (e.g., Blomberg, Gaibulloev and Sandler,
2011; Carter, 2012; Cronin, 2006; Phillips, 2013; Young and Dugan, 2014), the lethality of a terrorist
group’s attacks (Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008; Horowitz and Potter, 2014), or the use of specific weapon
types (Asal, Ackerman and Rethemeyer, 2012). Phillips (2013, p. 1) argues that terrorist groups that
have fewer operational capabilities and lack the ability to generate more resources are more likely to fail
either through internal dissolution or counter-terrorism pressure.
One of the most common measures to capture the severity of terrorist attacks is a count of the
casualties per attack (Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008; Horowitz and Potter, 2014). While several terrorist
groups have the ability to carry out small-scale attacks, the ability to kill or injure many people at
once indicates a more resourceful terrorist organization. Another possibility to account for the varying
operational capability is to include the number of annual attacks. Terrorist groups that are capable of
carrying out attacks at a higher frequency than other groups need to have the resources to sustain such a
high-frequency campaign (Clauset and Gleditsch, 2012).
Terrorist attacks can also vary in the tactic employed. Terrorist groups can employ a variety of tactics,
which include suicide bombings, attacks using some kind of explosive, shootings, or hijackings. While
a terrorist group needs specific knowledge in order to use a specific tactic, it is difficult to establish
a comprehensive and mutually exclusive rank ordering of capability based on these tactics. Young
and Dugan (2014, p. 9) propose to assess a terrorist group’s operational capability with their ability to
mix different kinds of tactics. Employing a variety of tactics implies not only that the terrorist group
possesses the knowledge to do so, but also that it has access to the necessary weaponry and other material
resources that may be needed to use different tactics.
Young and Dugan (2014, p. 9) further suggest that the ability to carry out transnational attacks
carries information about the operational capability of a terrorist group. Their assumption is that a
terrorist attack that transcends national borders is more difficult to carry out and more resource-intensive
implying a greater operational capability. Furthermore, terrorist attacks vary in their target selection
(Jackson and Frelinger, 2009). Depending on the defensive infrastructure surrounding a target, the
selection may also be constrained by the resources of the group. This does not mean that attacking
a soft target cannot be a strategic decision. The distinction made here is to assess possible tactical
considerations based on their opportunities. As with other tactical decisions, a terrorist group does not
only need to have the material resources to carry out the attack, but also the cognitive resources how to
penetrate security perimeters.
Frisch (2012) suggests assessing the percentage of successful attacks as an indicator of a terrorist
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group’s capability. A terrorist group that has few failed attacks suggests an organization in the back-
ground that is proficient at matching their activities to the cognitive and material resources. It also
manages to plan and coordinate the attack well enough for it to succeed. Related to this is the suggestion
of focusing on the number of attackers per incident (Frisch, 2012). This can also imply the presence
of coordinative capacity within the organization. A terrorist group that uses multiple attackers has the
logistical infrastructure in place to ensure communication with the attackers and the material supply of
those who carry out the attack. An attack with multiple attackers can either be of more than one attacker
at one location at one time, or it can include simultaneous attacks at different locations but coordinated.
Resources that are available to a terrorist group have an effect on a terrorist group’s ability to perform
specific types of attacks. By consequence, the attack itself allows researchers to draw inferences from
the observable qualities of the attack to the capabilities of terrorist groups and their available resources.
Since terrorist groups operate clandestinely, we know very little about their everyday proceedings and we
usually only observe their attacks. By this logic, their ability of how often they can conduct an attack,
whom they attack and how they can carry out their attacks is influenced by their resources. Terrorist
groups use the resources that are available to them in an attack as a terrorist group is aiming to inflict as
much damage on the target population and the opponent government as possible.
My argument follows the common conceptualization of a terrorist group being the weaker actor in
conflict with a stronger opponent. Being the weaker actor in a conflict, terrorist groups need to rely on
the opportunities they have. This implies that the optimal course of action might not be a viable option.
Freedman (2007, p. 324) supports this perspective stating that, a “common tendency of groups in weak
strategic positions is to choose tactics that are geared to their capabilities rather than their ultimate
objective.” Evidence shows that terrorist groups do not always choose the optimal course of action, but
that they are constrained by their material and cognitive limitations (Crenshaw, 1990, p. 13-15). This
may be due to the fact that they do not have access to the material or cognitive resources needed to carry
out a specific attack at a specific time against a specific target, but also due to the fact that they lack the
capacities to assess the given strategic situation and respond accordingly (Simon, 1982).
I assume terrorist groups use the resources that are available to them instead of storing them for the
future since their attacks are meant to communicate a clear message to their audiences. An attack signals
the terrorist group’s ability and willingness to inflict harm (Kydd and Walter, 2006). Kydd and Walter
(2006) claim that terrorist groups employ a strategy of costly signaling to communicate their seriousness
to their opponent and constituencies to increase their coercive capacities. This urges them to use the
resources available to them to increase their coercive capacity.3 I expect that the available resources of
3Terrorist groups also need resources to maintain their organization. Any extra resources can go towards the attack. Of
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a terrorist group influence the group’s operational capability. Hence, I expect that the characteristics of
a terrorist group’s attack reflect the group’s resources.
3.2.2 Previous definitions of resources
The resource-based view is a theoretical approach explaining how different resource endowments un-
derlie the performance of firms. Originating in the strategic management literature, it argues that those
firms with better resource endowments can advance their competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Peteraf,
1993). Research studying violent actors implicitly assumes a similar logic as outlined above (Staniland,
2012; Weinstein, 2007). Resources, such as weapons, money or other liquefiable assets, are the lifelines
of terrorist groups. Terrorist groups need resources to “sustain themselves, conduct operations, and live
to fight another day” (Vittori, 2011, p. 1). Without funding and material assets they cannot achieve their
vision. I conceptualize terrorist groups as economic entities. This allows me to build on the strategic
management literature and explicitly use its concepts. Thereby, I can 1) classify resources in a way
that is theoretically and empirically useful, and 2) identify potential mechanisms how resources affect
terrorist groups’ behavior.
Wernerfelt (1984, p. 172) defines resources as “tangible and intangible assets which are tied semi-
permanently to the firm.” Barney (1991, p. 101) ties resources to their importance for the firm classifying
them as “all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge, etc.
controlled by the firm that enable the firm to conceive of and implement strategies that improve its
efficiency and effectiveness.” Amit and Schoemaker (1993, p. 35) define resources as “stocks of avail-
able factors that are owned or controlled by the firm.” Common to those definitions of resources is the
assumption of proprietary. While the above cited definitions of resources include all types of assets,
Makadok (2001, p. 389) distinguishes between resources and capabilities, stating that capabilities are
“a special type of resource, specifically and organizationally embedded non-transferable firm-specific
resource whose purpose is to improve the productivity of the other resources possessed by the firm.”
This highlights the notion that resources within one organization are not independent from each other
but ideally interact to increase the overall value (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). For example, a terrorist
group having a clear ideological narrative impacts the number of new recruits or supporters, affecting
access to money, weapons, or training.
According to Astley and Sachdeva (1984) resources vary in a) how difficult they are to obtain, and
b) how critical they are to the functioning of the organization. Vittori (2011, p. 25) claims that terrorist
course, a terrorist group can inflict major harm with little resources as can be seen by attacks of supporters of IS, in which they
use cars as weapons.
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groups need resources that are 1) simple and do not require too much expertise to access and exploit;
2) provide security from discovery or confiscation by the law or others who wish to harm the terrorist
group; and 3) are available in large amounts without the need to expend too much effort to attain them.
Freeman (2011) notes that terrorist groups need to consider six aspects when browsing the market for
resources. First, the quantities of resources that can be acquired are important. More resources allow
the terrorist group to operate with greater flexibility. Second, the legitimacy of the sources is of high
relevance when it comes to a business partner. Terrorist groups have a specific clientele of supporters
that might not accept some sources. This is an argument often made in the context of the collaboration
with organized crime, since the economic motivation of the latter is perceived to be irreconcilable with
the political aspirations of terrorist groups. Terrorist groups often avoid engaging in drug trafficking
for that reason (Freeman, 2011, p. 463). Third, the operational security must be upheld. The constant
threat of disruption demands measures that ensure the secrecy of the operation. If a terrorist group
does not manage to keep its resource exchange hidden from law enforcement’s counter-measures, it
jeopardizes not only its resource flow, but also its organizational survival. The survival can be threatened
by the lack of resources needed to sustain the organization, but also by the arrest of crucial members.
Williams (2008) points out that it can be dangerous for terrorist groups to rely on organized crime,
whose members he finds to be easier to turn. This can hamper the seamless administration of tasks
and threatens the secret identities of other members. Fourth, it matters how reliable the source is in
delivering resources. A source that is unpredictable can have existential consequences. If a terrorist
group cannot rely on the expected supply of resources, it may be unable to carry out a planned attack
or uphold its organization. Whether or not a terrorist group has access to reliable resources can depend,
for example, on its geographical location. FARC or the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), for example,
benefit from their access to the drug trafficking market (Eccarius-Kelly, 2012). Fifth, terrorist groups
want to be able to control or influence the source or the mechanism of delivery. A terrorist group might
prefer to do business with a centralized organization, as it is able to know who is in charge. The source
and the exchange mechanisms are more reliable in those instances. Finally, the simplicity of the whole
transaction process is relevant in order to keep the transaction costs low and decrease the chances of
error. Geographical proximity can decrease the logistical complexity. This can also be achieved relying
on resources that either require no specific skill-set to handle, or for which the skilled personnel is
available.
The classifications of Vittori (2011) and Freeman (2011) further differentiate Astley and Sachdeva’s
(1984) typology of resources. Astley and Sachdeva (1984) recognize the importance of specific features
of the resource itself, and highlight that resources vary in how easily they can be transferred from their
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point of origin to the terrorist group. However, it falls short of detailing the transfer mechanisms and
the features of resources that allow them to be moved between actors. I build on the work by Vittori
(2011) and Freeman (2011) and provide a more fine-grained typology of resources that captures their
transferability.
I distinguish resources based on their tradability. Before I elaborate what tradability entails, I discuss
the types of resources that terrorist groups need to sustain their operations. Previous terrorism literature,
oftentimes, does not explicitly list the required resources (Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008; Horowitz and
Potter, 2014; Phillips, 2013), or focus on only specific resources, such as weapons of mass destruction
(Asal, Ackerman and Rethemeyer, 2012). Some researchers have arrived at classifications of resources
that further the scientific debate and practical countermeasures alike. I discuss them in the following
paragraphs (Byman, 2005; Clarke, 2015; Cragin and Daly, 2004; Metz and Millen, 2004; O’Neill, 2005;
Vittori, 2011).
I differentiate resources from declarations of sympathy. Such sympathetic expressions and transfer
of actual material assets are often summarized under the term support. Expressions of sympathy are,
undoubtedly, very important and may even be an indicator for the propensity to provide material support
to terrorist groups. They are, however, distinct actions. Expressions of sympathy do not require any
direct contact between two actors. The exchange of material resources, however, is contingent upon dir-
ect interaction. O’Neill (2005), for example, identifies different support types classifying them as moral
support, political support, material support, and sanctuary. Byman (2005) analyses different forms of
state support listing training, money, arms, logistical help, diplomatic backing, organizational assist-
ance, ideological direction, and sanctuary. Byman (2008) also distinguishes between active and passive
support. Active support includes tangible assistance with money or weapons. Thus, Iran is sponsoring
Hezbollah with a variety of material assets (Hubbard, 2017). Passive support captures the lack of sanc-
tions against a terrorist group. States have tolerated terrorist groups on their territory as long as they
do not threaten the incumbent regime. Saudi Arabia has oftentimes been accused of harboring jihadist
movements that are rooted in Wahabist ideology (Kirkpatrick, 2014). In this dissertation, I focus on
what Byman calls active support.
The exchange of resources depends on the needs of the terrorist group. Various approaches exist in
the relvant literature. Metz and Millen (2004) identify five categories of resource needs for insurgencies.
They need 1) manpower, including people with a specific skill set, 2) financial assets, 3) material to
use in their military operations, 4) sanctuary to regroup and plan activities, and 5) intelligence about
their enemy. These resources focus on the operational side and are also captured by Cragin and Daly
(2004). In their study about assessing the threat of terrorist groups, they name eleven tools that can
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boost a groups capabilities, sorting them in four organizational and seven operational tools.4 They
define operational capabilities as the capacity of a terrorist group to carry out a series of successful
attacks. Organizational capacities capture activities that sustain the groups existence and cohesiveness
(Cragin and Daly, 2004, p. 25). Colin Clarke (2015) makes the same distinction between organizational
and operational capabilities. His analytical framework describes the activities of terrorist groups in
the realm of dark and grey economy aiming to understand how terrorists and insurgents fund their
activities through illegal and semi-legal economic activities. He defines weapons, sanctuary/safe haven,
intelligence, training, and financing/funding as operational capacities, and leadership, ideology, human
resources, and publicity/propaganda as organizational capacities. Vittori (2011) claims that terrorist
groups need a variety of tangible and intangible resources, as well as money to ensure the groups’
capability to conduct violence. She expects that terrorist groups that fail to uphold a stream of resources
wane and become extinct. She defines tangible resources as material assets that have a monetary value.
In contrast, intangible resources are assets that a terrorist group cannot live without, but cannot easily
be attached a monetary value. Tangible resources are goods that can easily be turned into money, i.e.,
drugs or antiquities. Intangible goods include, for example, training or intelligence. As such, money
holds a particular value as it can be turned into any material resource necessary. These studies highlight
that resources affect a terrorist group’s performance and provide valuable classifications of resources. I
build on those classifications but distinguish between resources that can be exchanged and those that are
tied to the organization itself as outlined in the following section.
I first define and classify different types of resources, terrorist groups rely on. I then introduce
various mechanisms of how terrorist groups can acquire resources and how variations in the access to
resources translate into different behavior. I focus on the exchange of resources between the terrorist
group and other actors in their environment. Finally, I explain the logic of resource allocation and how
the organizational structure of a terrorist group affects its ability to manage resources.
3.2.3 The tradability of resources – an original conceptualization
Money is not the only good that can be used to purchase, exchange, or barter for another good. Any
commodity that has a material value and can be transferred between two actors can be used in exchange
relationships. Since the purpose of this study is to analyze the resourcing process in terms of resource
acquisition and resource allocation, a conceptualization of resources needs to capture those qualities of
exchangeability – both theoretically and empirically. Regardless of the resource being used in operations
4Organizational tools are a guiding and motivating ideology, strong leadership, an accessible recruitment pool, and publi-
city. Operational tools are command and control, weapons, training, operational space (i.e., time and space to plan, train, and
prepare the attack), operational security, intelligence, and money (Cragin and Daly, 2004).
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or to maintain the organization or the resource being tangible or not, according to the resource-based
view of the terrorist group, all types of resources are determinants of a terrorist groups performance
(Amit and Schoemaker, 1993).
While existing classifications of resources provide a relevant foundation for this dissertation, they
are not sufficient to study the exchange of resources in particular. To that end, I develop a classifica-
tion of resources that is based on their exchangeability. I adopt an original definition of resources that
captures whether or not resources can be traded between organizations. Resources that have material
or monetary value can be exchanged in market relationships that are structured by the principles of de-
mand and supply. I call this property ‘tradability of resources’. Table 3.1 displays my classification of
resources terrorist groups require, which is based on the criterium of tradability. Resources that have
some monetary value and can be transferred across organizational boundaries are classified as tradable.
Resources that cannot be moved but are fixed to a specific location or organizational idiosyncrasy are
classified as non-tradable. This classification is related to the notion of immobility of resources (Barney,
1991). As I will elaborate in the next section, terrorist groups can enter exchange relations with other
actors in their environment by trading resources and consequently improve their performance. The argu-
ment that actors can improve their performance by exchanging their resources, differs from arguments of
the resource-based view that considers resources to be valuable to the firm if they cannot be transferred
between actors. I argue that a terrorist group can perform better because it can exchange its resources
and not because of some non-tradable organizational idiosyncrasies.
This classification is different to those that distinguish between tangible and intangible resources
(Vittori, 2011) or operational and organizational resources (Clarke, 2015). It allows the researcher to tap
into the process of resource generation. Instead of focusing on what a terrorist group can accomplish
with their repertoire of resources, it is also possible to assess how terrorist groups can access specific
resources. This opens up new avenues for research questions such as, for example, a) how terrorist
groups exchange resources; b) how the patterns of resource exchange generate different consequences,
c) if the type of resource affects the exchange mode, and d) if terrorist groups consider tradable resources
differently than non-tradable ones. Assessing those questions has both academic and policy relevance.
My classification differs from Vittori’s classification of tangibility in two aspects. First, it classi-
fies training and expertise as resources with material value. Empirical evidence illustrates that human
capital that is captured by training and expertise is treated as a tradable commodity. Two well-known
connections illustrate the treatment of human capital as a valued commodity. PIRA sent men to Colom-
bia to train FARC members in the techniques of urban hit-and-run tactics enabling FARC to conduct
new operations in a changing environment (Ward and Hackett, 2003). Similarly, the Japanese Red Army
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Table 3.1: Classification of resources
Tradable resources Non-tradable resources
Money & other readily liquefiable commodities Leadership, command & control
Weapons Guiding ideological narrative
Training, expertise (human capital), fighters Recruitment pool
Intelligence
Operational space, safe haven, sanctuary
conducted joint operations with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and trained
with them (Zieve, 2012). In both instances one terrorist group reached their limits in what they could
manage to do and sought assistance from other terrorist groups. These examples lend support to the
claim that terrorist groups exchange missing resources. It also supports the argument that motivation is
not sufficient to produce a credible and significant terrorism threat.
Second, money is not a separate category but another tradable resource. This is also true for other
assets that are readily liquefiable. Such assets are, for example, drugs, natural resources, or antiquities.
Those commodities can be sold or bartered in exchange for weapons or other resources.5 A terrorist
group that had a very diversified portfolio of such goods was PIRA which trafficked a wide variety of
commodities ranging from cigarettes to drugs and weapons (Horgan and Taylor, 1999, 2003).
The attribute of tradability is not just relevant for transfers across organizational boundaries. While
tradable resources can be exchange commodities in inter-organizational relations, they can also be
moved within an organization. Once acquired, tradable resources can be used for exchange again, or
they can be allocated within an organization. This is crucial as resources need to be moved to the cell
or individual that conducts the attack or stores it for future use.6 I provide a detailed overview of the
relevant types of resources in the following sections.
Tradable resources of terrorist groups
Money and other readily liquefiable commodities
Byman and his colleagues describe money as a powerful tool as “it can be used to buy weapons, bribe
local officials, pay operatives, write propaganda, provide a social network that builds a popular base,
5Terrorist groups also engage in human or arms trafficking. This can have a dual purpose. Arms and people can be trafficked
merely for economic benefits. Terrorists can use human trafficking also to access human capital or arms trafficking to use the
arms themselves.
6Specifically in Western countries, more and more terrorist attacks are conducted by lone actors that use everyday items
that can be acquired by those individual who also carries out the attack. However, my analysis focuses on attacks that are
conducted by an organization in the background excluding lone-wolfe terrorism. Thus, organizational logic applies.
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and otherwise fill a myriad of purposes” (Byman et al., 2001, p. 87). Money is the ultimate tradable
resource, for it can be exchanged for any other resource that is missing but required to conduct an attack.
Money is not just used as a medium of exchange. As a commodity of exchange, money also indicates
the price and value of other goods. Further, it has value in itself and thus can be used to store wealth
(Cohen, 1998, p. 11).
Money is oftentimes generated through trafficking other illicit and readily liquefiable goods. Terror-
ist groups engage in various forms of illicit trafficking. While the trafficking of arms and people might
have immediate operational purpose, the trafficking of drugs, antiquities, or natural resources mostly
serves the purpose of being turned into operational resources. Of course, arms and humans can and
might also be trafficked for financial reasons, thus having a dual purpose. Terrorist groups use the glob-
alized economic system not only to traffic their goods, but also to launder their financial returns. Many
terrorist groups hold legal businesses and bank accounts, some of them on a global scheme. PIRA, for
example, used a variety of legal businesses to launder money and to fund their organization (Clarke,
2015, p. 31).
Weapons
Terrorist groups need weapons to conduct an attack. These weapons range from simple box cutters or
matchsticks to sophisticated weaponry, including small arms and weapons of mass destruction. Con-
sidering that terrorism is a tactic chosen by the militarily weaker actor against a stronger opponent, the
common choice of weaponry often are small arms and light weapons (SALW). They are easy to use,
carry, and conceal (UNODA, 2017).7 The literature identifies the threat that emerges from terrorist
groups acquiring these kinds of weapons (Hartung and Berrigan, 2007). The majority of terrorist attacks
over the last decades have been committed using small arms and light weapons (Clarke, 2015; Hartung
and Berrigan, 2007; LaFree, Dugan and Miller, 2015). Those arms are used in various types of attacks
ranging from targeted assassination to indiscriminate shootings in public places.
The definition of SALW does not include explosives. However, terrorist groups often use them in
various forms. Using data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), LaFree and his colleagues find
that between 1970 and 2012 terrorists use explosives in 50.73% of all attacks (LaFree, Dugan and Miller,
2015, p. 100). Explosives can be used in various types of attacks. They are used by suicide bombers, as
car bombs, or improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
7Small arms include revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine guns, and light
machine guns. Light weapons include heavy machine guns; hand-held, under-barrel, and mounted grenade launchers; portable
anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns; recoilless rifles; portable launchers of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missile systems; and mortars
of less than 100mm caliber (Small Arms Survey, 2015, p. 3). The terms SALW includes both the weapon systems and the
ammunition.
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Terrorist groups can access weapons from states that are supportive of their cause, purchase them
on the black market, or steal them from weapon repositories. Terrorist groups also turn regular items
into weapons. In the recent years more and more attacks are committed using automobiles or planes.
Examples include the attacks in Nice (July 2016), Berlin (December 2016), or the attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon (September 2001). Those attack types are more common in Western
countries, where other weapons are restricted items, while cars and other regular items are readily avail-
able. However, those regular items are just another form of weaponry, which can be traded between
actors. For example, one group might possess the skills to steal cars and can offer that car to another
group.
Training and expertise
Training is a crucial component of a terrorist group’s capabilities. As Horowitz claims, “Sometimes
technical expertise is not enough (...). Even though al-Qaeda had money, committed members and
weapons, it needed to send its members to Hezbollah (...) to pick up the tacit knowledge necessary to
conduct its own suicide operations” (Horowitz, 2010, p. 165). It is necessary that the individual fighters
of a terrorist group get educated in various tactics and technical requirements needed to carry out attacks
at varying levels of sophistication. Training has a dual purpose: first, members of the group are taught
the tactical requirements, and second, the group exposes itself to innovation by seeking external or
distributing internal expertise.
Training requires people who are skilled with practical and technical knowledge to teach others and
a space to train secure from detection. Physical space is important, since terrorists not only have to learn
the technical aspects, but also need to train how to handle their weapons, make bombs, or how to conduct
surveillance and reconnaissance. While explicit knowledge can be learned from books and is accessible
via the Internet or other forms of remote learning, tacit knowledge requires personal experience (Kenney,
2007). AQ’s refuge in Sudan and Afghanistan provided the organization with the geographical space to
undertake extensive training sessions without the need to remain covert. When NATO forces moved
into Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11, AQ lost their training ground and had to extend their training
from the physical space into the virtual space of the Internet publishing manuals on bomb making or the
ideological reasoning (Cruickshank and Ali, 2007). The distribution of educational material has been a
common feature since the beginning of modern terrorism and the invention of the printing press.
Terrorist groups have repeatedly collaborated with other actors such as other terrorist groups, insur-
gents, or states. Madhok states, “Collaboration is a useful vehicle for enhancing knowledge in critical
areas of functioning where the requisite level of knowledge is lacking and cannot be developed within
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an acceptable timeframe or cost” (Madhok, 1997, p. 43). Terrorists train with other actors in order to
learn tactical or technical knowledge, which strengthens their capabilities and advances their strategic
agenda to increase their chances of success. It may also allow them to adapt to new developments in
their environment, thus increasing their longevity. The ability to learn is, therefore, a predictor of the
potential threat a terrorist group poses. “Since learning is the route through which organizations can
seek solutions to the problems that bound their freedom of action and limit their ability to pursue their
goals in changing operational and security circumstances” (Jackson et al., 2005, p. x).
Operational space, safe haven, sanctuary
Terrorist groups need a sanctuary where they can regroup, train, and plan an attack. This space can be
in a group’s home base in an area outside of government control or in another country that is willing to
provide shelter to the terrorists or unable to prevent them from doing so. Sanctuary is one of the most
vital resources of a terrorist group. A safe haven is an area over which the government has no control or
no knowledge of its existence. That means that state institutions do not reach every part of the country.
It can be as large as an entire country or as small as a neighborhood or someone’s living room. Critical
factors for a safe haven are geographical inaccessibility and remoteness such as jungle territory or vast
hinterlands without functioning infrastructure. Demographic and socioeconomic factors can produce a
space that is outside the authorities attention and allows terrorists to blend in with the local population.
In 2016 Belgian authorities realized that terrorists could hide in sympathetic neighborhoods in Brussels.
After the attack on Brussels airport in March 2016, one of the attackers, Salah Abdeslam was hiding
in the neighborhood Molenbeek, where he had connections to the criminal milieu and was able to hide
among the population. He was arrested only after several raids (Graham-Harrison and Rankin, 2016).
Intelligence
To adequately plan an attack, terrorist groups need to identify a potential target and assess the intricacies
that come with a specific type of attack and target. They need to gather information and understand
potential responses that their attack is likely to trigger (Cragin and Daly, 2004, p. 50). Incorrect or
incomplete intelligence can lead to unsuccessful attacks, unintended responses, and can be counterpro-
ductive to their cause or to the integrity of the group. For example, if a terrorist group wants to hit
a specific person, it needs to identify the schedule of this person and the likely routes taken. It also
needs to assess the best spot to attack depending on what type of weaponry it is using. Terrorist groups,
much like their governmental counterparts, use various types of intelligence gathering. They use human
sources gathering information about potential targets through surveillance and reconnaissance, openly
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published material or Google Earth to assess the vulnerabilities of their enemy and target their attack
(Clarke, 2015, p. 17). Reliable intelligence is not only operationally important but also relevant for the
overall strategic calculation of the terrorist group.
Non-tradable resources of terrorist groups
Leadership, command and control
The leadership of a terrorist organization sets the general strategic direction of the group. It provides
an ideological vision, coordinates the actions and needs to ensure the cohesion of the group, potentially
uniting various factions within the organization. Leadership is connected with all other resources of the
group. Without good leadership the resources might be misdirected or opportunities lost. Decapitation
is always discussed as an effective counterterrorism strategy as it has the potential to target successful
leaders (Cronin, 2009). However, theoretical and empirical assessments of decapitation strategies come
to ambiguous findings (English, 2009). Depending on the structure of the organization, built-in redund-
ancies might render the removal of a leader useless as some other person might step into place. Also, in
case of a charismatic leader the cult that surrounds a personality may create a backlash effect in case of
decapitation. Some leaders may not lose their attraction and power over the people even if they are dead.
Osama bin Laden has not only been the strategic and ideological leader of AQ but also an inspirational
figurehead of violent Jihad. His death has done little to decrease the motivational and military power of
AQ. Decapitation works in the absence of a viable successor to take over the operations. In the case of
AQ the killing of Osama bin Laden lead first to Ayman al-Zawahiri taking over, and ultimately, to the
decentralization of the organization (Jenkins, 2011). With no leadership to provide a united vision under
constant counterterrorism pressure, the organization factionalized and diversified. This can lead them to
deviate from their original strategic mission but does little to decrease the threat.
Guiding ideological narrative
An ideology is a set of beliefs about the state of the world held by an individual or a group (Zald, 1996).
It addresses specific social, political, or economic grievances - whether real or perceived. It provides
a vision about how to meet those grievances, providing people a platform to voice their perceptions
of inequality and injustice. Having a clear ideological narrative is important for terrorist groups as it
maintains its purpose, motivates people to devote their work and potentially their life to the cause, and
to recruit new members. It provides a lens through which to assess reality, lending legitimacy to the
terrorist group in the eyes of their supporters. Empirical evidence suggests that terrorist organizations
are very cognizant of the importance of ideology. Violent jihadists, for example, cite the Quran to
54
legitimize their actions or reject Western imperialism and consumerism (Holbrook, 2010).
A resonating ideological narrative can arouse transnational enthusiasm. This can increase a terror-
ist group’s resilience especially when facing counterterrorism pressure in a certain geographical region.
Even if its capabilities are severely hampered in one place, they can regroup and continue in other re-
gions. With the downfall of core IS that is forced to relinquish its territories in Syria and Iraq, it moves to
other operational arenas. IS affiliated groups evolved in Libya and Egypt where they find support by the
local population (Awad, N.d.). As long as the ideology resonates with sympathizers a terrorist group is
almost impervious to interdiction. Even more so, combating an ideological movement through military
force only strengthens the terrorist group’s resolve and the resolve of its supporters. Forceful military re-
pression often results in discrimination and alienation, humiliation, frustration and, oftentimes, collateral
damage (Paul, 2009). Over time this harms a moderate civil society through radicalization, providing a
fertile mobilizing ground for terrorists. Terrorist groups are aware of the need to communicate a clear
ideological narrative. As such, they remain cautious when engaging in drug trafficking or other types
of criminal activity as well as changing the face of the organizations for fear of losing the support from
strict believers of the ideological narrative or even of. Terrorist groups need to find the balance between
a rigid guiding ideology and enough flexibility to utilize as many opportunities as possible.
Publicity and propaganda
Publicity is important to advertise the ideology and cause of the terrorist group. Terrorist groups use
coercion to achieve their goals. With attacks against random civilians they aim to pressure the gov-
ernment into political decisions that promote the terrorist groups goal. This strategy depends on the
terrorist group’s ability to spread fear. To that end, they need to publicize their attacks. If only a lim-
ited audience learns of an attack, fear does not spread to the rest of society. Terrorist groups usually
claim responsibility for attacks to propagate their cause, to spread fear among the enemy population
and to mobilize supporters. It directly impacts the access to other types of resources. In the ‘battle for
hearts and minds’ terrorist groups invest a lot of effort in communicating with their audiences. IS has an
entire department dedicated to marketing and communication showing a great deal of professionalism
(Sanzgiri, 2015). The group produces videos that are streamed worldwide and print periodic journals to
address their constituencies directly and with a geographical scope that goes far beyond their core territ-
ory. While the reach of IS propaganda is astonishing, it is nothing new. Since the beginning of modern
terrorism, organizations printed leaflets to advertise their message, to generate sympathy for their cause,
and to mobilize support (Offard, 1986, p. 28). Consequently, propaganda is an important weapon in the
operational repertoire of terrorists.
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Recruitment pool
In order to prevail or grow over time, a terrorist group needs a constant supply of new members. A
terrorist group needs to recruit faster than they lose personnel. By recruiting new members, the group
imports skills and human capital. As mentioned above, terrorist groups strategically claim responsibility
and publicize their goals and activities to increase their resonance among supporting populations. An
ideology that is inclusive enough to speak to a wide audience combined with credible activities make
the membership in a terrorist organization an attractive alternative to people with often rather bleak
prospects in life.8
The process of radicalization and recruitment is not a linear one. People can be recruited in personal
meetings or via the Internet. While the process of radicalization is different for every individual, some
general patterns are observable across cases. People have to have a cognitive opening for the ideology
to resonate. They feel wronged by society in some aspects that the membership in the terrorist group
promises to alleviate. Radicalization and consequent recruitment into the organization is a social process.
In many cases, terrorist groups are attractive since they provide a sense of belonging and group identity
to people who are struggling to find their way in life. Through this social process of radicalization
people ultimately accept violence as a viable response to their grievances, turning sympathizers into
active participants in terrorist groups (Helfstein, 2012; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008).
3.3 The acquisition of resources
3.3.1 Terrorist groups in their resource environment
I link the resourcing opportunities to the environment of terrorist groups as it provides them with a
‘menu’ that is specific to the respective environment. Similar to legal business firms, terrorist groups
are located within a specific environment that determines which resources are available and accessible.
Each group needs to work with the resources it can access. The variation in a terrorist group’s behavior
is a function of the environment that introduces a variation in the repertoire of resources.
Previous research acknowledges the environment to have an effect on the resourcing strategies of
organizations in general (Child, 1972; Glazer and Weiss, 1993). The findings can be applied to terrorist
groups in particular as the acquisition of resources provides the terrorist group with opportunities but
also with challenges.9 In order to better understand the performance of terrorist groups I consider the
possibilities of terrorist groups that vary across terrorist groups’ environments. The environment encom-
8There are many reasons why an individual may join a terrorist group. For a review of the literature see, for example,
LaFree, Yang and Crenshaw (2009), English (2009), or Lia and Skjølberg (2004).
9This literature is discussed more detailed in chapter 4.
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passes those elements outside an organization’s boundaries that affect its ability to survive and achieve
its ends. Based on this conception the environment can be perceived “as a store of resources as well as
a source of opportunities and constraints, demands and threats” (Scott and Davis, 2014, p. 14).
Previous research classifies this resource environment in a way that highlights the factors relevant
to the organization. Evan (1967) defines the ‘organization set’ as all organizations that one focal organ-
ization interacts with, in order to access resources that can then be translated into market output. Dill
(1958) coins the term ‘task environment’ to highlight the key elements outside organizational boundar-
ies. James Thompson (1967a, p. 27-28) argues that an organization’s task environment is composed of
1) customers and clients; 2) suppliers of materials, labor, capital, equipment, and workspace; 3) com-
petitors for markets and resources; and 4) regulatory groups, such as government institutions, unions, or
inter-firm associations. The task environment conceptualizes the actors as organizations that can interact
with each other. This highlights the importance of focusing on the organization as the level of analysis.
Many studies of terrorism are implicitly located within this categorization without acknowledging it
explicitly. Terrorism research deals with 1) terrorist groups generating support from their client base
(Vittori, 2011); 2) the exchange of material resources (Horowitz and Potter, 2014; Phillips, 2013) and
the importance of operational space or sanctuary (Sinno, 2008); 3) competition between terrorist groups
either for resources or constituency support (Conrad and Greene, 2015; Nemeth, 2014); and 4) the impact
of both the anarchic task environment of terrorist groups (Piazza, 2008) and counter-terrorism pressure
(Cronin, 2015).
Thompson’s ((1967b)) theory on ‘Organizations in Action’ provides a valuable foundation for ex-
ploring a terrorist group’s exchange relationships with other actors. It highlights the importance of
focusing on external relations of organizations instead of placing them within a vacuum. Organiza-
tions – and hence terrorist groups – are constrained by the constellation of actors that are present in
their environment. Investigating those constraints helps explaining part of the variation in a terrorist
group’s performance. Conceptualizing terrorist groups as organizations embedded in their respective
task environment allows me to explain organizational behavior as a function of external factors. I at-
tribute a terrorist group’s behavior to elements in its task environment that it interacts with. Given that
the information available on the internal dynamics of terrorist groups is limited to the outside observer,
focusing on environmental factors influencing terrorist groups’ behavior offers a theoretical framework
that can be empirically evaluated. However, it discounts relevant internal dynamics. Knowing and in-
corporating those internal elements would increase the empirical precision of the theory and enhance
our understanding of terrorist groups’ behavior.
Resource dependence theory (RDT) studies how external resources affect the behavior of the organ-
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ization. Procuring external resources is seen as a crucial guideline of strategic and tactical decisions
by the management of firms. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) build on Thompson (1967a) formulizing the
argument that firms – or rather organizations in general – depend on resources, which originate within an
organization’s environment. Resources can be owned by other organizations in the same operative en-
vironment creating interdependences between organizations. RDT defines critical and scarce resources.
Critical resources are those without which the organization could not function. Resources that are scarce
increase their value of possession (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, p. 68). This leads to the attachment of
power to an organization’s resources vis-a`-vis other organizations in the environment that have fewer re-
sources (Emerson, 1962). Thus, terrorist groups that manage to increase their resources – either critical
or scarce – can increase their operational and organizational capabilities. According to Emerson (1962,
p. 32) an organization’s dependence on another actor increases (1) in proportion to the organization’s
need for resources, and (2) in inverse proportion to the ability of others to provide the same resource or
performance. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) suggest that organizations alleviate dependence by diversify-
ing their exchange partners, reducing their reliability on a single partner. Jodi Vittori (2011) develops
this argument with respect to terrorist groups, arguing that terrorist groups that can choose from a larger
pool of resource strategies are more capable and enjoy greater autonomy from their respective suppliers.
By maintaining alternative suppliers, a terrorist group can reduce its dependence and uncertainty in its
task environment. Considering that terrorist groups face constant pressure on their organization and op-
erations, they need to exploit as many resource possibilities as possible. That way they ensure autonomy
from a single supplier and resource, securing their survival in case this resource is cut (Vittori, 2011).
3.3.2 Relational rents
Relational rents include all benefits that arise through the exchange between a terrorist group and other
actors in its resource environment. Those rents depend on the resources that a terrorist group gains
access to through cooperative interactions. Through relational rents a terrorist group can increase its
performance through the interaction and exchange with other actors. The underlying premise of cooper-
ation between terrorist groups and other actors is their mutual benefit from such a relationship (Williams,
2002). For establishing those kinds of cooperation, ideological affinity is secondary to matters of prag-
matic expediency. Since short-term engagement does not reveal too much secret information about the
organization or future operations, trust is not as important. The benefits in terms of operational and
logistical assistance may not endanger the organization too much. Those alliances are purely tactical.
They are founded on shared interests alone and not on a combination of interests and ideology. Tactical
alliances can shift alongside interests and are not expected to last indefinitely (Moghadam, 2015, p. 24).
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Those alliances can be labeled as ‘marriage of convenience.’ Terrorist groups may establish tactical al-
liances when facing a common opponent. Multiple terrorist groups aligned with each other in Iraq after
the U.S. led invasion in 2003. Irrespective of their ideology or ultimate goal, religious and nationalist
groups forged tactical alliances to oppose the U.S. and their allied forces (Moghadam, 2015, p. 24).
Dyer and Singh (1998) develop the concept of relational rents. They provide a comprehensive theory
relating dyadic and network connections of firms to their level of performance. Their contribution helps
to bridge the gap between the organizational perspectives on firm behavior and network theory, which
identifies inter-organizational relationships as critical when analyzing a firm’s environment (DiMaggio
and Powell, 1983; Grandori and Soda, 1995; Nohria, 1992). The unit of analysis is no longer the in-
dependent organization but the organization with its dyadic relations to other organizations. The focus
is on the interactions between organizations and their position within an inter-organizational network.
Gulati (1998) argues that firms enter voluntary relationships to exchange and share resources, and col-
laborate to jointly develop or produce products. These connections allow them to benefit from network
resources (Gulati, 1998). Network resources are “external resources embedded in the firm’s alliance net-
work that provide strategic opportunities and affect firm behavior and value” (Lavie, 2006, p. 638). This
relationship between network resources and performance is the core of social capital theory (Bourdieu,
1986; Burt, 2007; Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 2000).10
These exchange relations between terrorist groups can be classified as logistical and operational
cooperation (Karmon, 2005). Logistical cooperation can boost the operational capabilities of terrorist
groups. It includes a variety of activities necessary in preparation of an attack. Logistical cooperation
can significantly affect a terrorist group’s operational success. It entails the exchange of knowledge and
intelligence, financial or material support, or the provision of a safe haven (Moghadam, 2017, p. 34).
This kind of cooperation requires more coordination and is more risky, but also includes more benefits.
The exchange between LTTE with Palestinian groups illustrates this logistical cooperation. The LTTE
provided logistical support for Harakat al-Mujahideen transporting weapons to Abu Sayyaf on its behalf
(Jayasekara, 2010; Moghadam, 2017). Moving weapons or money requires skills and a network of will-
ing participants. Being able to work together with a terrorist group that possesses those skills increases
a terrorist group’s operational and tactical range.
Operational cooperation entails the joint planning and execution of an attack (Moghadam, 2017,
p. 36). Terrorist groups can pool their material resources, their knowledge and intelligence required
for carrying out the attack, thereby increasing their chances of success and higher impact. Sometimes
cooperation is necessary since another group can provide access to an area that is not easily penetrable
10Social capital theory is discussed more detailed in chapter 6.
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by some group. German militants, for example, provided support to the Palestinian Black September
group that carried out the attack on the Munich Olympics 1972 (Alexander, 1989). In this dissertation I
focus on these kinds of short-term transactional types of cooperation.11
Terrorist groups choose to cooperate with other terrorist groups either because they feel a threat to
their survival, or because they can boost their overall capabilities (Crenshaw, 1985; McCormick, 2003).
Cragin et al. (2007, p. 6) suggest that the exchange of resources can have a threefold effect, increasing
1) the operational range of terrorist groups, i.e., allowing it to do new things that it could not do before,
2) the operational effectiveness, i.e., allowing the terrorist group to do things that it could already do,
but better than before, and 3) the operational efficiency, i.e., allowing the terrorist groups to carry out
operations that it could already carry out, but do so at a lower cost and with fewer resources. Such a
terrorist group can potentially boost its operational range by adopting new tactic. To do so, it might need
new weapons or training that allow the terrorist group to rely on a larger tactical repertoire (Cragin et al.,
2007, p. 6). A terrorist group that manages to enhance its operational effectiveness can, for example,
increase the number of casualties, reduce the risk for its operatives, or increase the likelihood of hitting
the intended target.
In these alliances, terrorist groups maintain their organizational independence. Instead of integrating
(parts of) the organizations, their cooperation is restricted to one activity at a time. Those interactions
can be formal or informal. Often they rely on some kind of barter agreements, where one actor provides
a specific good in exchange for another. While the rational framework requires both sides of a co-
operative relationship to have more net benefits, the objectives do not need to be identical. Ideological
perspectives or goals can be different as long as a terrorist group can further their intermediate goals
through cooperative agreements. The management literature shows that the distribution of benefits and
resources might be asymmetrical to the disadvantage to the supplier (Lavie, 2006, p. 645). This can
be the case in asset-specific relationships, where the supplier and buyer may value a specific asset dif-
ferently (Dyer and Singh, 1998). A terrorist group may require specific knowledge and training that
another terrorist group might be able to supply. While the first groups survival might depend on the
development of new tactics, the second group may supply the training for financial benefits instead of
existential need.12
The number of performances that depend on a specific type of resource, such as specific technolo-
11Logistical cooperation may offer valuable insight into a terrorist group’s activities outside of attacks. Data restrictions
make it nearly impossible to study. Analyzing operational cooperation is a valuable and important first step to explaining
terrorist groups’ behavior.
12PIRA is known to have closed such deals. In the early 2000s PIRA sent experts on urban guerilla tactics and explosives
to FARC, in order to train them in tactics and attack types previously unknown to FARC. In exchange they received financial
compensation (Ward and Hackett, 2003).
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gical assets, increase when firms form links to other asset-specific firms (Ahuja, 2000; Lee, Lee and
Pennings, 2001; Rothaermel, 2001). This hints towards resource exchange in relationships akin to
supplier-customer relationships. The innovative capacity of a firm is correlated with these inter-firm
linkages (Stuart, 2000). Lavie (2006) argues for a twofold effect. The effect of the directly shared re-
sources intended to complement or pool with existing resources along with the indirect protracted effect
of shared resources interacting with existing resources. A terrorist group, for example, can have a suffi-
cient supply of recruits. However, those members can lack the specific training to produce a specific type
of violence. In addition to the effects of training (direct effect), having the ability to work together with
well-trained members of another terrorist group can amplify the performance of those recruits (indirect
effect).13
3.4 The allocation of resources
3.4.1 Previous conceptualizations of organizational structure
In his analysis of insurgency groups Johnston (2008) recognizes the problems stemming from vaguely
specified concepts of organizational structure. In this section I provide an overview over prior conceptu-
alizations of organizational structure. This is the foundation for the conceptualization of organizational
structure used in this dissertation. The organizational structure determines how the work efforts of indi-
viduals and teams are orchestrated and how resources are distributed. It shapes how jobs and tasks are
divided and integrated and how the hierarchy within the organization is established.
Child (1972, p. 2) defines organizational structure as the “formal allocation of work roles and the
administrative mechanisms to control and integrate work activities including those which cross formal
organizational control.” In his influential article ‘The Nature of the Firm’ Ronald Coase (1937) asks
whether the firm’s organization affects its allocation of resources. This spawned a large body of re-
search (e.g., Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Williamson, 1975). In firms formal and informal processes and
relationships affect the working dynamics of the firm. It is difficult to capture an entire picture of what
is going on inside a firm, since informal relationships are hard or impossible to view from the outside.
These challenges are even more pronounced for clandestine actors, as even formal processes are not
easily detectable from the outside.
While data constraints challenge the researcher analyzing the organizational structure of clandestine
actors, tackling these challenges is both interesting and important. We can gain a more fine-grained
13Horowitz and Potter (2014, p. 2) illustrate this mechanism with the example of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) continously receiving
training from AQ members allowing JI to increase their sophistication and deadliness of attacks.
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understanding of terrorist groups when we are able to draw conclusions from their organizational dy-
namics. Morselli, Giguere and Petit (2007) analyze clandestine organizations and find that they have
different structural properties depending on the stage of preparing an attack they are in. The structure
of the cell that carries out the attack might look substantially different than the cell in the planning and
resourcing stage. Whereas it is nearly impossible to track the structural make-up of terrorist cells over
time in a large-n research design, this finding highlights the significance of organizational dynamics
for the specific activities of terrorist groups. Thus, only focusing on the attack cell might 1) lead to
biased insights into the structure of terrorist organizations as a whole, and 2) leave possibilities to dis-
rupt the organization prior to the attack unused. I focus on the structure of terrorist groups in relation
to its resource acquisition and allocation activities. Understanding how the resourcing process and or-
ganizational structure of terrorist groups interact can be helpful in devising effective counter-terrorism
strategies.
Theories of strategic management suggest that organizations need to establish a structure that min-
imizes transaction costs (Williamson, 1975). Transaction costs are those costs that derive from ineffi-
ciencies associated with incomplete information that creates uncertainty (Williamson, 1981). They also
suggest viewing hierarchy not simply in terms of power and status, but also in terms of a decision on
how to cluster tasks and establish coordination mechanisms within an organization (Scott and Davis,
2014, p. 163). Thompson (1967b, p. 59) writes that, “It is unfortunate that [hierarchy] has come to stand
almost exclusively for degrees of highness or lowness, for this tends to hide the basic significance of
hierarchy for complex organizations. Each level is not simply higher than the one below, but is a more
inclusive clustering, or combination of interdependent groups, to handle those aspects of coordination
which are beyond the scope of any of its components.” Grouping together specific activities can reduce
transaction costs. Integrating members and tasks of an organization allows for them to share resources
and skill-sets.
Dugan and Gibbs (2009) classify the organizational structure of terrorist groups similarly to the man-
agement literature using three criteria. First, a terrorist group can be vertically differentiated, capturing
the number of layers of hierarchy and supervision within the group. This describes hierarchical groups
such as the RAF, which had a clearly defined set of leaders and subordinates (Crenshaw, 1985). Second,
terrorist groups can also be horizontally differentiated. This captures the number of independent sub-
units working on pieces of a larger, more complex task (Dugan and Gibbs, 2009, p. 113). Hamas has
such a set-up, where it is organized in functional cells, some working on fundraising or social services,
while others carry out military operations (Hill and Ward, 2002). Third, terrorist groups can be spatially
dispersed over several geographical locations. This is the case for AQ, where individual cells work glob-
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ally and independently from each other, both in gathering resources and in carrying out attacks (Cronin,
2006).
Jordan and Horsburgh (2005) provide evidence from the Madrid attacks in 2004 that locals unaffili-
ated with a centralized organization can carry out effective attacks. In light of such events it is crucial to
understand how terrorist groups resource their operations, and what effect the organizational structure
carries. This is even more crucial as trends show a shift in organizational designs towards more de-
centralized organizational structures. Parallel to the decentralization of terrorist groups, resources also
become more decentralized, thus decreasing the operational inefficiencies of such organizations (Laitin
and Shapiro, 2008). As the market in weapons and information about the production of weapons has
globalized, local networks without central directives are given the opportunity to take autonomous ac-
tion in the name of the broader organization (Laitin and Shapiro, 2008, p. 224). This can be seen by
the recent attacks in Europe carried out by supporters of IS. Adapting to local opportunities and con-
straints, individual attackers choose their own target and tactic. They coordinate the logistical intricacies
of the attack themselves including only a few other people that may or may not be affiliated with IS
themselves.
Recent approaches adopt a network perspective (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001). The network ap-
proach focuses on the relations of a set of actors, while recognizing the implications of these interactions
on the behavior of these actors (Knoke, 1990; Latour, 1993). Following this view, actors are interde-
pendent, which affects how they can reach their goals. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001, p. 7) apply this
view to terrorist groups, claiming that these networks have very little or no hierarchy or official author-
ity. Decision-making and tactical operations can be initiated and carried out locally without clear central
leadership. New information technologies benefit such organization (Knoke, 1990, p. 93). In the next
section I conceptualize the organizational structure of a terrorist group by the degree of centralization.
3.4.2 Conceptualizing the organizational structure by the degree of centralization
The degree of centralization is determined by the degree to which the power over decision-making is dis-
tributed within the group. I define the organizational structure to be either centralized or decentralized.
While in reality the organizational structure cannot be characterized as a clear dichotomy, I make this
binary distinction in favor of analytical clarity of the conceptualization. Centralization captures the de-
gree to which activities of a terrorist group, i.e., planning and decision-making, are concentrated within
a particular part of the group. In centralized terrorist groups all important decision-making powers are
with the leadership of the group, i.e., the center of the group. Centralization is a measure for 1) con-
centration of power, 2) the differentiation between core and peripheral actors, and 3) the location of
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decision-making in the chain of command. It captures the extent to which power over decision-making
in the organization is dispersed among its members (Mintzberg, 1980, p. 326).
In centralized terrorist groups the authority to make decisions is concentrated at the strategic lead-
ership of the group. It is responsible for coordinating strategic actions and making operational and
logistical decisions. In decentralized terrorist groups, the authority to make decisions is delegated to
lower levels. The conceptualization of terrorist groups based on centralization is closely related to the
concept of hierarchies. In a hierarchical organization the leadership delegates tasks to lower levels. The
lower levels are bound by the decisions made by the upper levels. In some instances there may be
coordination among people on the same level, but most commonly the integration and coordination of
tasks in a hierarchy is vertical instead of horizontal. Each sub-ordinate reports back to the upper level
and receives new orders. Centralized terrorist groups have communication channels that integrate the
divisions of the organization. Management literature finds these to be important for completing tasks
(Arrow, 1974; Galbraith, 1973; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Mintzberg, 1979). Early communication
research states that networks with shorter distances between each node to a central node perform better
concerning the completion of complex tasks (Bavelas, 1950). The central node acts as an “information
integrator”, collecting, filtering, and distributing the relevant information (Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell,
2011, p. 48). In centralized terrorist groups, the leadership can decide what resources are needed for
which task, coordinate their exchange, and keep track of the resources for future development. This
decision-making power of a centralized authority is attributed to their advantage in accessing to relevant
information. Since the different sections of the group communicate with the central authority, the lead-
ership knows which resources are present in which part of the organization. It can plan and coordinate
the separate sections in a way that supports the overall goal of the organization.
Decentralized terrorist groups have a flat hierarchy. In decentralized terrorist groups, the individual
cells are not highly specialized. Since the individual cells are not integrated in a central coordination pro-
cess, they do not receive tactical directions, material contributions, or cognitive resources by other parts
of the terrorist group. Instead, they need to capitalize on the knowledge and resourcing opportunities
that are present in their cells. Therefore, each cell needs to either include people that complement each
other by contributing their own specialist knowledge, or they need to be generalists capable of providing
what is necessary to complete a mission successfully. Mostly, those cells are responsible for their own
actions and very rarely communicate with each other. Within the individual cells there might by some
central authority and hierarchy installed, but not between the cells that constitute the organization. Those
organizations are often labeled with the term ‘leaderless resistance’ as they are connected by the same
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broad goals and ideology but not controlled by a common authority (Kaplan, 1997).14 Sageman (2004,
2008) defines the Jihad movement as such a decentralized organization and attributes AQ with features
of leaderless Jihad. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones (2008) similarly characterize AQ as less danger-
ous than people might commonly think, because its decentralized organization amplifies problems of
coordination and communication.
A common point that fosters the prevalence of networks in practice and in research is that they have
many advantages that are rooted in their fluid structure (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones, 2008, p. 8).
Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones (2008) combine theoretical and empirical evidence to contrast the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of decentralized organizations. I focus on how the organizational structure
is influenced by a terrorist group’s environment and on how it determines the resource allocation of a
terrorist group. In other words: I focus on the determinants and consequences of a terrorist group’s
organizational structure. To develop those specific arguments in the following chapters, I discuss the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of the specific structural set-up of decentralized organization in the following
two sections as it is important to understand the interconnectedness of each of these characteristics.
Advantages of decentralization
Decentralized organizations are found to be more resilient, that is, they are better at withstanding dis-
ruption efforts. This is due to the lack of one central member, whose capturing cripples the entire
organization. Decentralized organizations also recover fast because they can replace captured members.
This capacity is promoted by two structural criteria that Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones (2008, p. 15)
call ‘loose coupling’ and ‘redundant design’, which reduce the vulnerability of the entire organization.
Loose coupling refers to members of a decentralized organization being connected as little as possible
and as much as necessary. Organizations decrease the amount of people who are privy to information
about other members of the group or details of a specific operation. In case of one person being captured
and interrogated, this person does not know enough to jeopardize the entire organization. Helfstein and
Wright (2011) find that since law enforcement agencies have only limited knowledge about the organiz-
ation, the probability that they capture a central member is smaller in decentralized organizations than in
centralized ones. Their finding is supported by empirical evidence from studying criminal networks that
supposedly rely on built-in redundancy to avoid the disruption of the group (Bruinsma and Bernasco,
2004; Kenney, 2007).
‘Redundant design’ means that members can replace another member if necessary, allowing the
14Terrorist groups can include all specialized divisions in one cell. However, this is only feasible if the terrorist group is very
small, leading to other problems, such as, the lack of certain specialties.
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operation to continue without disruption (Burt, 1992). There are two types of redundancy. Structural
redundancy refers to a structural design in which any member has a structural equivalent. For example,
where one member connects two otherwise disconnected parts of the organization the capture of this
member may potentially severely disrupt the organization. By having another member in the same
bridging position the organization ensures its resilience. If two members fulfill the same functional role
in the organization they are functionally equivalent.15 A terrorist organization that has two members
with, for example, the skills to assemble a bomb can still carry on if one of them gets captured. Terrorist
organizations build redundancy into their organization even though they increase their visibility and
offer more points for security breaches. For clandestine organizations, every additional person who
knows other members or details of an ongoing operation may become a liability.
Previous research argues that decentralized organizations are better at adapting to changes in the en-
vironment (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones, 2008, p. 8). Based on the loose coupling criterion explained
above, boundaries and internal connections of the organization are more flexible than in a centralized
organization. Whereas in a centralized organization change requires fundamental restructuring and the
central leadership gives the direction of change, a decentralized organization can react to external stim-
uli where necessary while leaving the rest of the organization unconcerned. Decentralized organizations
can disconnect from abundant contacts and form new connections where necessary (Thompson, 2003,
p. 144). For example, if a terrorist organization no longer requires the skill-set of a specific mem-
ber, but requires members with different know-how, it is relatively easy to sever connections to the old
member and get into contact with new ones. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones (2008, p. 15) content that
decentralized organizations are able to relocate geographically. Considering the relative lack of a phys-
ical infrastructure allows them to move operations quickly from one geographic area to the next, thus
increasing their adaptive ability.
Closely related to adaptability is the scalability of organizations. Scalability is the ability to easily
add new members (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones, 2008, p. 14). If new challenges require new skill-
sets or geographic expansion, decentralized organizations can adapt by adding new members (Mayntz,
2004; Podolny and Page, 1998; Powell and Smith-Doerr, 1994). Decentralized networks that are dis-
tributed over large geographical areas and divers parts of the population can also benefit in terms of
recruitment. Their membership pool connects to different parts of the society, whose human capital
might be beneficial to the organization (Klandermans, Kriese and Tarrow, 1988). Those recruitment
networks can span large geographic areas. As such, IS is able to recruit people in Europe based on their
15In reality no two members are exactly the same. If their skillset is suffiently interchangeable, those two members are
functionally redundant.
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members that are already located in Europe. Research identifies the wider recruitment scale as a primary
advantage of decentralized organizations. Scalability is also promoted by the advances in communic-
ation and information technologies enabling organizations to coordinate activities over long distances
(Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones, 2008, p. 14). Ample evidence reports how clandestine organizations
benefit from using the internet to coordinate and plan their activities, to move funds, and to mobilize
supporters (Zanini and Edwards, 2001).
Decentralized organizations have advantageous information processing capacities. In a centralized
organization, the decision-making authority receives a lot of information that it needs to process simul-
taneously, increasing the risk of congestion and delay (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones, 2008, p. 13).
Given that every person has limited cognitive capacities, some information may be overlooked or de-
cisions might take longer to be made. In addition, members of the terrorist group may feel more valued
and motivated to fight for the collective goal if they are included in the decision-making process. Indi-
vidual members have more discretion over their actions as they match the information they receive to the
local requirements (Baker and Faulkner, 1993; Powell, 1990; Scharpf, 1994). Decentralization capital-
izes on the specific knowledge and skill-set of other members, potentially resulting in better decisions.
Horizontal communication not only includes more diverse members of the group into the decision-
making process but also relies on inter-personal trusted connections. Both aspects increase the quality
of output based on such lateral communication and information integration. Information that originates
from a trusted source is interpreted differently than information from a stranger. Trusted relationships
are based on reciprocal loyalty and repeated interactions (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Powell, 1990). This
promotes joint evaluation of the information. If member A knows member B has a specific set of skills
and can contribute to his own work, and if they trust each other based on previous interactions, they can
work together to reach a better outcome at greater speed (Podolny and Page, 1998, p. 62).
This is related to the advantageous innovative capacity of decentralized organizations. Research
found decentralized organizations to be better at innovation and facilitating organizational learning (e.g.,
Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Podolny and Page, 1998; Powell, 1990). Knowledge is said to diffuse faster in
decentralized organizations than in centralized ones, allowing individual members to learn quickly about
opportunities and threats (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones, 2008, p. 16). In centralized organizations the
distribution of information needs to be controlled by the central authority. This might neglect the full
potential of the members of the group and also potentially overwork the central authority. Decentral-
ized organization, therefore, decreases the workload of the leadership and the organization’s overall
dependence on the quality of its leadership.
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Disadvantages of decentralization
Decentralized organizations have been found to be good in disseminating information within the or-
ganization. In the previous paragraph I illustrated how horizontal communication can contribute to the
organization producing better output. However, Watts (2004) finds that distributed organizations per-
form worse than centralized organizations as they lack a central entity that catalogues the knowledge
and distributes knowledge and information in an efficient way to all members. They need to receive
the information in order to work at the top of their game. In decentralized organizations information
might travel laterally, but it is un-coordinated. There is no guarantee that information reaches the inten-
ded member and that it reaches said member in a timely manner. A central authority that coordinates
communication and information distribution can circumvent such disadvantages.
Another disadvantage is ineffective decision-making (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones, 2008, p. 21).
Literature focusing on the advantages of decentralization highlights decentralized organization’s ability
to be flexible and adapt dynamically to a changing environment. However, the structural intricacies
of decentralized organizations are unlikely to be as dynamic as argued. Terrorist groups need to make
decisions “regarding resource allocation, tactics, whether and when to use violence, what social and
political levers to manipulate, and so on” (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones, 2008, p. 21). Powell points
out that due to a lack of central guidance and authority the decision-making process in decentralized
organizations is probably slow and complicated (Powell, 1990, p. 318). The lack of control over people
and their decisions can lead to inconsistencies in the decision-making process potentially harming the
strategic goal of the terrorist group and damaging its credibility in the eyes of the supporters. Each
member of a terrorist group may have private objectives alongside the collective goals. Delegating
decision-making power to individual members without vertical control allows them to act according to
their private incentives. Consequently, resources might be used inefficiently, tactics are contradictory
and costly to the overall group objective, and private short-term gains trump the long-term success of
the terrorist group (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones, 2008, p. 21).
Considering that delegation occurs also along functional roles, members possess specialized skills
and knowledge introducing additional sources for inconsistency. They might not coordinate with other
divisions, making decisions based on incomplete information. Furthermore, having to make the decision
on their own might overwhelm some members. This might lead to inert decision-making, depriving the
terrorist group of acting to their full potential, or maintaining the flexibility needed to survive and strive
in a changing and challenging environment.
While one advantage of decentralized organizations is the scalability of recruitment and structural
68
adaptability, illicit organizations face some crucial limitations (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones, 2008,
p. 23). As clandestine organizations, terrorist groups need to prioritize trust and loyalty between their
members. This limits the size of terrorist groups and restricts their recruitment activities (Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni and Jones, 2008, p. 23). Trust is easier developed in small communities (Thompson, 2003)
and people are more likely to know many or all members that carry out activities together instead of
delegating tasks to some stranger. The social distance between the members of a group is small, which
promotes trust relationships. Since clandestine organizations heavily rely on inter-personal trust rela-
tionships the adaptability of decentralized terrorist groups is restricted. Since those relationships are
rooted in familial ties, it is difficult to cut those connections even if they are no longer required (Podolny
and Page, 1998, p. 61-62). Those relationships are oftentimes linked to a specific location, making
geographical expansion difficult.
Research on network formation suggests that trust is more easily generated in homogenous organiz-
ations (Igarashi et al., 2008). Illicit organizations capitalize on preexisting social relationships to recruit
friends and family members. Those groups share a similar outlook on culture, challenges, and reasons to
engage in illegal activities and terrorism (Erickson, 1981; Klandermans, Kriese and Tarrow, 1988; Raab
and Milward, 2003).16 In his study about the Mujahedeen network of AQ, Mark Sageman (2004, p. 113)
finds that at least 75 % of fighters have preexisting ties to family members or friends who were already
part of the network. Such familial ties can also restrict the amount of new information and resources
flowing into the organization.
The compartmentalization of cells restricts members exchanging knowledge only within their cell,
impeding their chances to learn from the experience of others (Kenney, 2007, p. 115). Lacking commu-
nication and exchange between cells in decentralized organization increases the compartmentalization
and restricts the group’s capacity for innovation and learning. This restriction is enhanced as decent-
ralized organizations lack the central repository needed to conserve knowledge over time (Levitt and
March, 1988). As a consequence, the skills and experiences disappear with the members possessing
them leaving the organization voluntarily or by being captured or killed. A central entity can collect,
store, integrate and distribute knowledge functioning as an organizational memory.17
More generally, in-fighting is more likely in decentralized organizations (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and
Jones, 2008, p. 27). Local decision-making in decentralized organizations enhances a terrorist group’s
responsiveness to local challenges and it promotes collective-action issues that stem from coordination
16Generally, the importance of trust depends on the severity of the crime committed. The more dangerous and risky the
activity the more clandestine organizations rely on trusted networks of people (McFarlane, 1999, p. 53). Considering the risk
inherent to terrorism that is facing the constant risk of disruption, terrorist groups are expected to prioritize trust and loyalty
over the expansion of their organization (Crenshaw, 1985).
17This mechanism is empirically explored in chapter 6.
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problems. Without central coordination a decentralized terrorist group lacks coherent resource allocation
mechanisms and tactical guidance resulting in diminishing operational and organizational capabilities of
the terrorist group as a whole. In addition, without a local authority that coordinates and monitors local
divisions, challengers are more likely to rise up to threaten the cohesion of the group.
Collective action problems arise more frequently the longer the geographical distance between the
members of the terrorist group. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones (2008, p. 28) content that decentralized
terrorist groups face obstacles due to misunderstandings that emerge without face-to-face interaction.
Communication that is only conducted via impersonal messaging such as e-mail, voice transmissions,
or instant messaging is prone to misinterpretation and misjudgment (Hinds and Bailey, 2003; Hinds and
Mortensen, 2005). A central hub not only ensures efficient decision-making, but it can also provide
individual members with a central base where they can meet, train, and coordinate activities. The lack
of such a hub might increase the security of a terrorist group, but it promotes the likelihood of local solo
action and decreases social cohesion between the members of the terrorist group (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni
and Jones, 2008, p. 29). Until security forces reclaimed the territory occupied by the IS, their self-
proclaimed caliphate attracted individuals from all over the world to go there and join their organization.
There they would train together, carry out military operations, and develop a social bond to the collective
purpose of the group (Dearden, 2016). With the loss of this territory, people no longer travel there but
radicalize at home and carry out attacks close to where they live. The tactics are chosen by the individual
attacker, which does not guarantee a unified strategy. As such, the attackers match the tactic to their
abilities.18
To summarize, both decentralized and centralized organizations provide benefits to terrorist groups.
Terrorist groups face existential danger from a myriad of sources. They are actively fought against by an
enemy government against which a decentralized organization provides increased resilience. However,
the need for loyalty and trust established in close personal relationships might limit the abilities of
a terrorist group to decentralize. Terrorist groups need to mobilize support on an ideational and more
material level, which may also require them to stand their ground against potential contenders. Failing to
meet those ends can ultimately threaten the survival of the group. They need a coherent strategic vision
and tactical consistency. Here, greater centralization is advantageous as it enhances coordination and
accountability between the individual members of the group. The need for strategic cohesion and tactical
consistency challenges the advantages of the decentralized organization in flexibility, scalability, and
resilience. Therefore, there is no ideal form of a group’s organizational structure. Terrorist groups have
to understand and mitigate the respective risks associated with their existing organizational structure.
18This exemplifies the argument I make in this dissertation.
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3.5 Summary
Table 3.2 summarizes the key focus of my dissertation. It provides an overview of key concepts and
key characteristics for each focal component in my theory. I build on existing theories of strategic
management and apply the concepts to analyzing terrorist groups.
Table 3.2: The economic market of terrorism
Focus Key concept Key characteristic
Unit of analysis Terrorist group Economic organization
Source of variation Resources Tradability
Acquisition Exchange relations Relational rents
Allocation Efficient management Centralization
My unit of analysis is the terrorist group. I conceptualize it as an economic entity and as an or-
ganization. This allows me to use organizational theories to explore the behavior of terrorist groups.
While it is nearly impossible to study terrorist groups’ internal dynamics due to its secretive nature,
focusing on organizational idiosyncrasies enables me to explore behavioral differences as a function of
group-internal dynamics. In addition, I assume that each terrorist group has to be an economic actor.
Each terrorist group needs to ensure a supply of resources to carry out attacks. The source of variation
in terrorist groups’ performance lies within the resources that each terrorist group has at its disposal.
Several conceptualizations of terrorist groups’ resources exist. I provide a novel classification referring
to economic theories of resource-dependence and resource exchange. I define resources based on their
tradability, focusing on the opportunity to acquire resources from their environment. Shifting the focus
onto terrorist groups’ exchange relations, I argue that they can reap relational rents. They achieve a
higher performance when cooperating with other actors in their environment. Building on network the-
ory, I discuss how terrorist groups can enhance their performance by engaging in cooperative exchange
relations. I also argue that terrorist groups need to be able to efficiently manage their resources. Terrorist
groups that are better at managing their resources can achieve a higher performance. Using organiza-
tional theory, I build an argument based on the organizational structure of terrorist groups arguing that
centralized terrorist groups are superiorly managing their resources.
I offer a novel approach to studying the behavior of terrorist groups by analyzing the terrorist group
in interaction with its environment. The environment offers a terrorist group access to resources. It
also defines the conditions, in which a terrorist group needs to operate and survive. The environment
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influences the organizational structure of a terrorist group, which, consequently, influences a terrorist
group’s performance.
I explore three empirical mechanisms to study how the resourcing process affects how a terrorist
group can conduct attacks. First, I explore how terrorist groups design their organizational structure
given certain environmental conditions (chapter 4). I argue that terrorist groups match their organiz-
ational structure to the environmental conditions. Second, I explore terrorist groups’ involvement in
organized crime (chapter 5). Since terrorist groups can generate a substantive amount of revenue by
engaging in organized crime, I study the predictive capacity of several environmental and organizational
factors combining both group-internal dynamics and terrorist groups’ interactions with their environ-
ment. Finally, I explore the operational performance of terrorist groups and to what degree they are
affected by patterns of cooperation between terrorist groups (chapter 6). Focusing on relational rents, I
argue that terrorist groups exchange resources with other terrorist groups. I assess the effect of efficient
resource allocation on the operational performance of terrorist groups by testing whether centralized
terrorist groups perform better than decentralized groups and whether the organizational structure of a
terrorist group mediates its external resource acquisition.
Figure 3.1: Theoretical framework
Figure 3.1 illustrates the theoretical framework graphically. I elaborate the individual theoretical
mechanisms in the empirical chapters and derive testable hypotheses. I also provide specific details on
the research design for testing the implications of my theory in the respective empirical chapters.
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Chapter 4
The environmental effect on the
organizational structure of terrorist
groups
“An organization cannot evolve or develop in ways which merely reflect the goal, motives
or needs of its members or of its leadership, since it must always bow to the constraints
imposed on it by the nature of its relationship with the environment” (Sadler and Barry,
1970, p. 58).
4.1 Introduction
Why does the organizational structure of terrorist groups vary between centralized and decentralized
structural designs? In this chapter, I focus on the effect that the environment of a terrorist group has
on the organizational structure of the group. While previous research focuses primarily on the secur-
ity environment of terrorist groups linking their organizational structure to counter-terrorism pressures
(Sageman, 2004; Pace, 2014), I argue that this analysis is incomplete. I do not dispute that high counter-
terrorist pressure leads to terrorist groups adopting a more decentralized structure to decrease their like-
lihood of being detected, infiltrated and disrupted to the point where they cannot function anymore
(Helfstein and Wright, 2011; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones, 2008; Podolny and Page, 1998; Sinno,
2008). However, I argue that we need to consider more than just security constraints when we want to
understand the organization of terrorist groups. If security concerns were the only factor terrorist groups
consider, there should not be any observable anomalies.
Most of the Northern Irish terrorist groups had a centralized structure even though the United King-
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dom has a very high counter-terrorist capacity. Also, we should not observe any within-country variation.
This deviation from theoretical expectation cannot be explained by theories linking counter-terrorist
pressures to the organizational structure of the terrorist groups alone. Out of the 48 countries that are
part of the sample studied here, 23 of them host centralized and decentralized terrorist organizations.1
Another approach expects terrorist groups to no longer needing to have centralized structures, since
modern communication technology allows for remote planning and coordination of the attack as much as
the remote recruitment and training of the attackers (Crenshaw, 2008; Jenkins, 2006). They attribute this
development to the availability of new communication technology that allows for a larger distribution of
the organization without sacrificing coordination capabilities. Moreover, the prevalence of decentralized
terrorist organizations today can be implicitly linked to a decentralized resource acquisition strategy.
Faced with a substantial loss of state funding after the end of the Cold War and again after 9/11, ter-
rorist groups need to adapt to not having a central supporter. As resources become more decentralized,
terrorist groups need to accommodate their organization to minimize operational inefficiencies (Laitin
and Shapiro, 2008). As the market in weapons and information about the production of weapons has
globalized and modern communication technology is available to be used by everybody, local networks
without central directions are given the opportunity to take autonomous action in the name of a broader
organization (Laitin and Shapiro, 2008, p. 224). However, the data show that even in the years after
2000, more than half of all newly founded terrorist groups are structured centrally. The determinants for
that pattern need to be explored more thoroughly.2 The question remains: Why do some terrorist groups
adopt a centralized organizational structure, while others do not?
This study highlights the relationship between the terrorist group’s environmental conditions and
its organizational structure. I discussed the advantages and disadvantages of organizational designs
in chapter 3. Based on this discussion, I claim that the most efficient organizational structure for a
terrorist group is a centralized one. But some terrorist groups adopt a decentralized structure. This
study investigates specific factors that can explain those deviations from the ideal type of a centralized
organizational structure. I focus on the conditions introduced by the environment. Those factors are
external to a terrorist group. Internal factors constitute all those elements that a terrorist group can
control. Previous research discusses, for example, regional scope (Ohlheiser, 2014), the incorporation of
multiple goals (Pace, 2014) or attack type (Abrahms and Potter, 2015) to be affecting the organizational
structure of terrorist groups.
1In India, for example, there are 29 terrorist groups, of which 11 have a decentralized structure and 18 are organized
centrally.
2Of all newly founded terrorist groups after 2000 in the sample, 49 % adopt a decentralized organizational structure and 51
are organized centrally.
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Additionally, the data on environmental variables are generally more precise and reliable than data
on internal variables. Moreover, external factors can be observed across various countries and over
an extended period of time, rendering any conclusions drawn from their analysis more transparent and
reliable.3 Previous research that focused on organizational structure of terrorist groups mainly used it as
an explanatory variable for a terrorist group’s violence profile in general (Heger, Jung and Wong, 2012)
or for the choice of particular tactics (Abrahms and Potter, 2015). My argument in this chapter specifies
the relationship between the environment and the organization, as it links resourcing opportunities and
security concerns to structural designs.
I argue that a terrorist group adopts a specific organizational design after assessing how the ideal
organizational structure needs to look like, given the environment it operates in. Depending on the
environmental conditions, a terrorist group has more or fewer opportunities to mobilize resources or
to adopt a broader repertoire of functions. I analyze the effect of a state’s security measures on the
organizational structure of a terrorist group. I assess the effect of a state’s military capacity to capture
the general capability of a state to counter terrorist groups in their territory. Additionally, I evaluate
the effect of repressive activities capturing the willingness of a state to use violence against non-state
actors on their territory. Being faced with such security challenges, terrorist groups need to capitalize
on the opportunities provided in their environment. Depending on the opportunities, terrorist groups
can mobilize the population to support their organization or generate financial and material resources. I
focus on the existence of other terrorist groups in the country and the degree of ethnic fractionalization
to explore those opportunities. My approach captures both the restrictions and the opportunities that lie
within a terrorist group’s environment.
Group-dynamics can also affect the organizational structure of terrorist groups. A comprehensive
approach concerning the research on terrorist group’s organizational structure ultimately needs to com-
bine external and internal factors to fully understand why terrorist groups organize in the way they do. I
rely on ideology as one internal factor that can be evaluated from the outside. Ideology is publicly com-
municated by the terrorist group and can be used to infer their political goals and strategic intentions.4
As I show below, my findings suggest that environmental conditions influence the organizational
structure of terrorist groups. The results show that the state capacity to repress and also the willingness
to repress increase the likelihood of a terrorist group being decentralized, supporting previous findings
(Helfstein and Wright, 2011). My research highlights that it is important to focus on the activities that
terrorist groups do. Many groups extract resources from the population. Moreover, they can also provide
3Accepting the limitations of internal data, understanding the effect of environmental conditions on a terrorist group’s
organizational structure is even more relevant.
4Other group-internal factors are, for example, organizational size, territorial control, or organizational age.
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public goods for their constituency. The results indicate that in countries, where terrorist groups need to
coordinate between multiple ethnic fractions, the likelihood of having a centralized structure increases.
During the Cold War, when many terrorist groups were funded by states to operate as their proxies in
conflicts, they were also more likely to adopt a centralized organizational structure. Terrorist groups that
follow a maximalist ideology are less likely to be centralized, suggesting that those terrorist groups need
to adopt a flexible organizational structure to accomodate its members.
4.2 Organizations as sticky institutions
This part of the dissertation focuses on why terrorist groups adopt either centralized or decentralized
forms of governance. I argue that the environmental conditions at the time of organizational formation
affect a terrorist group’s decision about which structural design it chooses. This argument is based
on the assumption that one organizational style is more functional and desirable at a specific point in
time given the prevalent conditions (Podolny and Page, 1998, p. 68). Findings on structural inertia
support this approach. Hannan and Freeman (1984, p. 151) argue in favor of structural inertia claiming
“the speed of reorganization is much lower than the rate at which environmental conditions change.”
Building on Stinchcombe’s (1965) arguments of organizational stability, the structure of an organization
is established during its early days and difficult to change (Podolny and Page, 1998, p. 68). Stinchcombe
(1965) notes that the organizational structure is stable, because it tends to become institutionalized and
holds a value that goes beyond technical or economic efficiency. As such, a certain organizational
structure may favor the position of individuals within the organization resulting in an organizational
design that is more stable than it should be in changing conditions. Podolny and Page (1998, p. 68) offer
examples from the computer industry, in which firms that started their business years ago display a high
level of vertical integration, whereas younger firms are less vertically integrated due to shifting market
conditions. Instead of adapting to the new conditions, the older firms stick to their older structural
designs.
Organizations refrain from structural reform because it is costly. Davis and Powell (1992, p. 333)
claim that change threatens the interests within the organization. Reorganization includes a redistri-
bution of power in the organization. Members who stand to lose in the process of change might act
against it. This is even more relevant as those members that have the most to lose are usually those
who have the most resources to work against change. Moreover, even if an organization manages to
change the structural design, its continued success is not guaranteed (Davis and Powell, 1992, p. 333).
Davis and Powell (1992, p. 333) state, “attempts at reorganization lower the organization’s reliability,
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increasing the probability of organizational death, and the risk increases with the time it takes to accom-
plish reorganization.” Terrorist groups might, thus, refrain from structural reorganization. Infighting
decreases their operational and organizational capacity, decreases tactical and strategic cohesiveness, or
leads to organizational splits. Decreasing cohesiveness and organizational infighting can lead to opera-
tional mistakes or unnecessary risk-taking. Therefore, it can also increase the visibility of the terrorist
group, enhancing its vulnerability to disruption and threaten group survival.
Davis and Powell (1992, p. 333) assert that organizations lose much of their accumulated knowledge
stored within the old structure if reorganization happens. This forces them to face again the ‘liability
of newness’ (Stinchcombe, 1965; Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Interpersonal relationships are broken
up and new ones need to be established. For clandestine organizations, such as terrorist groups, this
is a substantive obstacle to reorganization. As elaborated in chapter 3, personal relationships between
members of terrorist groups are based on loyalty and trust - two attributes that are crucial for maintaining
the optimal functionality of terrorist groups. These attributes need time to develop and are lost when ties
are severed in the process of reorganization. This might impede the functionality of a terrorist group and
threatens their survival. Moreover, since members of a terrorist group are often related through kinship
or friendship, severing those ties might not even be possible.
Taken together, these observations underscore my line of argument that terrorist groups establish
their organizational structure when founding the group and are unlikely to change it in the future.
4.3 Which structure to adopt?
Glazer and Weiss (1993) state that there is no universally best structure because it depends on the en-
vironment. They argue that contextual factors constrain the organizational structure of firms. Child
(1972, p. 8) explains that “these constraints are assumed to have force because [...] organizations must
achieve certain levels of performance in order to survive. If organizational structure is not adapted to its
context, then opportunities are lost, costs rise, and the maintenance of the organization is threatened.”
This notion of environmental effects on the organization go back to contingency theory, which claims
that the best way for an organization to organize depends on the nature of the environment that it needs
to adapt to (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Scott, 1981). Contingency theory suggests that organizational
performance is achieved by matching organizational contingencies with structure (Donaldson, 2001).
Following the discussion of advantages and disadvantages of decentralization in chapter 3, I content
that in an ideal world, terrorist groups centralize their organization at least to some degree as it enhances
their overall performance. An ideal environment 1) is free from state repression, 2) contains opportunit-
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ies for mobilizing resources, and 3) provides terrorist groups with a void of governmental control which
it can take over and assume functions to increase its legitimacy in the eyes of the population. From
this perspective, centralized terrorist groups are better at the production of violence. Previous research
supports my claim (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones, 2008; Podolny and Page, 1998). Heger, Jung and
Wong (2012, p. 745) argue that the functional specialization within units positively impacts an organ-
izations lethality. They argue that 1) a clear chain of command and control to coordinate the efforts of
various parts of the organization, 2) the accountability between functional units, and 3) central control
each supports the positive impact of functional differentiation on the organization’s lethality. Those
characteristics of a centralized organization maximize a group’s ability to translate resources of all kinds
into violence. Given the observable variation in organizational designs, the question remains why some
terrorist groups deviate from such an ideal structure.
Illicit organizations have been found to choose their organizational set-up based on a strategic de-
liberation given their respective resources and their functional goal (e.g., Easton and Karaivanov, 2009;
Tremblay, Bouchard and Petit, 2009). Tremblay, Bouchard and Petit (2009) analyze the structure of
Hells Angels, finding that they decentralize tasks and operations since they wish to enhance the geo-
graphical scope of their trafficking operations, but are constrained by their limited size of membership.
Easton and Karaivanov (2009) analyze the optimal crime network structure in response to alterations in
a specified set of costs and benefits. They find that certain strategies to counter crime are ineffective in
cases where the crime network is aware of measures and can adopt their structure accordingly. They
give the example that removing the ‘key player’ from the network might be ineffective when accounted
for by the crime network endogenously. This finding matches network theory, which argues that built-
in redundancy can increase a network’s resilience to external shocks (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones,
2008; Podolny and Page, 1998).
Previous literature and anecdotal evidence suggest that in an environment that is beyond the reach
of government authorities, terrorist groups can coordinate their activities without fearing discovery and
disruption (BBC, 2016; Sinno, 2008). Some terrorist groups control such safe havens. Terrorist groups
use political instability in a country to undermine institutionalized structures and counter-initiatives. As
such, IS first set up operations in Iraq, which was left with a power vacuum after U.S. troops retreated
without a stable Iraqi government in place (Johnston et al., 2016). Another example is al-Qaeda, which
in the 1990s had moved the base of its organization to Sudan to be free from repression (Sageman, 2004).
While those territories outside any governmental control exist, states can be better and worse equipped to
deal with violent opposition groups within their borders. As clandestine organizations, terrorist groups
are required to maximize their organizational security by adopting an organizational structure that is
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resilient to interdiction. States that are good at countering terrorist groups can increase “the degree of
threat that faces the organizational decision-makers in the achievement of their goals” (Child, 1972,
p. 4).
4.3.1 Case examples
My research is informed by various instances of terrorist groups matching their organizational structure
to the environmental conditions. In the following, I briefly describe cases of terrorist groups provid-
ing motivational evidence for my research. First, I discuss the case of the so-called Islamic State (IS).
Second, I elaborate on two terrorist groups that use organized crime to fund themselves. Those descrip-
tions do not attempt to provide an empirical test of the argument, but rather provide case-based specific
examples to support a purported trend. Most terrorist groups do not change their organizational structure
over the course of their life. Some groups, however, manage to adjust their organization to tremendous
changes in their environment to ensure their survival and performance. Exploring those cases in more
detail allows me to hone in on the specific mechanisms of how environmental conditions affect the
organizational structure of a terrorist group.
The most recent case of IS is very informative. Over the course of the past years, many documents
were discovered reporting governance structures in great detail (Johnston et al., 2016). In 2013, IS star-
ted to rise in Iraq and Syria. Its members included the rank and file of Saddam Hussein’s government
and military apparatus. It adopted a state-like structure to fill the vacuum created after the U.S. inva-
sion (Johnston et al., 2016). It established a hierarchy not unlike that of a regular state. This structure
included pseudo ministries, which were led by individuals that were responsible for their departments
and reported to the leadership of the group. IS was very prone to extracting resources from its envir-
onment. It had access to oil fields, antiquities, and weapons (Johnston et al., 2016). It complemented
those resources by taxing the population in their territory (Johnston et al., 2016). IS also provided a
great variety of public goods to the population in their territories. It offered education, health care, and
employed people as ‘civil servants’ (Johnston et al., 2016). Moreover, it established a court system and
processed people disobeying their laws (Johnston et al., 2016). Thus, the Islamic State is a highly cent-
ralized organization, which has control over many functions of social life beside their military actions.
It also attracted many supporters from all over the world, who were willing to move into the territories
controlled by the group. Also, IS expanded its operations to Syria, again profiting from the lack of
governmental authority, which allowed IS to step in to appropriate the state’s functions.
In 2017, IS faced a different environment. The level of repression on IS by the coalition forces
had increased extensively as the international coalition increased their efforts to eradicate IS in Iraq
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and Syria. As a result, the group lost most of its territories and the funding opportunities that came
with them (Riley, 2017). It no longer controled any oil fields. It also stopped providing public goods
to its ‘citizens’ (Schorzman, 2016). It only provided military resistance and has shrunk to only a few
committed fighters. Facing this new context, it changed its strategy from establishing a state in a distinct
territory to committing terrorist attacks worldwide. To meet the demands of such a strategy, it went from
a strictly centralized structure to one relying on coaching and inspiring individual cells of individuals
sharing their ideology (Schmitt and Kirkpatrick, 2015). Facing the increasing repression of its organiza-
tions and the crumbling support of the population, it needed to adapt if it wanted to keep the movement
alive. However, it was not only the physical pressure on its organization that forced it to decentralize its
organization and operation. It also did not need to maintain a broad repertoire of functions. It no longer
provided any services to its population, given that it did not have any physical resources to extract and
sell any longer.
Research has also shown that the organizational structure accommodates the requirements of spe-
cific resource mobilization strategies (Eccarius-Kelly, 2012). Terrorist groups also fund themselves by
engaging in organized crime, ranging from the cultivation and trafficking of drugs, the mining of gold
or diamonds, to exploiting natural resources. They traffic humans, weapons, wildlife or antiquities; use
extortion, fraud and money laundering (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Felbab-Brown, 2010; Lujala,
2010; Ross, 2006; Saab and Taylor, 2009; Vittori, 2011). Eccarius-Kelly (2012) provides case-study
evidence that terrorist groups decentralize their organization to accommodate the logistical challenges
of being successful in the illegal drug trafficking business. She compares the Kurdish Workers Party
(PKK) to the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC), finding that both create specialized
units to deal with drug trafficking. Still, those groups did not fully abandon their centralized structure
but rather created ‘tentacles’ reaching out from the center to complete various tasks. Those parts acted
in large parts independent from each other, but they were accountable to the central authority, which
coordinates the activities. This adds evidence to my claim that terrorist groups are reluctant or unable to
undergo extensive structural reform. It also highlights their responsiveness to the environment. Given
the possibility of engaging in drug cultivation and trafficking, those groups needed to match their organ-
izational structure to manage the added functional requirement.
The environmental complexity also affects the structural organization of terrorist groups. Child
(1972, p. 3) defines environmental complexity as “the heterogeneity and range of environmental activ-
ities which are relevant to an organization’s operations.” It captures all those efforts that a terrorist
group has to undertake to extract potential resources from its environment. The more resources are
potentially present within a terrorist group’s environment, the higher is the environmental complexity.
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Terrorist groups need to find resource generation strategies to extract as many resources as possible. In
an environment where terrorists can only access few resources, i.e., taxing the population or engaging
in common crime, the challenges of organizing the resource extraction and to process those resources
are smaller. It becomes more difficult the more diverse resources a terrorist group can extract from their
environment. This means that when faced with a complex or multidimensional resource space in their
respective environment, terrorist groups have to adapt their structure to be able to handle this complexity
and to not let potential resources, which might be beneficial for the overall achievement of their goals to
be wasted.
Additionally, Felbab-Brown (2010) argues that insurgent groups that engage in the production and
trafficking of illicit goods can create political capital. Following her rationale, terrorist groups that
engage in such illicit economies can generate popular support by employing the local population in
their business activities and by protecting them from violent rivals threatening the population’s survival
and economic lifeline. Engaging in illicit activities is not only a way to mobilize resources, but also
to create supporting ties between the terrorist group and the population. However, such ties come with
the responsibility not to destroy them and maintain operations in the interest of sustained support. This
requires some degree of central coordination to constrain deviant behavior.
Those examples describe terrorist groups as they match their organizational structure to the envir-
onmental conditions. In order to maintain their organization they need to stay hidden from government
repression, while at the same time mobilize resources to stage attacks. The more opportunities terrorist
groups have to generate resources the more they need to coordinate their actions. All groups discussed
have established specialized sections to deal with the logistical intricacies of those activities, but all
maintained central control and coordination over those activities. The examples also highlight the con-
nections a terrorist group has to its constituency. Depending on the quality of this connection, a terrorist
group has to broaden its functional repertoire. It may not be enough to carry out attacks, but it also has
to provide other goods and services to the population. In the following section, I use this case-based
evidence to formulate a general theoretical argument that I then use in a large-n approach to identify
global trends.
4.4 Environmental explanation of organizational structure
Terrorist groups operate in different environmental conditions. I investigate the conditions under which
terrorist groups adopt a specific organizational structure. While for some terrorist groups the central-
ized structure is optimal, for some it is the decentralized structure. Stern and Modi (2010) find that
82
organizations adjust to a non-favorable environment by maintaining an adaptive mechanism to survive
in a competitive environment. I employ a political opportunity model arguing that a terrorist group’s
opportunity to freely go about its business is constrained by the conditions of the environment in which
it operates. The environment of a terrorist group introduces uncertainty about the interactions with other
actors, ranging from a supporting population and the target audience to more tangible interaction with
competitors or state and non-state benefactors. A terrorist group needs to function within this context.
It needs to mobilize resources, coordinate independent tasks, and it needs to deliver some output.5 Fol-
lowing this rationale, I argue that the organizational structure of a terrorist group needs to implement
features to reduce uncertainty, while capitalizing on present opportunities.
Increasing governmental pressure on the organization itself but also on other parties with whom
the terrorist group interacts, increases the level of stress for the terrorist group, which also decreases
its operational possibilities. Increasing pressure on terrorist groups leads to their decentralization, be-
cause they need to structure in a way that does not lead to the total collapse of the organization in case
of a strike against them (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones, 2008; Helfstein and Wright, 2011; Raab and
Milward, 2003). Cronin (2009) observes that leadership decapitation is not effective in cases of a de-
centralized organization with distributed functions and roles, since they include enough redundancy to
replace someone in case one person gets removed from the organization being captured or killed. A
similar logic applies to randomly targeting members of the organization. The likelihood of capturing a
member in a vital position is smaller in a decentralized organization, and even if someone is captured,
redundancy ensures someone to step in and bridge this gap. Also, captured and interrogated members
can only tell others about their immediate contacts, not knowing the entire structural layout and hier-
archy of the organization. Oftentimes, members do not know the location of the person in charge or even
his or her true identity. After the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, Osama bin Laden explained
in a video “those who were trained to fly didn’t know the others. One group of people did not know the
other group” (Michael and Wahba, 2004).
In this respect, the environmental freedom available to a terrorist group is determined by the counter-
terrorism capacity of the state in its home country and the state’s ability to repress violent movements.
Being a clandestine actor operating underground, high counter-terrorism capacity restricts a terrorist
group’s freedom to move around and go about its business. In contrast, in a state with low counter-
terrorism capacity, a terrorist group faces less existential danger and can operate more freely.
5Some terrorist groups have a militarized and a non-militarized section. They need to produce attacks, but some also need
to deliver social services.
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Hypothesis 1 (Ability to repress): The higher the ability of a government to repress a terrorist group,
the less likely it is that a terrorist group adopts a centralized organizational structure.
I differentiate the ability to repress from the willingness to repress. Not every country that has a
police force and military apparatus at their disposal decides to actively engage terrorist groups. Further-
more, a government can choose to employ different strategies to counter terrorism in their country. It can
adhere to the rule of law and legitimate institutions or it can decide to use more radical forms, including
torture, political disappearances or extrajudicial killings. I assume the same considerations concerning
the terrorist group’s security to hold when faced with such activities.
Hypothesis 2 (Willingness to repress): The higher the willingness of a government to repress a ter-
rorist group, the less likely it is that a terrorist group adopts a centralized organizational structure.
Oftentimes, terrorist groups are not the sole violent group in the country. The more terrorist groups
there are present in one country, the higher is the chance of them interacting.6 Terrorist groups in
the same country can either represent the same constituency or they can cater to different audiences.
Moreover, they can collaborate or compete with each other. Anecdotal evidence provides numerous
examples of terrorist groups whose existence is threatened by the competition with other terrorist groups
fighting within the same environment.7 Additionally, many terrorist groups have worked together. The
ongoing Syrian civil war provides numerous examples of both phenomena. Depending on the ever-
changing conditions of the conflict, allegiances are broken and new ones are formed (Zorthian, 2015).
I expect the potential interaction with other terrorist groups in a country to positively correlate with
the likelihood of terrorist groups adopting a centralized organizational structure. Terrorist groups which
experience competition from other terrorist groups need to strengthen their operational capability. In
order to succeed and outperform competing terrorist groups, they need to constantly produce terrorist
attacks. The moment in which a terrorist group stops conducting attacks in a highly competitive envir-
onment, it loses followers to other groups. In such an environment, a terrorist group cannot afford to
leave resources unused due to inefficient resource allocation.
6I am aware that, potentially, there are many divers actors which use violence to achieve their goals. They may cover the
entire spectrum ranging from criminal organizations to rebel movements. Terrorist groups can interact with all of them in
various capacities. For matters of comprehensiveness, I restrict the argumentation to interaction between terrorist groups.
7AQ lost a significant amount of supporters and affiliates to IS. Throughout the Maghreb, dissatisfied AQ movements
pledged allegiance to IS. Boko Haram in Nigeria and Ansar Beit al-Maqdis in Egypt became official provinces of the IS.
Before, those two terrorist groups were following AQ. In the fallout of those changing affiliations, those groups experienced
fractions splintering from the original group and now fight in the same regions for recognition, supporters, and resources
(Watts, 2016).
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Moreover, especially when being challenged by competitors, a terrorist group needs to ensure to be
communicating a consistent narrative to their audiences. It needs to communicate strategic consistency
to its constituency in order to convince them to provide support to the one group that combines enough
strategic and tactical foresight, professionalism, and resolve to pursue a communal goal. Those qualities
make it worthy of their support. It also needs to be consistent in its actions to strengthen its position
vis-a`-vis the government (Arreguı´n-Toft, 2001). A terrorist group needs an authority that provides the
direction of the group. Thus, when located in a highly competitive environment, a terrorist group is
required to adopt a centralized structure to efficiently allocate their resources and to communicate a
consistent narrative.
The more terrorist groups exist within a shared geographical space, the more likely it is for the
groups to engage in cooperation with each other. When terrorist groups collaborate, they intent to com-
plement and pool their resources to expand their operational repertoire (Phillips, 2012). It is in the
interest of a rational terrorist group to exploit all potential resources in its environment that enhance a
terrorist groups capability. However, no matter how short-term and non-institutionalized the exchange
is, terrorist groups increase their vulnerability as collaboration increases their visibility to outside actors.
As terrorist groups try to minimize their exposure and to not endanger their organization, it is reasonable
to assume that they only engage with other terrorist groups if they can maintain a professional organiz-
ation of the business exchange. If a terrorist group can rely on the other actor to meet the agreed upon
terms and to not act unexpectedly or disorganized, the threat to the own organization can be minimized.
This argument is in contrast to the common line of argument in the literature, which argues that when
the exposure and danger to a clandestine organization increases, they are more likely to be decentralized
(Bakker, Raab and Milward, 2012). I argue that in cases where terrorist groups interact with each other
to reap the benefits from cooperative exchange, professional behavior is key to a successful relation-
ship.8 This is also a quality that is acknowledged by criminal cartels. The Italian Mafia, one of the most
sophisticated criminal organization, and the Islamic State collaborated to traffic oil (Willan, 2017). Both
organizations are very professional, possess the ability to carry out such transactions, and want to reap
the financial benefits from the trafficking operation. Given that terrorist groups tend to take advantage on
the resource pool in their environment, they are expected to adopt a centralized organizational structure.
This communicates a certain degree of tactical and strategic guidance by a central authority to potential
cooperation partners ensuring a certain degree of professionalism.
8Analyzing data that is used in chapter 5, I find that of those terrorist groups, which cooperate, 71.3% are centralized, while
only 28.7% are decentrally organized. This correlation provides initial support for the intuition of the argument.
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Hypothesis 3 (Interaction): The higher the potential for interaction with other terrorist groups that
are located in the same country, the more likely it is that a terrorist group adopts a centralized structure.
The next mechanism draws on social divisions within a country. I argue that in a country where
ethnic fractionalization is high, terrorist groups are more likely to be centralized. Terrorist groups can
capitalize on the grievances of some ethnicity adjusting their strategic narrative to mobilize support.
They can provide services to communities, which may be neglected by government authorities, and they
may even be able to hide among their population, thus creating a type of safe haven, which may or
may not fall within some territorial demarcations. Following the rationale that terrorist groups aim to
maximize their resource pool, it is reasonable to assume that they want to mobilize as many fractions
of a society as possible. A terrorist group needs to address the needs of one fraction, while not disreg-
arding those of another. This requires an organization to be able to coordinate its actions in a way that
allows to regard different interests. As elaborated in chapter 3, centralized terrorist groups are better at
coordinating and orchestrating activities, which do not disregard the interest of parts of the organiza-
tion. Assuming that the efficient coordination between ethnic fractions becomes more difficult the more
fractions there are, I argue that the higher the ethnic fractionalization in a country is, the more likely a
terrorist group is centralized.
Hypothesis 4 (Ethnic fractionalization): The higher the ethnic fractionalization in a country is, the
more likely it is that a terrorist group adopts a centralized structure.
4.4.1 Alternative explanations
In addition to the mechanisms elaborated so far, I test alternative explanations including both environ-
mental and group-specific factors that might influence the organizational structure of terrorist groups.
The organizational structure can be linked to funding opportunities. A substantial amount of terrorist
groups are funded by states (Byman, 2005). States might do this either because they support the cause,
or because they use terrorist groups as a proxy to further their interests in specific regions. This was es-
pecially practiced during the Cold War.9 The U.S. and the Soviet Union both funded terrorist groups all
over the world raising their capacities and building a stronghold against each other’s ideologies (Kalyvas
9It is still the case after the Cold War. As such, Iran, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia are known supporters of terrorist groups
(Callimachi, 2017). All three countries claim hegemony in the Middle East and fund terrorist groups to maintain and increase
their influence in other countries. In the ongoing war in Syria, groups that are internationally listed as terrorist groups, are
funded by Western countries to fight on all sides of the Syrian civil war (BBC, 2014). However, during the Cold War this
pattern was systematically observable (Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010).
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and Balcells, 2010). Terrorist groups that were founded during the Cold War are more likely to have a
centralized structure for two reasons: First, those groups were supported to be reliable partners in proxy
wars. They were trained and equipped to be able to fight the guerilla war against their enemy. This
requires a professional and centralized military apparatus. Second, states supply terrorist groups with
money and other resources expecting the output to be in their favor. Terrorist groups are accountable to
their supporters and need to carry out operations that further their objective (Vittori, 2011). This requires
centralized discretion over strategic and tactical decisions.
Hypothesis 5 (Cold War): Terrorist groups that originated during the Cold War are more likely to
adopt a centralized structure.
Group-specific dynamics can also affect the organizational structure of a terrorist group. I argue
that the ideology of a terrorist group can affect its organizational structure. Terrorist groups that pursue
a nationalistic or separatist ideology face different requirements than do those terrorist groups which
pursue a maximalist ideology. I argue that terrorist groups which have far-reaching abstract goals that
are almost utopian in nature and non-negotiable in practice, are less likely to have a centralized organ-
izational structure. Such goals include, for example, some world-wide implementation of Sharia law or
socialist revolution. Their maximalist goals are unlikely ever becoming a reality, since the majority of
people do not share the same vision for their society (Abrahms, 2006). They also make negotiation not
an option, as the maximal demands would require the complete overthrow of the dominant cultural or
political norms (Heger and Jung, 2017).
Such terrorist groups represent only a small fraction of people with the same mindset. The RAF, for
example, was not representing large parts of German society, but rather a very small fraction of the entire
population. Similarly, only a very small constituency that is very heterogenic and international in its
own right supports IS. As a consequence, a maximalist agenda needs to inspire people to commit to the
terrorist organization’s ideology with whatever they can offer. Rather than needing a central authority
to organize an attack, those terrorist groups need to inspire and guide people to carry out attacks at
their own discretion.10 Therefore, there is neither the opportunity nor the incentive to centralize the
organizational structure.
In contrast, terrorist groups that pursue a well-defined goal, whose achievement does not resemble
utopia but can become a reality, are more likely to have a centralized organizational structure. Such
10AQ regularly publishes the online-magazine Inspire, in which it calls upon its supporters to fight for them, prints interviews
with ideologues and provides practical tips and training for specific operations.
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groups have links to a defined part of society. Oftentimes, those groups pursue ethnic or nationalistic
self-determination. Terrorist groups that rely on the support of such an identifiable constituency are ac-
countable to their grievances. Their supporters expect those groups to actively pursue the set goals and to
not endanger possible solutions with destructive behavior. Those terrorist groups need to install a central
entity which coordinates actions and ensures accountability of its members in order to prevent deviant
behavior. Such behavior could destroy the trust between the terrorist group and its constituency. If the
consituency no longer supports the terrorist group as the actor fighting for their rights, it can threaten the
survival of the group. For example, such behavior has destroyed, or at least delayed, peace negotiations.
This strategy of spoiling is delaying or sabotaging peace settlements (Kydd and Walter, 2002). Kydd
and Walter (2006, p. 73) provide examples from talks between Protestants and Catholics in Northern
Ireland, or the Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations. One faction of a terrorist group commits an attack
to signal the fruitlessness of negotiation since those that negotiate the deal cannot control the actions
of all members of the group.11 To prevent such actions, I argue that terrorist groups with a national-
istic/separatist agenda are more likely to have a centralized organizational structure.12
Hypothesis 6 (Maximalist ideology): Terrorist groups that pursue a maximalist ideology are less
likely to adopt a centralized organizational structure.
4.5 Research design
4.5.1 Data and operationalization
The goal of this study is to assess the correlation between environmental conditions and the organiza-
tional structure of terrorist groups. The unit of analysis is the individual terrorist group. External factors
can constrain the opportunities of terrorist groups to centralize their organization. The environmental
conditions affect how freely a terrorist group can operate in a country, its opportunities to mobilize re-
sources, and the tasks it can assume to increase its legitimacy in the eyes of the population. The goal is to
conduct a systematic analysis of the conditions across many cases to contrast and complement the many
and very insightful, but limited in explanatory power, case studies (i.e., Gunaratna, 2002; Gunaratna and
11Often, this leads to splintering of the organization. The more extreme parts split from the original organization to keep
on fighting. This is also a consequence of organizational dynamics (Libicki and Jones, 2008). By signing a peace deal, the
terrorist group would abolish itself. Some members are not accepting such fate.
12Sometimes terrorist groups still fail in controlling the entire organization. During the Israeli-Palestinian peace process,
attacks have spoiled a positive outcome. Responsible for attacks have been splinter factions that disagree with the direction the
core organization was going (Kydd and Walter, 2002).
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Oreg, 2010; Horgan and Taylor, 1997, 1999). The dependent variable captures whether or not a terror-
ist group is centralized in a binary fashion. The independent variables account for the environmental
conditions and are all measured at the country-level.
I argue that the organizational structure is determined by the conditions in a terrorist groups primary
country around the time of formation and that it is unlikely to change. The primary country of a terrorist
group is the country in which it perpetrated most of its attacks (Young and Dugan, 2014, p. 8).13 The data
are cross-sectional. This choice is theoretically and empirically justified as the organizational structure
of a terrorist organization is very stable across time.14 I created an original dataset which includes the
information for 144 terrorist groups operating worldwide along with country-level predictors covering
the time period from 1981 through 2010.
For this dataset I aggregate attack level information to group level information. I use data from the
RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI). It defines terrorism by the nature of the
act rather than by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of the cause. For an incident to be recorded
in the database, it needs to be violent or threatening the use of violence. It is directed against civilian
targets, meant to create fear within a society to coerce the opponent into certain actions. The motivation
of an incident needs to be political.
I base the study on some conditions that restrict the empirical and theoretical scope of the analysis.
First, I ensure that the data contains only a single observation for each unique group. This means that
I exclude potentially duplicate observations that share different monikers, but are functionally the same
organization.15 Second, I only include terrorist groups which are operational for at least two years and
have had five or more terrorist attacks. This is done to ensure some degree of operational heterogeneity
within my sample, as it is possible that groups which do not meet those criteria would not have the same
data generation process. The excluded groups are often one-off attacks, lone wolfs, or ambiguous cases
of terrorist behavior. Finally, I exclude clearly non-violent political parties, social movements/mobs,
criminal gangs, and instances of transformation from a terrorist group to purely criminal enterprises by
case selection, since I investigate only terrorist groups which contintue to uphold their political focus.16
13Based on this coding, terrorist groups could, in principle, change their primary country over time. However, empirically
this is not the case. Exploration of the data reveils that of the groups in my sample, only two terrorist groups conducted
a substantial amount of attacks outside the country that is coded as primary country. The Cinchoneros Popular Liberation
Movement is located in the primary country of Honduras (3 attacks). However, it conducted one attack respectively in Belize,
Costa Rica, and Nicaragua. Hezbollah conducted attacks in a total of 24 countries. In its primary country Lebanon, Hezbollah
conducted 84 attacks. Even though Hezbollah conducts attacks all over the world, their core organization remains in Lebanon.
14Terrorist groups do not change their organizational structure radically from centralized to decentralized, or vice versa.
Some empirical cases have been found that made only moderate adjustments to their prevalent structure to accommodate
environmental changes (i.e., Eccarius-Kelly, 2012; Jackson et al., 2005).
15I combine the observations, for example, for al Jehad and al Jihad, as well as for Al-Mansoorian and Lashkar-e-Taiba, for
they are functionally the same organization.
16The same scope conditions hold for the analysis in chapter 5.
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4.5.2 Dependent variable: Organizational structure - centralization
I operationalize the structure of terrorist groups in a binary manner coded 1 for centralized groups and
0 for decentralized groups.17 To my knowledge, one of the most extensive efforts in measuring the
structural characteristics of terrorists groups were undertaken by Joshua Kilberg (2012), who developed
systematic rules for coding the organizational structure of terrorist organizations. I utilize his coding
framework to ensure comparability and external reliability.18 Kilberg classifies the organization of a
terrorist group along three structural properties - leadership type, command and control, and functional
differentiation. As such, the conceptual dimensions of organizational structure are used for the opera-
tionalization to make it quantifiable across cases. I utilize his coding procedures to create an original
variable. Table 4.1 summarizes the coding framework applied for creating a binary measurement.19
In chapter 3, I discussed leadership, functional differentiation and centralized command and control as
criteria to classify the organizational structure of terrorist groups. Terrorist groups which have cent-
ralized command and control are directed by a central leaderhip entity translating into a centralized
organizational structure. Terrorist groups may lack centralized command and control, but are function-
ally differentiated. Those functions need to be organized by a centralized leadership entity in order to
be usable, thus, translating into a centralized organization.20 If there is no functional differentiation
and no centralized command and control, a terrorist group is classified as decentralized. In decentral-
ized groups, leaders most often provide only ideological guidance. Those groups can be completely
leaderless and self-organizing or they can have a leadership.
Table 4.1: Coding organizational structure of terrorist groups
Leadership Functional differentiation Centralized command & control Coding
- - - Decentralized
+ - - Decentralized
+ + - Centralized
+ - + Centralized
+ + + Centralized
For a group to be coded as having an identifiable leadership, evidence has to clearly indicate the
existence of a governing entity. This could be the existence of an individual person with the authority
17The same coding applies to the analysis in chapter 6.
18I trained myself recoding randomly selected cases from Kilbergs data. Thus, I ensure consistency in the coding process.
19Please see appendix A.1 for an overview of all terrorist groups and their organizational structure in their first year.
20Oftentimes, it is empirically difficult to observe functional differentiation and centralized command and control due to the
clandestine character of terrorist groups. If there is functional differentiation, it is reasonable to assume that there is a structure
in place that can integrate the various tasks in order to carry out attacks. However, this is rarely observable.
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of organizational structure
to set the strategic and tactical agenda, but also includes a leadership council that shares this privilege
and obligation. For a group to be coded as having functional differentiation, it needs to have at least
one clearly distinct department or cell that is dedicated to a specialized function. This could entail a
political wing, a technical department such as a bomb-making cell, or a department that is handling
communication and marketing. Kilberg (2012) also accounts for structures of centralized command and
control. For a group to be positive on this dimension, evidence clearly needs to indicate the presence
of vertical hierarchy. Evidence has to clearly point towards leadership, functional differentiation, or a
centralized command and control structure to be coded as present. Otherwise it is coded as missing. I
utilize this procedure to hand-code all the terrorist groups in my sample. Extensive research allowed me
to find information on the organizational structure for 176 groups out of 205, identifying them as either
centralized or decentralized. Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of organizational structure in the sample,
showing 78 (54.2 %) groups to be centralized and 66 (45.8 %) decentralized.
4.5.3 Independent variables
In order to code environmental variables that capture the situational context in which a terrorist group
operates, a base of operations needs to be identified. Each terrorist group is assigned a country. I utilize
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data from Young and Dugan (2014), who define the primary country of a terrorist group as the country in
which it perpetrates most of the attack over its entire lifespan. This allows me to attribute characteristics
of the country as covariates affecting a terrorist group’s behavior.
To assess the repression a terrorist group faces in a country, I use state capacity to assess the general
ability to repress and additional indicators for more specific repressive activities to assess the willingness
to repress. Doing so, I aim to come as close as possible to measure what actions a terrorist group
actually faces. In many studies state capacity is measured by GDP per capita (Fearon and Laitin, 2003).
GDP per capita is considered to be a valid proxy for state capacity as it captures the overall military,
administrative, and bureaucratic capacity of a state (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Hendrix, 2010).
However, this does not automatically translate into the ability and the will to fight terrorist actors in a
country. I measure state capacity with the logged military expenditure per soldier as an indicator for the
quality of the military (Powell, 2012; Reiter and Stam, 1998). I further use the CIRI human rights data to
include a more fine-grained measure of repressive activities (Cingranelli, Richards and Clay, 2014). The
data measure torture, political imprisonment, disappearances, and killings, respectively. Cingranelli,
Richards and Clay (2014) provide an additive index constructed from those four variables, ranging from
0 to 8, where zero indicates that the government has no respect for the human rights preventing them
from such activities, and eight indicating that the government has full respect for those rights. This
coding implies that lower values correspond to more repressive activities. Correspondingly, a positive
correlation with the likelihood for terrorist groups to adopt a centralized structure indicates support for
hypothesis two.
Next, I count the number of terrorist groups that are active in a group’s foundation year to measure
the potential for interaction with those groups. A terrorist group is counted if it is recorded to have
committed an attack in the same year. This measure deviates from the one Young and Dugan (2014)
used to measure terrorist groups in a country. They count all groups that may or may not have committed
an attack in the same country and year. However, accounting only for those groups that actually commit
attacks matches better my theoretical requirements as the mechanisms of competition and cooperation
rely on the signaling of a certain capability. Attacks are such a signal.
Ethnic fractionalization measures “the probability that two people randomly chosen from society
will be from different ethnic groups” (Alesina et al., 2003, p. 158f.). The higher the value of the variable
is, the higher is the ethnic fractionalization in a country. I use the data on ethnic fractionalization
collected and used by Alesina et al. (2003).
I consider alternative explanations of terrorist groups’ organizational structure. I include a dummy
for maximalist ideology relying on original coding based on openly accessible documents. The ideology
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of a terrorist group is publically communicated as part of propaganda and, thus, is relatively easy to
identify.21 I differentiate those terrorist groups that have a maximalist ideology from those that have
local or concretely defined goals. A terrorist group is coded to have a maximalist ideology if it is
motivated by religious, rightist or leftist goals. It is coded zero if the terrorist group is motivated by
nationalistic or separatist goals.22 Further, I include a dummy for Cold War that takes the value 1 if
the organisation was founded in the years 1970 through 1989, and 0 otherwise. Finally, I include some
control variables. Region dummies are created from the GTD. I code five regions Asia, America,
Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, and one combining countries from the Middle East, Central Asia, and
North Africa. The reference category is Asia. Using data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program
I code a dichotomous variable that is 1 if there is a militarized conflict in a terrorist groups primary
country, and 0 otherwise (Allansson, Melander and Themne´r, 2017; Gleditsch et al., 2002).23
4.5.4 Handling missing data problems
Given the nature of the countries in which terrorist groups operate, the collection of reliable data is
sometimes complicated. The absence of state institutions collecting data, political revolutions, or for-
eign occupations render statistics on the government and society of some states impossible to collect
systematically. This leads to a substantial amount of non-random missing values biasing the results.
Therefore, I manually code missing values by making a case-by-case decision. Military expenditure
per soldier is an important measure of state capacity, but military expenditure and military personnel
was lacking for Iraq in 2004 and 2007, Afghanistan 1988, 1995, and 2004, Somalia 1992, 2007, and
2008, and for East Timor in 1999. I use data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) on military expenditure and personnel (SIPRI, 2016). This allows me to calculate the missing
values for Iraq and Afghanistan in 2004, respectively. I use information on the material military ca-
pacities of Indonesia to code East Timor in 1999, as the terrorist groups in this country were fighting
Indonesian occupation. The rest of the missing data could not be imputed.
As I aim to explain the effect of environmental conditions on the organizational structure of terrorist
groups in the year of formation it is reasonable to assume that the conditions in a country in the year
before are also relevant. The inertia of the formation process may require lagging time-variant variables.
21Most coding was done using South Asia Terrorism Portal (http://www.satp.org/), Mapping Militant Organ-
izations (http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/), the Big Allied and Dangerous Database (BAAD)
(http://www.start.umd.edu/baad/database), and Libicki and Jones (2008).
22Some terrorist groups combine more than one ideological profile. To code those ideology dummies, the most prominent
ideology was chosen. I.e., the Mahdi Army in Iraq has a Shiite profile, but it was formed to fight against the U.S. Army in the
Second Gulf War. Thus, it is coded as nationalistic/separatist.
23Please see chapter 5 for an explanation concerning the relevance of controlling for the existence of a militarized conflict
in a country.
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I have done this for the military expenditure per soldier. However, adding lagged variables drastically
decreases the amount of observations, since variables, which stem from the data sources mentioned
above, are often not reported in the year previous to the one of the observation. This can increase missing
values and lead to a corresponding bias. This bias, for example, is problematic concerning the repression
variables, since earlier experiences can be expected to have an effect on a terrorist group organizing itself.
Where the military is well equipped to fight terrorist groups in a country, a terrorist group may expect
little safe operational space, which it may accommodate with its organizational structure right from the
foundation. If a terrorist group expects repressive actions such as torture and targeted killings, it may
include build-in functional and structural redundancies in its organization or isolate persons, who are
critical to its survival. Therefore, I refrain from lagging variables where necessary, being aware of the
bias it might introduce to the results. The exploration of ethnic fractionalization has shown no variation
within the countries in my sample. Thus, lagging ethnic fractionalization makes little empirical sense.
Conflict and Cold War are not lagged either. Rather than following empirical deliberations. the rationale
is a theoretical one. The overall argument is that the environment provides opportunities and restrictions
for terrorist groups to form. It is assumed that those two variables impact a terrorist group’s opportunities
right away.24 The overall precision of the results, thus, does not benefit from lagging variables.25 Table
4.2 provides the descriptive statistics of the included variables.
4.5.5 Method
I investigate the correlation between environmental variables and the organizational structure of terrorist
groups. I fit logistic regression models as I regress on a dichotomous dependent variable. I calculate the
predicted probabilities of significant predictors to assess the substantive effect of each variable.
4.6 Results
Overall, the environmental variables investigated in this study explain a considerable amount of the
residual variation in the question if a terrorist group adopts a centralized or decentralized structure.
Table 6.2 shows the results. The first model shows the regression coefficients when including only the
control variables. The second model includes all independent variables. The results support hypotheses
1 and 2 relating a government’s ability and willingness to repress a terrorist group to the likelihood of
24If anything, it might be interesting to evaluate the effect of those conditions changing in the year of foundation in future
iterations of this research topic. Depending on the degree and direction of change this immediately affects a terrorist group’s
opportunities and restrictions.
25The number of other terrorist groups in the same country in the foundation year could also not be lagged due to peculiarities
of the data generation process.
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics
Number of terrorist groups in sample 144
Numerical variables
Variable Mean Variance(SD) Max Min
Interaction 1.62 1.67 7 1
Military Capacity 9.20 1.16 12.07 4.89
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.49 0.32 0.90 0
Repression 1.98 2.05 7 0
Factor Variables
Variable Yes (1) No (0) In percent
Centralized Structure 78 66 54.2%
Conflict 111 31 78.2%
Cold War 27 117 18.8%
Maximalist 96 48 66.7%
Asia 51 93 35.4%
Africa 23 121 16.0%
America 13 131 11.1%
Europe 10 134 7.9%
MeCaNa 47 97 32.6%
it adopting a centralized organiztional structure. Both coefficients are statistically significant and point
into the expected direction. My results do not support hypothesis 3 that more terrorist groups in the
same country in the year of formation positively affect the likelihood of having a centralized structure.
The coefficient for interaction is not statistically significant. Hypothesis 4 is also supported: Higher
levels of ethnic fractionalization correlate with a higher likelihood of a terrorist group being centralized.
Hypothesis 5 and 6 are supported. The statistically significant coefficients for Cold War and maximalist
ideology point into the expected direction.
To further shed light on these effects, I calculate the predicted probabilities for the statistically sub-
stantive predictors. Figure 4.2 shows the effects. This allows me to evaluate the substantive effect of
each variable at different values. The substantive effect of a variable is assessed by how much the prob-
ability changes that a terrorist group has a centralized organizational structure. The plots show how
the probability of terrorist groups adopting a centralized structure changes when shifting the respective
predictor from the minimum to the maximum. My findings confirm previous case-specific work sug-
gesting that higher state capacity relates to a lower likelihood of being centralized. The effect of military
expenditure per soldier is highly statistically significant indicating a negative correlation with the like-
lihood of a terrorist group adopting a centralized structure. Substantively, the predicted probability of
having a centralized organizational structure decreases massively from about 99.5% for the lowest level
of state capacity to 0.03% for the highest level of state capacity as shown in figure 4.3.
Figure 4.4 shows the predicted probabilities of a terrorist group adopting a centralized structure
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Table 4.3: Regression results
Dependent variable:
Centralized structure
(1) (2)
Military Capacity −1.211∗∗∗
(0.327)
Repression 0.463∗∗
(0.199)
Interaction 0.238
(0.182)
Ethnic Fractionalization 2.810∗
(1.472)
Maximalist Ideology −0.891∗
(0.524)
Conflict −0.031 0.899
(0.498) (0.683)
Cold War 1.924∗∗∗ 1.937∗∗
(0.631) (0.870)
MeCaNa −0.331 1.562
(0.436) (1.017)
America −1.890∗∗ 0.238
(0.820) (1.340)
Europe −3.038∗∗∗ −1.778
(1.168) (1.647)
Africa −1.258∗∗ −2.223∗∗∗
(0.555) (0.832)
Constant 5.124∗∗ 8.162∗
(2.487) (4.635)
Observations 142 122
Log Likelihood −84.877 −59.533
Akaike Inf. Crit. 183.753 143.066
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure 4.2: Regression estimates
Figure 4.3: Effect of state capacity on having a centralized structure
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Figure 4.4: Effect of repression on having a centralized structure
for the varying values of repression. The value 0 indicates a high willingness to repress while this
willingness decreases in the sense that the value 7 indicates low willingness to repress. The coding of
the variable indicates that higher values of the repression predictor are expected to correlate with a higher
probability of a terrorist group being centrally structured. The substantive effect shows that behind the
overall support of hypothesis 2 rests a heterogenous effect. The highest two values of the repression
correlate with a lower predicted probability of a terrorist group adopting a centralized structure. For
the values 0 through 5, the expected effect is substantiated with a slight deviation for the value 4. This
suggests an ambiguous effect for medium levels of repression.
I also find support for hypothesis 4, which states that higher levels of ethnic fractionalization cor-
respond to a higher likelihood of terrorist groups adopting a centralized organizational structure. The
predicted probability increases by 55.8 percentage points from 21.9% for terrorist groups in countries
with minimum ethnic fractionalizatio,n to 77.7% for terrorist groups in countries with the maximum
ethnic fractionalization. Figure 4.5 illustrates this effect.
Lastly, I also find support for the hypothesized effect of a maximalist ideology. Having such an ideo-
logical profile decreases the likelihood of a terrorist group having a centralized organizational structure.
Figure 4.6 shows that the predicted probability increases by about 21.6 percentage points, from 66.2%
for terrorist groups that have a nationalist/separatist ideology to 44.6% for those pursuing maximalist
goals.
My results further support the finding that during the Cold War, terrorist organizations were more
likely to be centralized as illustrated in figure 4.7. The predicted probability increases by roughly 41
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Figure 4.5: Effect of ethnic fractionalization on having a centralized structure
Figure 4.6: Effect of maximalist ideology on having a centralized structure
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Figure 4.7: Effect of Cold War on having a centralized structure
percentage points from about 43% for terrorist groups that were founded after 1989, to 83.9% for those
that originated during the Cold War. This finding confirms the previous literature, which attributes
terrorist groups a professionalized organization resulting from the need to work with supporting state
actors.
The variables tested in this analysis capture three theoretical mechanisms of how the environment
can shape the organizational structure that a terrorist group adopts. If a terrorist group is likely to
be repressed and met by their opponent with counter-terrorist activities, it is more likely to adopt a
decentralized structure. While previous research focuses on state capacity alone, I test for the willingness
of a state to fight terrorists with repressive means. I find that terrorist groups located in states which
have little regard for human rights and include torture, political imprisonment, disappearances, and
extrajudicial killings in their counter-terrorism repertoire, are less likely to adopt a centralized structure.
Those findings are intuitive and in line with prior findings that attribute the decentralization of terrorist
groups to state capacity (Helfstein and Wright, 2011; Raab and Milward, 2003). Terrorist groups need
to maintain their organizational security to survive and sustain their capability to carry out operations.
Using this measure of repression alongside the military capacity of the state alone allows me to obtain
more fine-grained results. In sum, my analysis disaggregates the repressive capacity and the willingness
of a state to make use of that repressive capacity.
The second theoretical mechanism describes the opportunities for mobilizing resources. Terrorist
groups have various options to engage with their environment to extract resources. For example, they
can cooperate with other terrorist groups, or they can rely on support from within the population. I hypo-
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thesize that the number of other terrorist groups in the country and the degree of ethnic fractionalization
are indicators of the resourcing opportunities terrorist groups have. All resource generation methods
come with requirements on the organizational structure. I theorized that those opportunities correlate
with a higher likelihood of a terrorist group having a centralized organizational structure. The empirical
results support the effect of ethnic fractionalization. However, I find no support for the interaction with
other terrorist groups in a country. I also find support for the argument that terrorist groups founded dur-
ing the Cold War are more likely to be centralized to fulfill the requirements bestowed on them by their
state supporters. This supports findings by Jodi Vittori (2011), who includes this type of relationship in
her resourcing model highlighting the dependence of terrorist groups on their resources.
Beside those environmental variables, I account for an alternative group-internal variable. I find
support for the effect of a maximalist ideology. This points toward the importance of considering a
terrorist group’s goals and what implications this has for its internal structure. The more tangible a
terrorist group’s goals are, the more important it is to adopt a consistent strategy. Central control is
beneficial for maintaining control over tactical and strategic behavior of the members allowing a terrorist
group to pursue their strategy consistently.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I analyzed why some terrorist groups are centrally organized, while others adopt a decent-
ralized structure. Given the advantages of a centralized organization, previous work argues that terrorist
groups choose a decentralized structure as it makes them more resilient when being challenged by re-
pressive activities of the state (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones, 2008; Podolny and Page, 1998). Others
claim that the requirements of an organization have changed with the development of new technologies
(Crenshaw, 2008; Jenkins, 2006).
To the best of my knowledge, the explanatory factors of a terrorist group’s organizational design
have never been systematically tested in a large-n quantitative design. Ample empirical evidence based
on individual or comparative case studies suggests that the environment of a terrorist group affects its
organizational structure (Eccarius-Kelly, 2012; Johnston et al., 2016). These studies suggest that terror-
ist groups strategically exploit their environment to improve their performance. They can exploit those
conditions by matching their organizational structure to the opportunities and challenges given by its en-
vironment. Linking this analysis to the overall theoretical argument of the dissertation, terrorist groups
are viewed as economic entities that maximize their managerial efficiency given a certain kind of en-
vironment. Adopting an organizational structure that capitalizes on the opportunities while minimizing
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the risks is one way to account for one’s environmental conditions. The central argument is that terrorist
groups need a business strategy that integrates and manipulates the resources over which it has control
(Reed and DeFillippi, 1990). Having an organizational structure that matches the resource opportunities
of the environment introduces variation in between such business strategies. This allows terrorist groups
to perform at a higher level than terrorist groups in the same industry or market gained through different
group attributes and resources. My analysis shows that terrorist groups match their organizational struc-
ture to the opportunities and constraints within their environment. With this theoretical and empirical
approach, I complemented the available case-study evidence by systematically defining the mechanisms
that are often lacking or only are implicitly asserted from previous work. Future work needs to proceed
on verifying those mechanisms and explore possible explanations.
One reason why I analyzed on environmental variables is to focus on those variables that can be
observed. Environmental conditions cannot fully explain why some terrorist groups adopt a centralized
organizational structure, while others opt for a decentralized design. My conceptual and empirical mod-
els were not meant to fully explain the residual deviation. External conditions only provide half of the
explanation, as internal dynamics play an important role. I tested one group-internal variable as a first
attempt to account for those factors. The ideology of a terrorist group is public information. It serves
propagandistic purposes and is therefore communicated by the terrorist group to all its audiences. It
allows for a categorization of terrorist groups based on its stated political goals. Future research needs to
hone in to those internal factors. It also needs to account for possible interactions between the environ-
ment and group-internal variables. As the initial quote by Sadler and Barry states, it might be important
to focus on group-internal dynamics, but those dynamics are, in turn, a function of the environment
themselves.
Qualitative case-based research can identify new and specify existing mechanisms. Other group-
specific factors can be important that are not part of this study. The type of leadership may affect the
degree to which internal control is required. For example, a charismatic leader may benefit from a devout
following which obeys his command without structural control mechanisms in place. Similarly, groups
that rely on close inter-personal relationships have different structural requirements than groups which
have a more formalized membership. I advise future exploration of determinants of terrorist groups’
organizational structures to explore those group-internal mechanisms. Qualitative case studies and case
comparisons can help identifying other mechanisms.
There are also more environmental factors that may play a role. Terrorist groups have plenty of
resourcing opportunities. Some examples include the exploitation of natural resources or the trade of
various kinds of contraband. IS, for example, generated a great amount of resources selling oil, but also
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engaged actively in the trafficking of antiquities, drugs, and other forms of booty (Callimachi, 2015;
Callimachi and Tondo, 2016). The variables tested in this study are proxies for the three mechanisms.
Future work can develop the research into this direction. This would allow researchers to compare more
than only a few terrorist groups at a time and help develop a more fine-grained theoretical approach.
To that end, better data need to be generated. The clandestine character of terrorist groups and
their day-to-day operations severely restrict the availability of cross-sectional or even longitudinal data.
Research on this topic would benefit greatly from the systematic collection and exploitation of country-
level data. My analysis showed that a substantive part of the residual variation can be explained by those
country-level factors.
The analysis in this chapter shows that which organizational structure a terrorist group adopts is a
function of both external and internal factors. The goal of this dissertation is to study the interplay of
internal and external factors to better understand the behavior of terrorist groups. In the next chapter,
I continue to analyze this interplay by studying how various external and internal predictors affect the
likelihood of a terrorist group to get involved in organized crime.
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Chapter 5
Exploring the determinants of terrorist
involvement in organized crime1
5.1 Introduction
Terrorist groups that become involved in organized crime pose salient security challenges across the
world. Faced with the need to fund their operations, some terrorist groups engage in criminal activities,
or they turn to criminal groups to supplement their resources with illegal activities such as the trade
in drugs or weapons (Freeman, 2011; Geltzer, 2011; Giraldo and Trinkunas, 2007). Without monetary
resources, terrorist organizations are restricted in their ability to inflict harm. While financial support for
operations originates from many sources, such as domestic and international sponsors, natural resources,
or looting, the involvement in organized crime is among the most lucrative (Costigan and Gold, 2007;
Wang, 2010).
By increasing their financial revenues, terrorist groups can expand their tactical repertoire. Organ-
ized crime opens up opportunities that would not be available otherwise. First, crime can be used to
generate funds that support their military operations and their political activities.2 Second, crime can
be used to provide logistical support, such as enabling the clandestine movement of personnel, material
resources, and money. Also, criminal activities can help prepare for operations through the procure-
ment and transportation of weapons and personnel on the black market by engaging in illicit human
smuggling (Williams, 2014). Moreover, terrorist groups use criminal activities as a means to generate a
resource pool which is independent from direct operational support. For example, terrorist groups can
1This chapter is based on a paper co-authored with Clayton Besaw, published in the Journal of Quantitative Criminology
(2019).
2Some terrorist groups have a broader functional repertoire. Hezbollah, for example, has a political wing and provides
social services to their supporters (Berman and Laitin, 2008).
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bribe officials to sign off paperwork for transporting weapons from one country to another.3 Terrorist
organizations justify the use of criminal activities as either a means to an end, or as directed against
the enemy in the name of the larger cause affecting the economic and political stability of a country
(Williams, 2014).
While organized crime may provide relatively high returns on the terrorist group’s investment, it
raises the group’s visibility to law enforcement units. A shift towards profit generation may additionally
endanger a group’s ideological clout. Given this puzzling behavior, the question investigated in this
chapter is: Why do some terrorist groups engage in organized crime while others do not?
Terrorist groups’ engagement in organized crime can be understood as a function of opportunity and
need. Previous research proposes several theoretical models suggesting a variety of factors that make
the connection between organized crime and terrorism more likely (Asal, Milward and Schoon, 2015;
Forest, 2013; Makarenko, 2004b; Shelley and Picarelli, 2005; Williams, 2002). Those studies identify
weak state structures, corruption, or militarized conflicts as environmental contexts that provide oppor-
tunities to turn to crime (Shelley, 2014). Looking inward, organizational attributes may also affect the
likelihood of a terrorist group being engaged in organized crime. The size of the organization, network
structure, territorial control, or ideology can incentivize criminal behavior (Asal, Milward and Schoon,
2015; Shelley and Picarelli, 2005). Both environmental and organizational factors affect the opportun-
ities terrorist groups experience for engaging in organized crime and to generate the necessary revenue.
Organizational and environmental factors do this by either opening opportunities for engagement, or by
pushing groups towards it. For example, a terrorist group that operates in a country with weak gov-
ernmental control can more easily engage with criminal actors operating in the same environment.4
Similarly, larger terrorist groups are more likely to possess criminal skills and the know-how to engage
with organized crime.
The aim of this study is to identify factors that improve our capacity to predict if a terrorist group
is involved with organized crime. To do this, I utilize an inductive machine learning approach using a
random forest classifier. The random forest method utilizes an ensemble of individual decision trees to
produce out of sample predictions of whether a group has engaged in organized crime. Such an approach
deviates from more deductively driven classification analyses commonly used in the study of terrorist
behavior, namely the logistic regression model.5 The random forest is not beholden to the assumptions
3To sell arms internationally an end-user certificate is required. It certifies that the buyer is in fact the final recipient of the
arms. It is meant to ensure that arms and ammunition are not sold to an unnamed third party or embargoed states. Forging or
altering end-user certificates allows shipments of arms to be transported via official channels and routes.
4As discussed later in the chapter, weak states support the development of criminal actors as well as terrorism. Their
interaction is more likely due to their co-existence (Freeman, 2011).
5I include the results of a logistic regression Appendix A.1 for comparison by the reader.
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that underlie regression parameter estimation and does not assume a specific functional relationship
between predictors and outcomes.6
While the random forest contains many advantages for out-of-sample prediction, it has received
criticism. Algorithms like the random forest have been described as a “black box”, in that it is difficult
for the analyst to unpack the causal relationships between predictors and outcomes. Because I am
interested in out-of-sample accuracy, I do not address problems of causal inference (e.g., endogeneity,
simultaneous reaction, etc.). Using cross-validation allows us to estimate the out-of-sample accuracy
of my prediction model and to explore substantive relationships outside regression assumptions. The
goal is to provide rigorous preliminary evidence for further theory building and deductive hypothesis
testing. To address different features of the forecast, I examine three aspects of the random forest. First,
I explore the out of sample predictive efficacy of several predictors of engagement in crime by using
k-fold cross-validation and area under the curve (AUC) scores. Second, I utilize a measure of variable
importance to assess which individual predictors are most important in gaining predictive accuracy.
Finally, I create partial-dependence functions for the eight most important predictors, to visualize the
functional relationship between predictor and outcome while controlling for all included predictors.
Following this machine learning methodology, I obtain four results. First, the inclusion of both or-
ganizational and environmental predictors has good, but not perfect, predictive accuracy when classify-
ing criminal engagement by terrorist organizations. Second, organizational factors are better at predict-
ing relative to environmental factors. Third, I find that group size and ideology are the most influential
variables for leveraging accurate predictions. Finally, I find that the eight most important predictors have
non-linear relationships with outcomes in engagement with organized crime.
5.2 Terrorism and organized crime
The definition of terrorism is contentious. We define terrorism as a tactic that is used by violent non-state
organizations to achieve political goals. As such, I can include all organizations that have been observed
to employ terrorism. It allows us to include violent non-state organizations irrespective of them being
commonly labeled terrorists or rebels.7
The definition of organized crime includes the trafficking in drugs, arms or humans, as well as
money laundering through legal enterprises. The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
(UNODC) defines an organized criminal group as 1) a group of three or more persons that was not
6Within the quantitative study of terrorism, logistic regression remains the workhorse methodology for analyzing binary
dependent variables. We argue that the random forest method is likely to be better for the analysis of complex problems due to
its ensemble methodology and the absence of strict functional form assumptions.
7See chapter 2 for a detailed definition of terrorism.
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randomly formed, 2) existing for a period of time, 3) acting in concert with the aim of committing at least
one crime punishable by at least four years incarceration 4) in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a
financial or other material benefit (UNODC, 2004, p. 5). The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODA)
identifies organized crime as a severe threat to peace and individual security as it violates human rights
and undermines the economic development and political stability in a country (UNODA, 2017).8 We
use this definition accordingly.
5.2.1 Comparison of terrorist groups and organized crime
Alex Schmid (1996) notes several commonalities between terrorist groups and organized crime groups.
Both are strategic actors which pursue preferences through violence. Their tactics are similar, as both
actors use strategies such as kidnappings or assassinations. They both oppose governmental authority,
leading to their illicit and clandestine nature (Schmid, 1996). Therefore, they need to employ strategies
which allow them to avoid detection, while mitigating the risk posed by the governments’ law enforce-
ment agencies and peer competitors.
However, several factors differentiate the two phenomena. James Forest (2013) argues that terrorist
groups and organized crime groups follow a different purpose when employing violence. Criminals aim
to secure their business operations, leading them to focus their violence on protecting their membership
and supply chain. Conversely, terrorist groups often do not use much discretion when it comes to the
selection of victims. Terror victims often have symbolic meaning, used as a message to instill fear in a
broader population.
The motivation for actors to use organized crime or terrorism also differs. Williams (2007) notes that
terrorist groups have subjective political goals, whereas organized crime pursues a greater share of their
respective illicit markets. Actors also use different communication strategies. While criminals prefer to
stay away from the spotlight, terrorists seek a certain degree of media attention, claiming responsibility
for their actions to propagate their cause (Forest, 2013).
Napoleoni (2004) suggests that terrorists and criminals can be distinguished by their view of money.
She points out that the ultimate goal of organized crime organizations is to accumulate as much wealth
as they can, whereas terrorist groups seek funds to support their operations. However, just as criminals
need to invest in suppliers and transit routes to ensure ongoing access to markets, terrorist groups need
to ensure a constant inflow of funding to ensure strategic and logistic efficacy. Napoleoni (2004) calls
8There are two different types of organized crime. Those which provide goods and those that provide protection. Often, the
same actor provides both types of criminal activity. The Italian Mafia, for example, is providing a range of criminal activities
which generate funds and deals contraband on the black market (Europol, 2013). Similarly, FARC in Columbia, engages in
the production and distribution of drugs, but also provides protection to the local population against other violent actors in the
area (Felbab-Brown, 2010).
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this the “economy of terror.”
5.2.2 Collaboration and appropriation
Terrorist groups can engage in organized crime themselves or they can collaborate with established
actors of organized crime. Both strategies provide financial revenue and access to operational resources,
but they entail different behaviors and costs. Given the differences, several scholars argue against true
collaboration between criminals and terrorists (Dandurand and Chin, 2004; Hoffman, 2006; Pre´fontaine
and Dandurand, 2004). Terrorist groups evolve into criminal enterprises as political motivations become
secondary to economic gains (Makarenko, 2004b). Concerning the interaction between terrorism and
organized crime, theoretical approaches span the continuum between no interactions on one end, to
the production of internal criminality on the other.9 Between those two extremes, one can observe
varying degrees of collaboration, ranging from opportunistic one-off collaboration to long-term alliances
or appropriation of organized crime (Naylor, 1993; Schmid, 1996; Williams, 2007).
The focus of my analysis lies on terrorist groups that either cooperate with organized crime or ap-
propriate organized crime in the pursuit of their political objectives (Mincheva and Gurr, 2013, p. 2).
5.3 Terrorist groups’ involvement in organized crime
We define a terrorist group’s involvement in organized crime both as collaboration and appropriation. As
elaborated above, terrorist groups and actors of organized crime have incentives not to collude with the
other. Throughout history, terrorists have always been adamant not to be labeled as ordinary criminals.
They consider themselves to be fighting for a bigger political cause that justifies their actions. As such,
they use labels like freedom fighter, or holy warrior (Silke, 2008). Justifications for violence come
through a broader ideology that rises above petty criminal interaction. However, involvement with
organized crime increases a terrorist group’s visibility and vulnerability to law enforcement initiatives.
So, engaging in criminal activities increases a terrorist group’s likelihood of detection.
Similarly, actors of organized crime have an incentive to stay away from terrorism. In a business
where security from law enforcement is paramount, interaction/engagement with terrorism endangers
the enterprise. Mark Galeotti (2009) summarizes this reluctance, stating that “on the whole organized
crime groups have not shown any particular enthusiasm to work with terrorists, whom they regard as not
only unreliable and amateurish but also dangerous, in that any evidence of such a connection is likely
9For conflict between criminal and terrorist organizations see Schelling (1984); for models of in-house production of crime
see Cornell (2007), Dishman (2001), Makarenko (2004b), Schmid (1996).
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to trigger a much more immediate and heavy-handed law enforcement response in the post-September
11th era.”10
While differences in their objectives suggest the interaction between terrorist groups and organized
crime to be unlikely, both anecdotal and empirical observations show that interaction between the two
types of illicit organizations occurs at a non-trivial frequency (Asal, Milward and Schoon, 2015; Boven-
kerk and Chakra, 2005; Perl, 2001; Piazza, 2012; Shelley and Picarelli, 2005). Two well-established
examples of collaboration are FARC and the Afghan Taliban. Both organizations have an active and
established political and social agenda, and both collaborate with international drug smuggling enter-
prises.11 Those examples illustrate that terrorist groups engage with actors of organized crime even in
instances where their ideological foundation potentially discourages criminality and profit. Both organ-
izations appear to value the gains from interaction more than the costs that come with it.
Comparing the Kurdish PKK and FARC, Eccarius-Kelly (2012) finds that they collaborate with
organized crime. They share critical infrastructure and knowledge concerning criminal skills, allowing
the terrorist groups to advance their operational repertoire. Both groups benefit, as they need to fulfill
the demand for a special skill or other assets, which are not available within their own organization
(Eccarius-Kelly, 2012).
Williams (2002) finds that short-term operational collaborations are more common than established
long-term alliances. This is due to a setting which is governed by anarchy, making prolonged formalized
interaction difficult to sustain. In such a setting, short-term collaboration allows terrorist groups to
extract resources from the criminal market with minimal investment and economic risk, and without the
knowledge and experience of the specific market and supply chains.12
In sum, terrorist groups are likely to collaborate with organized crime due to reasons of expediency
and mutual convenience (Williams, 2001). Terrorist groups use the connection to organized crime to gain
access to their clandestine logistics network to exchange and exploit each other’s resources. Thus, their
choice of collaborating with organized crime depends on whether the offered goods match their needs
(Williams, 2001, p. 135). On several occasions, terrorist groups have interacted with arms traffickers
to buy the weapons needed for an attack. The Syrian arms trafficker Monzer al-Kassar has provided
weapons to multiple terrorist groups, among which are Hezbollah, PFLP-General Command, or FARC
10Cited in Forest (2013, p. 175).
11These two examples especially highlight the puzzling nature of crime-terror cooperation. The Taliban have an explicit
moral agenda that is embodied by Sharia law, yet aids the production and trade of narcotics that are considered forbidden in
Islam. In Colombia, FARC seek to establish a socialist state that would conduct land and wealth reform to aid marginalized
socio-economic groups (agriculture and urban labor), yet cooperate with extremely violent and destructive drug trafficking
organizations which often inflict harm on the poorest of Colombian citizens.
12On the resource extraction in short-term collaborations see Saab and Taylor (2009) or Williams (2002). Of course, short-
term collaboration can be a repeated event, thus resulting in long-term collaborations. The logic, however, is still operational,
not motivational.
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(Greenberg, 2010).
Terrorist groups can also engage in organized crime themselves. Williams (2001, p. 138) identifies
three levels of this process. First, terrorist groups can take the strategic decision to turn to the in-house
production of organized crime as a means to provide funding. Second, members of individual cells
can sustain themselves through organized crime, and third, transnational diaspora networks, which are
actively engaged in organized crime, can support the group. PIRA has gained substantial support by the
Irish community in the U.S., who were strongly engaged in the trafficking of various kinds of contraband
(Horgan and Taylor, 1999, 2003). In fact, the number of terrorist groups using criminal activities has
increased over the last two decades (Williams, 2014, p. 6). A reason for this development may be that
many criminal activities do not require a complex skill set and can be quickly internalized by terrorists.
Furthermore, research has found an increasing trend of radicalization in criminal milieus and prisons
(Rotella, 2004). This provides terrorist groups with a pool of members which possess sought-after
criminal skills and personal networks, increasing their potential to appropriate criminal activities, but
also to be able to collaborate with criminal actors via personal relationships.
Oftentimes, collaboration and the appropriation of organized crime occur together. The in-house
production of organized crime might either precede or follow the collaboration with established crim-
inal organizations. In the former case, terrorist groups that engage in the production of organized crime
might get in contact with criminal groups, as they are an integral part of the illicit supply chain. In the lat-
ter case, terrorist groups first collaborate with criminals, for example through the purchase of weapons.
To manage this interaction with the criminal market, terrorist groups need to embrace the logistics and
functional requirements of crime. Over time, they may accumulate enough criminal know-how to be-
come more actively involved in the criminal market, potentially becoming suppliers themselves. The
difficulty to clearly distinguish collaboration from appropriation translates to both conceptual and em-
pirical ambiguities in studies with explanatory research designs. We aim to mitigate this ambiguity by
using a predictive research design, rendering the delineation between collaboration and appropriation
empirically neglectable.
5.4 Predictors of terrorist group’s engagement in organized crime
Because I seek to test predictive models of terrorist group engagement in organized crime, I first consult
the literature concerning factors thought to be influential in shaping engagement. The aim here is to dis-
cuss potential risk factors as they might contribute to an accurate prediction of terrorist groups becoming
involved in organized crime. As highlighted above, a terrorist group’s involvement in organized crime
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includes both costs and benefits. Previous research discusses the conditions that increase the likelihood
of a terrorist group to become involved in organized crime. We assess to what magnitude each factor
contributes to predicting a terrorist group’s engagement in organized crime correctly. As such, I am less
interested in testing theories of the substantive relationship between these predictors and engagement in
organized crime. Instead, I seek to utilize inductive methods for evaluating their predictive efficacy and
for determining relative predictive importance. As stated before, I also unlock the “black box” of the
random forest algorithm by estimating the functional relationship between classification outcomes and
each predictor.
The decision of a terrorist group to engage in organized crime draws on opportunism, pragmat-
ism, and trust. While decisions of opportunism and pragmatism have been discussed above, trust is
established via personal bonds or shared experiences. Individual relationships facilitate forming rela-
tionships. Those bonds are built on a foundation of ethnic or religious heuristics. Mutual backgrounds
of coming from the same community or having faced imprisonment or oppression helps to establish
trust relationships (Forest, 2012, p. 175). We focus on organizational and environmental characteristics
that affect the likelihood of engagement in organized crime. We use these categories as they reflect two
broad trends of approach found in the extant literature. They also reflect the theme of this dissertation
to assess how external and internal factors affect the behavior of terrorist groups. Factors that fall within
these two categories are explored in the following, as they affect the need of terrorist groups to engage
in organized crime as well as the opportunities of terrorist groups to do so. We proceed to discuss
both 1) organizational factors and 2) environmental factors as a theoretical foundation for my prediction
analysis.
5.4.1 Organization-level characteristics
Asal and his colleagues (Asal, Milward and Schoon, 2015, p. 4) postulate greater organizational size
to be correlated with a higher likelihood to be engaged in organized crime. They argue that large or-
ganizations need resources that exceed what the members of the terrorist groups can acquire, rendering
organized crime a necessity. Furthermore, the size of a terrorist organization is often used as a proxy
measure for human capital within the group (Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008). We expect larger terrorist
groups to be more likely to possess the ability to engage in organized crime. We argue that the human
capital within a terrorist group captures a group’s ability to integrate criminal skill into the organiza-
tion. The more members a terrorist group has, the higher is the probability that some members possess
criminal skills or know someone who does. Additionally, larger terrorist groups need more resources
to sustain themselves. The need for resources, coupled with the opportunity to access criminal know-
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how, leads us to expect that large terrorist groups should be more likely to possess the capability to
become engaged in organized crime. Thus, organizational size should increase my prediction accuracy
of terrorist groups becoming involved in organized crime.
Ideology is assumed to have a negative relationship with the involvement in organized crime (Willi-
ams, 2012). Ideological motivations are a crucial factor that distinguishes terrorist groups from organ-
ized crime, the latter being a purely economic enterprise. For ideological hard-liners within a terrorist
organization, engaging in organized crime might equal selling out the core beliefs of the organization.
However, Asal and his colleagues find that ideology per se might not be the most appropriate predictor
but rather needs to be disaggregated (Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008). They find no significant effect of re-
ligious ideology, but a positive effect of ethno-political ideology. However, it is debatable whether they
find an effect of a specific political mind-set or instead identify opportunities for the intended activities,
in their case drug trafficking. They argue that strong links to society provide opportunities to diversify
and to rely on their ethnic constituency to actively support them in their criminal endeavors. Thus, they
capture an environmental variable of access to resources in their area.
The organizational structure of terrorist groups varies between centralized hierarchies and decent-
ralized networks. How a terrorist group is structured affects the distribution of power over decision-
making within the group (Silke, 2008).13 In a centralized hierarchy, a central authority has discretion
over the decision-making process and distributes the tasks and responsibilities from the top, down to the
lower levels of the hierarchy. Crucial to a central organization is that information, which is necessary
for directed decision-making, is integrated on the upper levels (Podolny and Page, 1998). Decentral-
ized networks, on the other hand, are not controlled by one central authority. There could be multiple
decision-makers that do not necessarily pursue the same strategic goals. Each cell consists of individuals
with specific goals and skill-sets that are not integrated by a higher authority (Podolny and Page, 1998).
The common consensus is that illicit groups adopt decentralized structures to cope with changes in in-
ternational law enforcement, globalization, and technology, allowing them to diversify revenue streams
(Hutchinson and O’Malley, 2007; Mullins, 2009). In a study of the topology of clandestine networks,
Xu and Chen (2008) use computational models to show that networks are generally effective at connect-
ing with unrelated network nodes. Other studies support this finding of decentralized structures driving
intergroup cooperation (Asal, Milward and Schoon, 2015; Fiedler, 2008; Makarenko, 2004a; Mincheva
and Gurr, 2013; Picarelli, 2006). Centralized terrorist groups need to put a higher premium on their
survival, since their structural integrity is easier to disrupt, thus shying away from engaging in organized
13For more information concerning the decision-making process in centralized and decentralized organizations, see chapter
3.
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crime and instead turn to other types of funding (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones, 2008). Centralized
groups are more likely to be funded by external benefactors or states, as those donors prefer to give
money to organizations that are capable of monitoring the use of resources (Shapiro, N.d.). Given that
the engagement in crime increases a terrorist group visibility, a terrorist group which has access to other
fundraising opportunities, is expected to rather use those and stay away from crime. Thus, I expect the
organizational structure to increase the accuracy of my prediction of terrorist groups becoming involved
with organized crime.
Having multiple bases in various countries and regions increases the opportunities to engage in
organized crime given the sheer number of locations. Organized crime is mostly transnational in nature
(Williams, 2001). A terrorist group which has a structure that spans multiple countries can capitalize
on this infrastructure. Thus, terrorist groups are not only more likely to encounter actors of organized
crime, but they can also readily use their geographical reach for criminal revenue generation along with
political violence. Thus, I expect the variable of multiple bases having a positive effect on the predictive
capacity of my model.
Organizational age can have a twofold effect on the likelihood of engaging in organized crime.
Terrorist groups that have existed for a long time may have a clear and established political objective,
and they may have proven that they are capable of sustaining their organization over time. Thus, they
might not engage with organized crime absent of substantial external changes, which cut their estab-
lished resource streams. Furthermore, they might rely on a set cadre of members who might not be open
to engaging with organized crime but consider it a danger to their ideological integrity. Conversely,
established terrorist groups might be preferred partners for organized criminal enterprises. Criminal or-
ganizations might prefer becoming involved with terrorist groups that have proven to be able to sustain a
prolonged campaign and constrain impulsive and amateurish actions (Galeotti, 2009). Younger terrorist
groups, however, may engage with organized crime, since they need all potential revenue options to get
their campaign started. Their attacks need to signal their resolve to their opponents and supporters alike,
which require constant and substantial resources. Engaging with organized crime provides them with
valuable resourcing opportunities. In sum, I expect organizational age to have an effect on the predictive
capacity of my model.
Previous studies relate higher levels of lethality and the diversity of attack types to the amount of
resources a terrorist group has (Horowitz and Potter, 2014; Young and Dugan, 2014). All else equal, it
may be expected that those groups rather engage with organized crime to benefit from its high revenues.
Furthermore, the interaction with organized crime does not restrict terrorist groups to the same extent as
an external donor might do. By diversifying their revenue generation portfolio to organized crime, they
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do not only gain the necessary resources, but also keep their autonomy (Vittori, 2011). Thus, both the
lethality and the diversity of attack types are expected to increase the predictive capacity of my model.
5.4.2 Environment-level characteristics
The most widely accepted conditions that affect the need and opportunities of terrorist groups to engage
in organized crime concern the environment of both terrorism and organized crime. In his often-quoted
statement, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft notes in 2002, “they thrive in the same conditions,
support each other, and feed off each other.”14 A common intuition about the environment’s effect is
that failed states provide terrorist groups and organized crime actors with opportunities and space to
work together or terrorist groups to enlarge their tactical portfolio by engaging in criminal activities
themselves. In the absence of governmental authority, terrorist groups can develop the infrastructure
necessary to get engaged in organized crime. Abdulkander Sinno (2008) highlights a safe haven to be
the crucial contingency affecting multiple functions of a group that relies on secrecy for facing disruption
efforts allowing terrorist groups to regroup, train, and coordinate their activities.
Weak states lack coercive capacity, which is useful for establishing a thriving criminal market and
for politically motivated terrorists to set up their infrastructure (Meehan, 2011; Rotberg, 2003). Those
locations offer ample economic opportunities for organized crime, which often is the only source of
income for people living in those regions. Under these circumstances, criminal enterprises can establish
a shadow economy and feed off the weakness of state structures by appropriating governance functions
(Makarenko, 2004a). Such an unregulated environment which lacks the control and governance of a
recognized entity creates opportunities for interactions between terrorism and organized crime (Freeman,
2011). Where violent actors fight each other, criminal enterprises often rely on external protection
to secure their infrastructure. In such an environment, the engagement with organized crime seems
not only to benefit terrorist groups and their income generation, but also actors of organized crime.
If terrorist groups collaborate with organized crime enterprises in areas where the state authority is
weak and violent actors many, terrorist groups can offer their militarized support (Felbab-Brown, 2010;
Forest, 2013). Felbab-Brown (2013) discusses the cases of Colombia and Afghanistan to illustrate this
mechanism. In those countries, the local farmers plant coca or poppy plants, generally having to rely
on the cartels for payment. Some terrorist groups possess the firepower to defend those farmers from
rival cartels, the government, or other actors with incentives to disrupt production. Terrorist groups can
use such protection services as a strategy to generate funds and to promote their legitimacy. If terrorists
engage in crimes, they provide business opportunities to the population themselves, strengthening their
14Cited in Costigan and Gold (2007, p. 29).
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legitimacy. Several case studies provide evidence for these mechanisms (Eccarius-Kelly, 2012; Flanigan,
2012; Piazza, 2012; Shelley and Picarelli, 2005; Williams, 2012). Thus, weak states increase both the
likelihood for terrorist groups to engage in criminal activities and for terrorist groups to work together
with actors of organized crime. We expect the variable for weak states to increase the predictive accuracy
of my model.
Especially in regions with no state authority more violent non-state actors will seek refuge. This sets
the conditions for competition for resources between various groups. The existence of multiple terrorist
groups within a country can increase the likelihood of terrorist groups engaging in organized crime
in two ways. First, competing terrorist groups need more resources. Theories of outbidding find that
competing terrorist groups carry out increasingly lethal attacks resulting in a greater need for resources
(Conrad and Greene, 2015; Young and Dugan, 2014). They also have to share rare resources with other
terrorist groups operating in the same realm, which can drive them towards organized crime to enrich
their revenue streams. Second, in a setting of multiple violent non-state actors, existing organized crime
enterprises require more protection to maintain their enterprise.
Nevertheless, the existence of other terrorist groups in the same environment might also decrease
the likelihood of engagement. Terrorist groups can cooperate with other terrorist groups to exchange
resources.15 A higher amount of terrorist groups within one environment increases the opportunities
to engage in resource exchange relationships with those groups. This might be especially attractive for
terrorist groups whose members and supporters oppose criminal behavior. Collaboration with a polit-
ically motivated terrorist group twith even a similar ideology might be preferred over a profit-seeking
criminal actor. Thus, existence of other terrorist groups within the same environment can decrease the
need and the opportunities for a terrorist group to engage in organized crime. Both causal mechanisms
have merit. The empirical observation, however, is the same. We expect that the existence of multiple
terrorist groups in a country increases the accuracy of predicting the engagement in organized crime of
terrorist groups.
Rich and functioning countries provide unique opportunities for criminal engagement. Just like legal
businesses, illicit enterprises benefit from well-developed economic and financial structures where they
can function as a predator on the economy (Mehlum, Moene and Torvik, 2003). At the same time,
countries with a high GDP have the incentives to keep illicit economies at bay, fight terrorism and
have the capacities to do so. They can undertake substantial counter-measures to both terrorism and
organized crime constraining their operating environment (Forest, 2013, p. 176). This can decrease the
15See chapter 3 for more information concerning the reasons terrorist groups cooperate with other terrorist groups and the
mechanisms of resource exchange.
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likelihood of terrorist groups being engaged in organized crime. In contrast, under pressure generated
by governmental counter-measures, terrorists might be compelled to pursue any option for resource
generation possible (Forest, 2013, p. 176). Therefore, I expect GDP to increase the accuracy of my
predictive model.
The literature about the connection between democracy and terrorism is divided. Democracy is
found to be either promoting or restricting terrorism depending on the circumstances (Chenoweth, 2013;
Eubank and Weinberg, 1994). From a revenue generation point of view, democracies offer both op-
portunities and restrictions for terrorist groups to engage with organized crime. Open political systems
offer various legal economic opportunities. Therefore, it might be more difficult to mobilize criminal re-
sources in a democracy, since it is less attractive for people to divert from legitimate forms of business.
From this point of view, democracy decreases the likelihood of a terrorist group accessing organized
crime structures for its purposes. Conversely, democracies are less restrictive than autocratic systems.
Thus, they provide political and economic incentives for both terrorists and criminals to set up their
operations. Under such conditions, terrorist groups can either collaborate with actors of organized crime
or set up their own infrastructure, leading us to expect a positive impact of the variable democracy on
the accuracy of my model.
The proposed effect of population size is similarly ambiguous. The larger the population in the
home-base country of a terrorist group is, the larger is the group’s potential for mobilizing human capital
and thus for tapping into various kinds of resourcing options. Following this logic, terrorist groups can
either rely on less risky types of resourcing outside organized crime, or they can get involved with it
since the likelihood of having the opportunity to do so increases with a larger size of the population.
Considering the ambiguity of both theoretical arguments and preliminary evidence for establishing
a causal relationship between these factors and a terrorist group’s engagement with organized crime,
I instead focus on evaluating the predictive efficacy of these mechanisms for understanding variation
between organizations that engage in criminal activity, and those that do not. As such, I cannot ad-
dress issues of causal process, but I can provide evidence concerning which variables may merit further
consideration for deductive hypothesis testing. We can provide rigorous insight into the specific vari-
ables that may be of greatest interest for future research by examining predictive accuracy, predictive
importance, and estimated substantive relationships outside the assumptions of a regression framework.
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5.5 Research design
To explore the relationship between engagement in criminal activity and the factors outlined above,
I propose an inductive research design that is meant to leverage the strengths of the statistical learn-
ing approach to quantify both the predictive power and the substantive relationship of these variables.
Statistical learning is a methodology that seeks to integrate statistical models and algorithms with data
partition strategies to estimate the out-of-sample accuracy of a set of predictor variables. The goal of
such an approach is to find a reasonable function for which to make predictions about future data.
We believe this design is useful in studying the intersection of crime and terror because it seeks to
describe patterns independently from purely deductively driven hypothesis testing. Lo, Chernoff, Zheng,
and Lo (2015) find that complex samples of medical and social science data can suggest significant, al-
beit substantively meaningless, results when it comes to modeling observational data in a hypothesis
testing framework. Related to this, researchers using observational data may find statistically signific-
ant effects, yet these variables may not actually explain meaningful variation in the distribution of the
dependent variable, or even fail to be a useful predictor of future cases (Lo et al., 2015). Such spurious
relations are due to several factors, the most important including the absence of random assignment,
omitted variable bias, and sample size.
5.5.1 Unit of analysis and scope conditions
Our unit of analysis is the terrorist group. This results in a sample of 183 unique terrorist organiza-
tions and includes information on their involvement in criminal activity, organizational characteristics,
and environmental conditions. We utilize a cross-sectional unit of observation because systematic data
concerning the start and end of criminal activity and collaboration by terrorist organizations is neither
well-developed nor easily accessible seeing that such information is clandestine (Raab and Milward,
2003; Xu and Chen, 2008). We argue that the use of group-aggregated data is currently the best ap-
proach to investigate this topic. While cross-sectional data lacks precision over temporal patterns in
behavior, a focus on between-group variance provides a step into the right direction. We use data from
the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI).16
5.5.2 Variables and operationalization
Table 5.1 provides relevant descriptive information about each variable included in this study.
16For a more detailed definition of terrorism as it is used in the RDWTI, please see chapter 4
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics for variables used
Number of terrorist groups in sample 183
Numerical variables
Variable Mean Variance(SD) Max Min
Number of Bases 1.6 0.99 7 1
Polity Score 4.5 5.1 10 -10
ln(Military Spending) 1.9 0.9 9.2 0
Competition 17.7 12.3 45 0.5
ln(Population) 10.4 1.4 13.9 7.8
ln(Real GDP) 8.7 1.2 10.5 0
Attack Diversity 0.04 0.07 0.5 0
Transnational Casualties/Attack 0.51 0.86 5.4 0
Age 21.6 15 90 1
ln(Group) Size 5 2.1 9.2 2.3
Factor Variables
Variable Yes (1) No (0) In percent
Crime 69 114 37%
Centralized Structure 104 79 56%
Left-wing 69 114 37%
Religious 40 143 21%
Nationalist 68 115 37%
Right-wing 6 117 3.20%
Crime
The protocol for measuring a terrorist group’s engagement with organized crime uses open-source doc-
uments from journalistic, military/policy, and academic sources. We utilize a standardized search query
method to search for these sources, using three databases. These are: 1) Lexis Nexis, 2) Google, and
3) Google Scholar. The query-string used was as follows; group name + (trafficking or production) +
(drugs or weapons or humans or money laundering).17 To be coded as 1 (engagement), sources need
to explicitly mention the use of organized crime activity by the group. In cases where there are no
sources to point towards such an explicit involvement, the criminal activity is coded as 0. This heuristic
is practical and presents a substantive dilemma. Coding groups without a mention may underestimate
the involvement in organized crime because of a potential selection bias. Some groups may be new to
criminal engagement, or particularly skilled at hiding it. If open source material has yet to catch up with
conditions on the ground, or fails to capture well-hidden behavior, there is selection bias towards not
finding engagement. If this is the case, there may be more groups engaging with organized crime than
would be captured by my data.18
17Put into practice I use, for example: National Socialist Council of Nagaland + (trafficking or production) + (drugs or
weapons or humans or money laundering).
18Table A.2 in the appendix provides a list of all terrorist groups that are part of this sample. The table reports whether,
according to my research, a terrorist group is involved in organized crime or not along with the organizational structure of each
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Regardless of this bias, I argue that the potential for underrepresentation does not hinder my empir-
ical design in a substantial way. By using a resampling method known as k-folds cross-validation, my
analysis is more robust to conclusions driven by a single analysis of biased data, and instead computes
accuracy by using a series of data permutations. Finally, I assume that there are fundamental differences
in visibility between terrorist groups and organized crime. While some terrorist groups may be able
to hide their engagement, I argue that the more visible nature of terrorist behavior and the increased
scrutiny on violent extremists makes it unlikely that such a bias would be large.
Using these coding rules, the dependent variable is operationalized as a dichotomous measure of
organized crime, using a decision rule that codes the variable 1 if a group is coded as having participated
in at least one of the sub-measures of engagement with organized criminal activity, and 0 if not.
Organization-level variables
We measure several organizational factors. Given the clandestine character of terrorist organizations,
finding detailed information about their internal dynamics is challenging. The majority of my organiza-
tional variables are sourced from event-data created by Gaibulloev and Sandler (2013). These variables
include logged measures of group size, group structure, number of territorial bases, attack diversity,
average number of casualties per trans-national attack, group age, and the ideological disposition of the
organization.19 Gaibulloev and Sandler utilized Jones and Libicki’s database concerning terrorist organ-
ization longevity (Libicki and Jones, 2008) and RANDs Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents.20
Because the original organizational measures are coded in a panel event-data format, I aggregated most
time-series measures using the median value across all group time-periods in the Gaibulloev and Sandler
data.21 The exceptions here are age, ideology, and group structure. For age, I simply used the age at
the group’s termination, or as of 2017 if the group was still in operation. Ideology remains static in all
groups, so no aggregation is required. The organizational structure of the sampled terrorist groups is a
dichotomous variable measured as either centralized or decentralized.22
terrorist group.
19For information on the operationalization of both the organizational and environmental variables, see Gaibulloev and
Sandler 2013.
20RAND database of worldwide terrorism incidents. Available at http://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorism-
incidents.html.
21Because my predictors are aggregated from panel measures into cross-sections, it is possible that important variation is
lost during the aggregation. Appendix A.3 compares the panel means and variance to the cross-sectional measures. Only
transnational casualties/attack substantively deviates from the panel measure. The overall comparison gives reason to believe
that, on the whole, my aggregation procedure does not fundamentally change the distributional structure of the measures used
here.
22For more detailed information about the operationalization and coding of this variable, see chapter 4.
119
Environment-level variables
The second set of predictors captures environmental factors. The environmental variables are also re-
trieved from Gaibulloev and Sandler (2013). Each variable is measured at a group’s main geographic
base of operation. The first variable is the operating state’s level of democracy, operationalized by using
the Polity2 dataset. Next, I include a logged measure of military spending of the state in which a group
is based, a logged measure of population, and the states’ logged real GDP value. Finally, I include a
measure of competition by including a count of the number of other groups within the units geographic
area. As with the organizational measures, numeric measures were aggregated by taking the median
value of each measure within their respective groups.23
5.5.3 Statistical methodology
To carry out my inductively driven statistical learning framework, I utilize random forest classification.
The random forest is an ensemble learning method, built on the averaging of individual classification
trees to understand how a set of independent variables (predictors) describe the dependent variable (out-
come) (Breiman, 2001). Classification trees attempt to partition a set of training observations into the
best homogenous split between the binary levels of the outcome variable, conditional on the values of
the predictors (James et al., 2013). The classification tree then compares the split found for this set of
training observations with a subset of test observations.
When growing the forest, the random forest algorithm builds a pre-specified number of decision
trees based on training data. Every time a split in the tree is made, a random sample of predictors
is chosen as a subset of prediction candidates from the full set of included predictors, with only one
predictor from this subset being allowed to predict each additional branch (James et al., 2013). Each
subsequent split takes a new sample of predictors as the forest grows. The logic behind the sampling of
predictors at each split is that the algorithm will create a forest of uncorrelated trees, which results in
greater reliability across the forest (James et al., 2013, p. 320). As a result, the random forest provides
greater predictive accuracy compared to a single classification tree. The predictor split method is robust
23By aggregating organizational and environmental measures at the group level, I concede a loss of temporal information.
This is problematic in that I cannot parse out time-serial structures that may be important for understanding engagement with
organized crime and may mask a problem of reverse causality, or a temporal lag structure that characterizes engagement.
While these limitations must be acknowledged, there are two reasons for which it does not decrease the merit of this study.
First, multiple indicators at the panel level are essentially time invariant in their original measurements for the group’s entire
history or sizable amounts of their history (group ideology, group size, structure, etc.). Even if it was feasible to produce
true time series measures of engagement, these problems would not necessarily be solved by maintaining the original panel
structure. The second reason concerns my strategy. We make no attempt to estimate causal effects and instead focus on how
aggregated factors at the group level may be used to accurately predict engagement between different groups, and not when
groups adopt or discard engagement opportunities. While these questions are important, I believe that the results here can aid
in the formulation of more nuanced theories of engagement by focusing first on between-group variation in engagement.
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to outlier values, random noise, unbiased estimates of error, heteroskedasticity, and improves prediction
accuracy in test sets. Also, it handles problems such as non-linear relationships, interaction relationships
between predictors, missing data, and high dimensionality.
To perform out-of-sample validation, I utilize the .632 bootstrap method. This cross-validation
method has been proposed to be a better estimator for out-of-sample accuracy for small-N datasets
when compared to traditional methods, such as the leave-one-out cross-validation (LOOCV) method
and K-folds cross validation method (Efron and Tibishirani, 1997). We utilize a hundred bootstrapped
subsamples to estimate area-under-the-curve statistics, and brier score statistics concerning the out-of-
sample accuracy of various classifier specifications. To test robustness, I also include the results of a
10-fold cross-validation analysis in Appendix A.4.
5.6 Results
To evaluate the efficacy of organizational and environmental level factors in predicting engagement with
organized crime, two evaluation procedures are used. First, I show how well three specifications of the
random forest classifier perform in out-of-sample prediction using .632 bootstrap cross validation. Area
under the curve (AUC) scores are used to evaluate the accuracy of a fully specified forest, a forest with
only organizational factors, and a forest with only environmental factors. We finally explore variable im-
portance for each predictor for predicting engagement within the fully specified random forest analysis.
Building on these analyses, I then produce partial-dependence plots for the most important predictors to
estimate the functional relationship between predicted engagement and values within the predictors.
Figure 5.1 displays the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for out-of-sample accuracy
for all three random forest specifications. The AUC is used as a statistic for evaluating classifier perform-
ance. The AUC scores range within the interval between 0 and 1 with .50 indicating random guessing
and 1 perfect prediction. AUC values of .70 to .80 indicate fair predictive accuracy, values of .81 to .90
indicate good predictive accuracy, and .91 to 1 is considered excellent predictive accuracy.
Overall, the random forest specifications tend to do perform fairly well. The fully specified ran-
dom forest has an AUC of 0.83, indicating good accuracy. Breaking the analysis into predictor sub-
components, I observe an interesting pattern. The organizational factor specification has an AUC of
0.91. This result is close to the fully specified version and is on the bottom end of good predictive
performance. In contrast, the environmental factor specification has an AUC of 0.71. This is an almost
ten-point drop in performance when compared to organizational factors alone. The fully specified ran-
dom forest’s accuracy is driven mostly by organizational predictors. Environmental factors may only
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Figure 5.1: ROC curves for Random Forest specifications
marginally increase my ability to predict engagement with organized crime out-of-sample. An AUC of
0.71 is on the border between fair and poor predictive accuracy.
If organizational factors are better predictors than environmental factors, then it is valuable to dig
deeper into which specific variables are driving predictive performance. The random forest classifies
predictor importance by running a classifier analysis, first with the variable included, and again with the
variable’s values randomly permuted to stochastic noise. Importance is measured as the average decrease
in predictive accuracy when permuting to random noise from a predictor’s original values. Figure 5.2
displays standardized variable importance results for the random forest classifier. Group size and group
ideology remain near the top of importance, with group size having the largest decrease in accuracy when
left out. The environmental variables military spending in a country of operation and mean casualties
per transnational attack make up the next group of most important predictors. Alongside centralized
group structure, real GDP, and group age make up the middling variables in terms of importance.
Corroborating the analysis in figure 5.2, variables that reach a minimum threshold of 0.01 import-
ance, five of the seven variables are organizational factors. Below this threshold, four of the five predict-
ors are environmental. Interestingly, the number of bases of a group decreases the predictive perform-
ance of the random forest. Combined with the negative influence of this predictor, and the general dearth
of importance for many of the environmental factors, it is clear why the environmental factor specifica-
tion performed poorly compared to the full and organizational factor specifications, respectively.24
Taking the two analyses above in tandem, two patterns are suggested by the data. First, a fully
specified random forest performs well when estimating out-of-sample accuracy for engagement with
24The effects are not very large. Future research can improve the measurement of variables to increase the quality of analyses
and the magnitude of effects.
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Figure 5.2: Variable importance for Random Forest
organized crime. Second, it appears that organizational characteristics are driving most of this predictive
performance when compared to environmental factors. Yet, this leaves several substantive questions
unanswered. A criticism of the random forest method is that it can appear as a “black-box”. It may
provide accurate predictions, but the relationship between predictors and outcome is not always clear to
the analyst. Fortunately, the use of partial dependence plots can allow us to estimate, and visualize, the
functional relationship between each predictor and the outcome of interest.
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 display the partial dependence plots for the eight most important predictors as
indicated by the random forest classifier. Factor variables display their relationship using boxplots, while
numeric variables display their relationship using non-linear line plots. The y-axis displays the predicted
probability of involvement in crime. Group size shows an increase in the expectation of being classified
as having criminal involvement as the ordinal group size value increases, with less difference between
the two largest categories. Ideology shows religious organizations as having the highest classification
expectation, with nationalist groups having the second highest. Leftist and right-wing groups are the
lowest and are difficult to superficially tell apart. Military spending and transnational attack activity show
similar functional relationships, with the expectation of being classified as having criminal involvement.
They show a sharp positive relationship as predictor values initially increase, and a clear plateau effect
that levels off the expected classification numbers.
GDP shows a non-linear negative relationship with criminal classification. As GDP increases, I see
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Figure 5.3: Partial dependence plots for four most important predictors
a decrease in expected classification, but with a small parabolic positive shift near the logged GDP value
of 10. Group age shows the most linear relationship of the final four predictors, with a steady positive
increase in expected classification with group age. For centralized group structure, the random forest
agrees with the logistic regression, showing centralized group structure (1) as having a higher mean
expected classification than groups with non-centralized group structures. The main difference is that
the mean values between the centralized and decentralized categories do not seem to be superficially very
different from each other. Finally, population displays a highly non-linear relationship with classification
of criminal activity. Groups active in countries with larger populations tend to have higher expected
classification values, with a structural break occurring around the logged value of 10.
5.7 Conclusion
The goal of this study was to utilize an inductive machine learning approach to explore the predictive
accuracy of organizational and environmental factors in classifying terrorist engagement with organized
crime. It also explored the relative importance of predictors and utilized partial dependence plots to
draw the controlled-substantive relationship between predictors and engagement outcomes.
Organizational factors outperform environmental factors across all classifier specifications. This is
an interesting finding, considering previous studies that focus on environmental characteristics to ex-
plain the existence of a nexus between terrorism and organized crime (Eccarius-Kelly, 2012; Flanigan,
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Figure 5.4: Partial dependence plots for second most important predictors
2012; Freeman, 2011; Piazza, 2012; Williams, 2012). The tenor of those studies is that context factors
provide opportunities for criminality and terrorism to flourish and combine their assets. Based on this
assumption, these studies assert to explain why some regions in the world are more likely to host greater
interaction of terrorism and organized crime. Our results suggest a substantive impact of organizational
variables that are oftentimes neglected in large-n studies due to difficulty obtaining data on those vari-
ables. However, as my findings suggest, not focusing on organizational factors, may bias the results
substantially and systematically.
Knowing this, we must yet be careful in interpreting the results of this study. Our inductive ap-
proach cannot solve problems of causal inference and I cannot claim that organizational factors are more
causally related to crime than environmental factors. We can only suggest that they are substantively
important for predicting out-of-sample cases of criminal activity. A second qualification of these find-
ings is that I could not include all variables which may be of substantive importance to the crime-terror
nexus. We chose well-known factors found within the extant literature, but even the fully specified
random forest remained far from perfect when classifying out-of-sample. Variables such as diaspora
support, degree of border openness, geographic proximity to certain regions, and/or well-established
criminal organizations are examples of factors that can be of interest to future studies. Yet, these would
also require substantial effort to observe and operationalize. Additionally, my cross-sectional approach
cannot capture potentially interesting patterns of behavior that could occur temporally between terrorist
organizations and crime. Lastly, the exploration of the relative importance of predictors suffers from
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small effect size. Future research can work on identifying better measurements to improve the quality
of prediction and the magnitude of effect.
Knowing these limitations, I still believe that the findings of this study are of importance to the
crime-terror literature. This is the first study to evaluate the predictive importance of factors thought to
be associated with increased crime-terror interaction. While I do not propose a new theoretical approach,
my inductive analysis can help evaluate the existing theoretical mechanisms and guide future theory
formation and testing in three ways.
First, the results suggest that future studies may benefit from focusing on organization-based mech-
anisms for explaining the crime-terror nexus, and the potential interaction between organizational factors
and environmental cues. Our findings suggest the importance of focusing more on organizational factors.
The accuracy of prediction may be increased by including other organizational variables or by focusing
on how environment and the organization affect each other. Second, my set of predictors used here
leaves room for improvement. Going forward, the literature may benefit from process tracing analyses
of groups that engage in criminal activity as a strategy for identifying additional mechanisms. Organ-
izational variables are difficult to measure as they are mostly clandestine. In-depth case-based studies
may help to inform strategies on how to measure certain organizational characteristics and identify new
variables.
Finally, the results suggest that we should be more open to analytical methods apart from null-
hypothesis testing and the use of regression models. An algorithmic approach, such as random forest,
outperformed the more well-known logistic regression. The complexity of observational data concern-
ing terrorist-group behavior seems to be poorly captured by the regression modeling approach when
compared to random forest. With increasingly greater access to machine learning methodologies, I am
additionally able to unpack the “black box” of statistical algorithms and explore the functional relation-
ship between predictor and outcome in a way more familiar to those trained on regression modeling.
Adding to this, the use of out-of-sample predictive accuracy over null-hypothesis testing methods ap-
pears to be a viable alternative for evaluating the potential importance of theorized mechanisms in a
more concrete way than relying on statistical significance alone.
In the next chapter, I return to the method of null-hypothesis testing, as I analyze the moderation
effect of the organizational structure of a terrorist group on its social capital gained through cooperation
with other terrorist groups on its operational capability.
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Chapter 6
The network effect on the capability of
terrorist groups1
“Almost anything is, in principle possible through collaboration because you are not limited
by your own resources and expertise. You can, in principle achieve whatever vision you may
have by tapping into resources and expertise of others” (Huxham and Vangen, 2005, p. 3).
6.1 Introduction
On December 21, 1975 a group of six terrorists stormed a meeting at the headquarters of the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Vienna killing several people and taking several ministers
hostage. The Venezuelan terrorist Illich Ramı´rez Sa´nchez, aka Carlos, led the group and was working
together with Germans and Palestinians to carry out the attack (Martin, 2010, p. 281). Members of the
Revolutionary Cells (RZ) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) combined their
assets and managed to successfully siege the building and escape afterwards. This act of terrorism is an
example of operational cooperation. It illustrates the rationale of cooperation between terrorist groups.
Facing limited capacities to adequately perform their attacks terrorist groups ally with each other by
exchanging missing resources to overcome these limitations.
This example motivates my research question for this chapter: Why are some terrorist groups able
to carry out attacks with sophisticated weapons, while other terrorist groups are not? To answer this
question, I explore how terrorist groups can capitalize on their relationships with other terrorist groups
to acquire external resources and how they are equipped to manage their resources internally.
1This chapter is based on a joint research project with Anna-Lena Ho¨nig, which was presented at an earlier stage at the
International Studies Association 57th Annual Convention, 2016, Atlanta, Georgia.
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In this chapter, I explore why terrorist groups differ in what they manage to do. I capture this
with the observable variation of weapons used in terrorist attacks. My argument links what I call the
“sophistication of weapons” used in an attack to a perpetrator’s resources. Terrorist groups with more
resources can carry out attacks displaying a higher sophistication of weapons than terrorist groups with
few resources. I argue that terrorist groups cooperate with other terrorist groups to enhance their resource
endowments. I conceptualize cooperation between terrorist groups as terrorist groups jointly carrying
out an attack.2 Based on these instances of cooperation, I generate a network of terrorist groups. In this
network two terrorist groups are connected if they cooperated at least once. Through these connections
terrorist groups can generate relational rents.3 Based on the position within the network, some terrorist
groups can access more and more diverse resources from other terrorist groups. This concept of profiting
from the connections someone has is called “social capital” (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988; Putnam,
2000).
In addition to explaining the resource acquisition of terrorist groups with their connections to other
terrorist groups, I argue that it matters how well a terrorist group is equipped to manage the resources
internally. I claim that this capacity depends on a terrorist group’s organizational structure enabling cent-
ralized terrorist groups to manage resources more efficiently compared to decentralized terrorist groups.
The organizational structure determines how decision-making is distributed within the organization and
how resources can move through the organization. Terrorist groups have to manage the resource ac-
quistion and their efficient allocation within the organization. In this chapter, I explore the effect of a
terrorist group’s position within the network and its organizational structure on what it manages to im-
plement. Each characteristic influences a terrorist group’s resource stock independently. I also assess if
and to what degree the impact of a terrorist group’s network position is conditional on its organizational
structure.
With this approach, I combine intra-organizational dynamics and inter-organizational relationships.
The literature to date has focused on one or the other. My theoretical argument highlights the need to
combine both approaches. Focusing on resource acquisition and resource exploitation provides a bet-
ter understanding of the process by which terrorist groups gain value from resources to enhance their
operational capability. To elaborate my argument, I rely on management literature that consideres organ-
izations’ performance both in terms of their external resource environment and their internal dynamics.4
2This is a practice regularly done in network analysis. Actors are linked when they are present at the same event. Thus,
two people can be linked when they are at the same party or taking the same class at university (Borgatti, Everett and Johnson,
2013, p. 4). The substantial meaning needs to be attributed by the context. Much like it can be reasonably assumed that
students might at least know of each other once they have taken the same class, terrorist groups know each other if they are
active in the same attack.
3Relational rents are explained in chapter 3.
4See chapter 3 for more details on this literature.
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By transferring those mechanisms to terrorist groups and their resource acquisition and allocation, I
introduce insights gained from studying firms to terrorism research.
My argument and hypotheses are also informed by the assumptions of social network theory (e.g.,
Borgatti and Foster, 2003; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). I apply social capital theory, which uses con-
cepts of social network theory to explain how performance outcomes can be explained by the external
relationships of an actor (Coleman, 1990). This approach highlights a terrorist group’s reliance on its
ability to access and extract necessary resources from other actors for their operations (Duijn, Kashirin
and Sloot, 2014; Kinsella, 2008). I argue that the depth, breadth, and efficiency of resource exchange
hinges upon the interactions terrorist groups have with other terrorist groups.5 Social network theory
provides the conceptual framework for the analysis and the empirical tools to test my hypotheses.
In this chapter, I anaylze the variation of the network effect on the capbility of terrorist groups that
engange in cooperation. This means, I do not explain, why terrorist groups that cooperate fare worse
than those that cooperate. Instead, I explore the consequences of various degrees of cooperation. I
compare those terrorist groups that cooperate only little with those that cooperate more. This selection
is grounded in the network approach of this chapter. To be part of the network, a terrorist group needs
to have at least one connection to another terrorist group. If a terrorist group has no connection at all,
it has no link to the network. With such a sample selection strategy I can explain how the position in
a network relates to different possibilities to access resources. I analyze how the degree of cooperation
influences the amount of resource endowment and not how terrorist groups that cooperate distinguish
themselves from terrorist groups that do not cooperate.
I argue that the position of a terrorist group within the network affects its resource stock, thereby
affecting what it is able to do. I call this the operational capability. A terrorist group’s operational capab-
ility is assessed by its observable activities. The relationship between the resources and the performance
of a terrorist group is discussed in chapter 3. In this chapter, I measure the capability of a terrorist group
with the sophistication of weapon displayed in an attack.
I classify weapons based on their accessibility and simplicity of usage. I argue that the sophistication
of weapons used in attacks provides valuable information about the capability of terrorist groups as it
directly links their repertoire of cognitive and material resources, to features of the attack. It provides
a more immediate assessment of what a terrorist group can do, while distancing itself from approaches
that are used to assess what a terrorist wants to do. Previous studies measure the capability of a terrorist
groups with the lethality of an attack (Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008; Horowitz and Potter, 2014). Merely
5This argument stems from the management literature (Yli-Renko, Autio and Sapienza, 2001, p. 593).
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counting bodies can be misleading depending on the strategic intention behind the attack.6 The type
of weapon used in an attack, however, informs about the resourcefulness of terrorist groups. This is
relevant for weapons requiring high levels of sophistication, such as, for example, nuclear devices. Even
supposedly simple weapons, such as handguns, kitchen knives, or automobiles require some kind of
knowledge. While the explicit knowledge about how to use a handgun or drive a car might be easily
attainable online, each weapon requires tacit knowledge to be successfully used in an attack. An attacker
driving a truck into a crowd, for example, still needs to know how to drive. Additionally, some tactical
supervision is beneficial. Here, the attacker might need to be advised on where and when to hit a target.
This approach is expanding upon previous research on operational capability that focuses on attack type
or target type (Young and Dugan, 2014).
My findings suggest connections to other terrorist groups can increase a terrorist group’s operational
capability. They show that focusing on a terrorist group’s position within the network of cooperating
terrorist groups explains part of the variation in operational capability. Furthermore, attacks carried
out by terrorist groups with a centralized organizational structure have a higher operational capability
and this effect of cooperation is moderated by the organizational structure. These findings support my
argument about the importance of both, resource acquisition and allocation, for the operational capability
of a terrorist group.
I start by elaborating my theoretical argument linking the operational capability of a terrorist group
to its social capital and its organizational structure. I derive hypotheses concerning a terrorist group’s
direct connections, its embeddedness within the network, and its organizational structure. The final
hypothesis relates the operational capability of a terrorist group to an effect of network position that is
conditional on the terrorist group’s organizational structure. After that, I explain my empirical strategy
and present my results. I conclude this chapter with a critical discussion of my findings.
6.2 The social capital of terrorist groups – a network perspective
The theoretical argument I make in this chapter revolves around the question of how the network position
of a terrorist group can provide information about the flow of resources between terrorist groups in a
network. In order to analyze this relationship, I describe the mechanism that links the individual group’s
network position to its operational capability.
I use social capital theory to explain how connections between terrorist groups affect the operational
capability of each group (Bourdieu, 1986; Burt, 2007; Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1973, 1985; Putnam,
6A detailed account of the strategic intention behind a terrorist attack is provided in chapter 2.
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2000).
My theoretical reasoning is based on the assumption that patterns of intergroup relations are con-
sequential for understanding a terrorist group’s activities.7 The social capital approach is frequently used
in studies of strategic management. Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell (2011, p. 48) explain the mechanism of
capitalization as the process where “nodes acquire ideas, resources, and opportunities through their ties.
This process either directly increases their human capital or increases their ability to exploit their human
capital, which in turn contributes to their success in terms of performance and rewards.” Firms are able
to enhance their performance if they are located in a superior network position (Gulati and Garigiulo,
1999; Gulati, Noria and Zaheer, 2000; Portes, 1998; Reagans and Zuckerman, 2001; Tsai, 2001). These
studies link the structural embeddedness to behavioral outcomes of the actors in the network. They find
embeddedness to correlate with having good ideas (Burt, 2004), more opportunities (Lin and Dumin,
1986), or enhanced status (Lin, 1999).
In this chapter I use social network analysis as an approach both in terms of theory and analytical
methodology. Social network analysis includes a theoretical message that is based on the perspective of
actors not solely in terms of their attributes but in terms of their relations (Wasserman and Faust 1994).
From this perspective, the concept of social capital is defined as relational resources in various studies
(e.g., Bourdieu, 1986; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Coleman, 1988; Portes, 1998; Putnam, 2000).
Terrorist groups possess social capital if they attain resources from their relations with other terrorist
groups via their network connections. I do not aim to explain why some terrorist groups work together
and others do not. Instead, I investigate the consequences of networked interaction on the activities of
terrorist groups that cooperate with others. I assess to what extent the position of a terrorist group in the
network correlates with its operational capability.
Social network analysis is frequently used to understand terrorist groups’ behavior and the beha-
vior of individual members of terrorist organizations (Enders and Jindapon, 2009; Enders and Su, 2007;
Helfstein and Wright, 2011; Magouirk, Atran and Sageman, 2008). They provide network-related ex-
planations for radicalization (Helfstein, 2012; Sageman, 2004), focus on the distribution of power and
control within an organization (Magouirk, Atran and Sageman, 2008), or apply network methodology
to case studies, which analyze tactical networks (Abuza, 2002; Cleaver, 1998; Elison, 2000; Wayland,
2004; Zanini, 1999). Those studies aim to understand how the connectivity of terrorists and terrorist
groups affects the diffusion of specific tactics. Horowitz (2010) identifies Hizbollah and AQ to be key
actors in the diffusion of suicide tactics. Both groups provide operational knowledge to terrorist groups
enabling them to use suicide tactics.
7I provided a detailed assessment how cooperation between terrorist groups translates into more resources in chapter 3.
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The social capital approach has also been used to explore strategic positions of individual actors in
criminal networks (Duijn, Kashirin and Sloot, 2014). Previous research finds that illicit actors rely on
their ability to extract resources, necessary for operations, from their social network (Carley, Lee and
Krackhaardt, 2002; Coles, 2001; Klerks, 2001; Natarajan, 2006; Schwartz and Rouselle, 2009; Sparrow,
1991).8 They find that actors derive power and influence from their position in the network if they can
control the flow of resources. Their power increases the more other actors rely on them to pass on
resources. Thus, a beneficial position for a terrorist group is to have many connections, to be linked to
terrorist groups that are themselves well connected (Boissevain, 1974), or to be positioned between two
or more terrorist groups that are dependent on it to pass on resources (Morselli, 2001; Morselli and Roy,
2008). Those three mechanisms are evaluated in this chapter.
Using the network approach to social capital, I argue that differences in terrorist groups’ operational
capability are rooted in their different positions in the network that determine their access to resources
of other terrorist groups (Tsai and Goshal, 1998). The central assumption of this approach is that being
centrally located within the network increases the probability of accessing valuable resources due to
topological advantages (Ibbara, 1993). Put simply, the structure of the network helps determine what
individual actors are able to do. This concept is summarized in the so-called “resource-flow model” of
network theory, in which ties are viewed as conduits for resource flows (Borgatti et al., 2009).9 This
claim is in line with previous literature on related issues, such as a terrorist group’s longevity (Phillips,
2012), lethality (Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008), access to certain kinds of weapons (Asal, Ackerman and
Rethemeyer, 2012), or adoption of a specific tactic (Horowitz and Potter, 2014). These studies all focus
on the interaction between distinct organizations and reason that more direct connections lead to better
outcomes. It captures the mechanism of direct transmission from actor to actor (Borgatti et al., 2009,
p. 894). I argue that terrorist groups form a cooperative network to transmit resources via their ties,
and thus increase their capabilities affecting their performances. This approach contrasts research that
focuses on the individual terrorist group’s characteristics to explain its behavior. In my approach, the
network position may provide opportunities to extract resources from the social environment of a group
or constrain a terrorist group’s access to external resources.
6.2.1 Direct connections to other terrorist groups
I argue that terrorist groups that are more centrally located within the overall network have more ac-
cess to resources and are, therefore, more likely to have a higher operational capability. Resources are
8A more detail description how terrorist groups extract resources from the environment is provided in chapter 3.
9For a comprehensive account of types of ties see Wasserman and Faust (1994, p. 18).
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transmitted via connections to other terrorist groups. Terrorist groups that are able to complement their
own resources with those from other terrorist groups can mitigate their own resource shortage. They
can carry out attacks that were impossible without the resources of other terrorist groups. Conducting a
terrorist attack requires multiple resources as elaborated in chapter 3. The more sophisticated an attack,
the more (diverse) resources a terrorist group requires. A terrorist group that has many direct connec-
tions has the opportunity to access multiple and potentially diverse resources. Such a terrorist group is
expected to show higher operational capability. The advantages and disadvantages of having many dir-
ect connections are discussed in chapter 2. While the transaction costs rise with additional connections,
I argue that the amount of direct connections positively correlates with the operational capability of a
terrorist group. Furthermore, terrorist groups with multiple ties to other terrorist groups can compensate
the loss of one tie.
Terrorist groups with only one or few ties substantively loose their access to external resources
should those ties be severed. Terrorist groups “can access knowledge, information, personnel, financial
reserves, and material that might otherwise be unavailable” (Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008, p. 440). Sev-
eral examples illustrate this mechanism. The introductory example highlights how FARC was able to
carry out hit-and-run tactics in urban settings due to the help provided by memebers of PIRA (Ward and
Hackett, 2003). German militants supported the Palestinian Black September carrying out the attack at
the Munich Olympics in 1972 (Alexander, 1989). In 1992, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
cooperated with Hizbollah to enhance their tactical repertoire and improve their operational effective-
ness, resulting in increased casualties per attack (Horowitz and Potter, 2014). To summarize, terrorist
groups with multiple direct connections are expected to have higher operational capability. Those ties
allow a terrorist group to aggregate resources and to receive help carrying out attacks.
Hypothesis 1 (Number of direct connections): Terrorist attacks that are conducted by terrorist groups
that have more direct connections to other terrorist groups are more likely to display a higher operational
capability.
6.2.2 Embeddedness within the network
Aside from having many direct connections to other terrorist groups it is also helpful to be connected to
terrorist groups that are themselves well connected. Several scholars find that the type and magnitude
of resources, which are available to an actor depend on the network connections of the actors oneself
is connected to (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Bonacich, 1987; Lin, 1999). Granovetter (1973) famously
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defines the “strength of weak ties,” capturing the usefulness of connections based on the number of
connections a partner has. This approach accounts for the importance to focus on resources that originate
beyond a terrorist group’s immediate neighborhood. Those resources are not immediately accessible
by a terrorist group but need to move through the extended network ties of its partners. A terrorist
group can benefit greatly from these resources as they are potentially different from their own stock of
resources and, hence, are complementary. Management and sociological research defines the concept of
embeddedness to capture the effect of the social context, meaning the connectivity between actors, on
their economic behavior (Granovetter, 1985). Research finds embeddedness to be positively correlated
with performance (DiMaggio and Louch, 1998; Gulati, Noria and Zaheer, 2000; Uzzi, 1996, 1997). In
particular, Hansen (1999) finds that organizations that are embedded in a network are able to identify
and acquire the resources they need.
Thus, it is not just the number of connections that is relevant, but it is “about the value of con-
nections” (Borgatti and Foster, 2003, p. 993). It matters to whom a terrorist group is connected. For
example, a terrorist group can be connected to another group that has one more connection, or it can be
connected to a terrorist group that has five other connections. The more terrorist groups a cooperation
partner is connected to, the larger is the overall network embeddedness of this terrorist group. I argue
that it matters for a terrorist group’s stock of resources to how many groups a cooperation partner is
connected. A cooperation partner is more relevant if it is connected to many other terrorist groups. This
affects the amount of resources, but also the potential diversity of resources a terrorist group can access.
Therefore, the degree of embeddedness of a terrorist group positively affects the stock of resources it
can use in its attacks. By the logic of my argument made in this chapter, I expect a terrorist group that is
more embedded to have a higher operational capability.
Hypothesis 2 (Number of indirect connections): Terrorist attacks that are conducted by terrorist
groups that are linked to well-connected terrorist groups are more likely to display a higher operational
capability.
6.2.3 Access to structural holes
Finally, I explain the variation in operational capability by relating terrorist groups’ access to structural
holes to their operational capability. A structural hole is a gap or absence of ties between two terrorist
groups (Burt, 1992, 2007; Crossley et al., 2015). Since those two groups are not connected they are
unable to pass resources directly between each other. This highlights the powerful position of terrorist
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groups that are connecting those otherwise disconnected parts of the network (Burt, 1992; Freeman,
1979). Such terrorist groups establish a bridge to transfer resources. Terrorist groups that are positioned
in such a brokerage position own “bridging capital” (Putnam, 2000). They serve as conduits through
which resources need to flow. Terrorist groups that are located between two other terrorist groups enjoy
the benefits of access to both, which endows them with a great and divers stock of resources.10 Across
disciplines, studies find that actors that bridge structural holes outperform those that are not located in
such an advantageous position (Burt, 1992, 2007; McEvily and Zaheer, 1999; Zaheer and Bell, 2005).
They can access novel information and diverse resources from remote parts of the network (Burt, 1992).
Such actors hear about opportunities and threats, and learn about potential partners for cooperation
(Powell and Smith-Doerr, 1994; Uzzi, 1996).
Especially in the context of a global network of terrorist groups, it is important to explore the effect of
the immediate neighborhood of a terrorist group. In practice, a terrorist group cannot interact with every
other terrorist group, but it faces restrictions and opportunities based on the role it has in its immediate
network. A terrorist group that can bridge otherwise disconnected sections of its network can access
more resources and conduct attacks with a higher operational capability. In contrast, terrorist groups
may have many redundant ties, i.e., multiple ties to the same partner(s). Such ties do not provide fresh
resources but increase the transaction costs, which constrains a terrorist group in its ability to explore its
resource opportunities. For terrorist groups having access to structural holes is especially desirable as it
allows them to access a higher amount or more diverse resources, while minimizing the number of con-
nections it has to other terrorist groups. As elaborated previously, clandestine actors increase their risk
of detection by cooperating with others, requiring them to balance the benefits of acquiring resources
with the costs of increased visibility. Bridging structural holes can offer them such an opportunity.
Hypothesis 3 (Access to structural holes): Terrorist attacks that are conducted by terrorist groups
that bridge structural holes are more likely to display a higher operational capability.
6.3 Organizational structure and operational capability
Terrorist groups need to manage their resources in a way that allows them to use their resources as effi-
ciently as possible. An attack requires the coordination of all resources that are needed for its successful
10Burt’s concept of structural holes is similar to Granovetters strength of weak ties concept. The important difference is
that according to Burt‘s approach a tie matters to a terrorist group because of who the partnering terrorist groups are NOT
connected to (Burt, 1992).
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execution. Both human and material resources need to be prepared and moved to the location of the
attack. Weapons and other material resources need to be assembled and members of the terrorist group
need to be selected to carry out the attack. Those members need to be trained in the use of the weapons
and their tactical specifications. They might need to learn how to use a suicide vest, to pilot a plane, or
to operate a remote detonator. This requires terrorist groups to have access to such knowledge. It also
requires them to retain this knowledge over time, to integrate both explicit and tacit knowledge where
necessary, and to have the communication mechanisms in place to transmit information and other re-
sources for successfully coordinated action. The better a terrorist group manages its resources, the better
it is expected to perform in its attacks.
Theories of organizational learning and innovation explore these mechanisms in more detail (Horow-
itz, 2010; Jackson et al., 2005; Jackson, 2001). Goshal and Moran (1996) define the “organizational ad-
vantage” that originates in an organization’s superior capability to create and transfer knowledge. While
those mechanisms are oftentimes tailored towards cognitive resources, I content that this restriction is
unnecessarily one-dimensional. Material resources need to be managed as well. Organizational the-
ory claims that a good organizational structure needs to minimize the costs of transaction (Williamson,
1975). In that tradition, a terrorist group is like a conventional firm, in which an authority directs the
resources to save costs (Coase, 1937).
Terrorist groups may be able to acquire resources that are available within their environment. How-
ever, the assumption that those resources are readily available for the terrorist group to use is a mislead-
ing oversimplification of the process of resource allocation. Acquired resources need to be combined
with resources already owned by the terrorist group for their efficient use (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990;
Kogut and Zander, 1992).11 As the exploitation of resources is dependent on the individual terrorist
group’s efforts and ability to exploit resources, some terrorist groups might be better at this than others
introducing observable variation in the attack characteristics (Inkpen, 2000).
Previous research summarizes these abilities as ‘absorptive capacity’ (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).
This capacity describes the ability to evaluate which resources are needed, the willingness to integrate
those resources, and the ability to do so. Jackson et al. (2005) apply this approach to terrorist groups.
They claim that, given a terrorist group wants to acquire new technologies for reasons discussed above,
it needs to match the new technologies with already existing resources. A terrorist group can procure
a new type of bombs that can potentially enhance the group’s operational capability. However, without
the necessary know-how and personnel that can operate the new weapons, they have no effect on the
11Terrorist groups can, in principle, acquire readily assembled weapon systems along with the trained personnel to operate
these systems. In practice, however, this might be a very rare event due to the availability of the resource and other constraints.
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operational capability.12
6.3.1 Centralized and decentralized organizational structures
The process of resource retention and absorption requires a prolonged oversight over the operations
and tasks of individual divisions. Decentralized terrorist groups lack the ability to track and evaluate
the activities of other cells in great detail. This can lead to negative externalities, where cognitive and
material resources are lost to parts of the terrorist group. For example, one cell may require training
in the use of IEDs. Due to lacking communication and centralized oversight, it is unaware of such
knowledge in other cells and needs to either change its tactic or acquire the resources by itself. If the
members of the cell, who were proficient in manufacturing the IEDs, become unavailable, the cell loses
this tactical opportunity. In centralized terrorist groups, the cognitive and material resources can be
retained and deployed to different operational units as required by the central leadership.
Consequently, I argue that centralized terrorist groups are expected to outperform terrorist groups
that are decentralized. The managerial processes are more efficient in centralized than in decentralized
organizations. A centralized structure superiorly allows to manage existing resources and coordinates
between functionally and geographically differentiated parts of the organization to ensure the integra-
tion of all relevant segments of the terrorist group to carry out an attack. Resources are less likely to
be lost due to miscommunication. IS has exemplified its absorptive capacity over the past years. As a
centralized organization it managed to not only keep up with its tactical choices but also to stay innovat-
ive to match the changing challenges (Cancian, 2017). Like a firm, it developed new tactics integrating
cognitive and material resources efficiently. For example, it managed to use remotely controlled cars in
attacks and even to develop airborne drones for intelligence purposes (Hennigan, 2017).
Hypothesis 4 (Centralization): Terrorist attacks that are conducted by terrorist groups that have a
centralized organizational structure are more likely to display a higher operational capability.
6.3.2 The moderation effect of organizational structure
I identify the independent effects of the network position and the organizational structure and further
argue that the organizational structure influences the effect of the network position as well. The effect
that the network position has on the operational capability depends on the organizational structure of the
12The successful adoption of new technologies also depends on the technological requirements. As such, a new type of
explosive device might be more easily adopted into a terrorist group’s repertoir than a nuclear weapon, which would require a
much greater skill-set.
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terrorist groups that carry out the attack. I expect that those terrorist groups that combine an advantage-
ous network position with an advantageous organizational structure perform better than terrorist groups
that are disadvantaged on one dimension.
Hypothesis 5 (Moderation effect): The network position of a terrorist group affects the operational
capability more if the group has a centralized organizational structure.
Figure 6.1 provides an overview of the theoretical argument and the related hypotheses, regarding
the independent and moderated effect of cooperation patterns and organizational structure on operational
capability.
Figure 6.1: Theoretical framework
6.4 Research design
6.4.1 Data sources
The data set creation provided several challenges, which can be grouped into two general issues: first,
data limitations inherent to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), and second, challenges from trans-
forming event data into organizational data. The GTD is the most expansive database on terrorist events
worldwide (LaFree and Dugan, 2007; LaFree, Yang and Crenshaw, 2009). It reports terrorist incidents
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from 1970 through 2015 and is updated annually capturing a total of about 142,000 attacks. These at-
tacks are performed by a total of 3,240 individual perpetrators. However, the unique identification of
these perpetrators provides some challenges, which I discuss in this section.
First, the GTD relies on open source data, thus capturing only terrorist attacks that are publicized.
Thus, the events reported are “biased toward (1) the most newsworthy forms of terrorism, and (2) suc-
cessful attacks that avoided early detection by authorities” (Dugan 2012: 182). Second, different media
sources can provide conflicting accounts of terrorist attacks complicating the coding process. Third,
Dugan (2012, p. 182) states that the most important limitation of using terrorism event data for generat-
ing group information is that many attacks are not attributable to a specific perpetrator. To be included in
my sample, each perpetrator needs to be uniquely identified, i.e., the attack reported needs to be attrib-
uted to a specified terrorist group. Multiple group names and inconsistent coding exacerbates uniquely
identifying the terrorist group. I corrected the final sample of terrorist groups for multiple occurrences
of the same group to not artificially inflate the sample (Dugan, 2012, p. 183).13
Terrorist groups may come together under a new name (Dugan, 2012, p. 183). These groups can
then rely on the inter-personal networks of both individual groups, making them more likely to enter
cooperative arrangements. Empirically, the new terrorist group enters the sample as a unique observation
in the line of succession of the former individual groups. The origninal groups seize to exist with the
formation of the new terrorist group.
Terrorist groups can also fracture. Fractions of specific groups that are the result of splits and splin-
tering and conduct attacks in their own name are considered to be a unique terrorist group (Dugan, 2012,
p. 183). While I acknowledge the similarities between the splintering group and the parent organization,
I content that it is reasonable to consider them different entities, since the split itself indicates their intent
to go their separate ways.
I work with a subset of the GTD that only contains groups that have cooperated at least once in the
timeframe under study. This allows me to compare the operational capability of terrorist groups that
cooperate at least once. I argue that the social capital of a terrorist group affects what it can manage
to do. To have social capital terrorist groups need to have connections to other groups. By this logic,
terrorist groups that have no connections to other terrorist groups cannot be part of the network. They
are isolate actors, thus being excluded from the sample.14 In section 6.5.3, I calculate network statistics
13The GTD reports attacks that cannont be attributed to any terrorist group in particular (e.g., unknown, other, indivudal,
Sikh extremists, or Palestinians). Since I attribute characteristics of the perpetrators to attacks, I need to be able to clearly
identify each actor. As it is impossible to correlate these attacks with organizational factors, I exclude these perpetrators
from the sample. Further, I recode group names if a group is attributed with multiple group names to make them uniquely
identifiable.
14Some terrorist groups may never cooperate. Reasons can be, for example, strategic choice or missing opportunity.
140
as measures of a terrorist group’s social capital. Social capital is influenced by the position of a terrorist
group within the network. The aim of this chapter is to analyse the influence of varying degrees of social
capital. Put simply, I compare terrorist groups that cooperate a lot with those that cooperate less. While
the GTD is updated annually the control variables limit the time frame to the years 1970 through 2010.
The final sample includes 30,635 terrorist attacks carried out by a total of 205 terrorist groups.
Seconde, the GTD data are event data capturing different qualities of terrorist attacks. Terrorist
groups are listed as perpetrators attached to individual attacks. When interested in organizational char-
acteristics these datasets need transformation. Creating an organizational dataset from an event database
is prone to various difficulties that need to be addressed (Young and Dugan, 2014, p. 8). I highlight those
challenges when describing the operationalization of the respective variables in the following sections.
6.4.2 Dependent variable
The dependent variable is the operational capability displayed in an attack.15 This chapter introduces
a novel measure, aiming to assess the effect of resources at a terrorist group’s disposal as directly as
possible. I use the sophistication of weapons as a proxy, since it offers a more immediate way to meas-
ure the operational capability of a terrorist group compared to other measures, such as the frequency or
lethality of attacks (Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008; Horowitz and Potter, 2014). Previous categorizations
of weapons are not suitable for this analysis for several reasons. A direct measurement of the monetary
value of the weapons is not possible due to the extreme fluctuation in prices over time and space (Small
Arms Survey, 2007). Other established categorizations of weapons, such as the United Nations differ-
entiation between small arms and light weapons, are too broad for this analytical purpose, as terrorist
attacks rarely feature weapons such as rocket systems.
I categorize the sophistication of the weapons used in a terrorist attack as high versus low. It is
defined by the accessibility of the weapons and the simplicity to operate them. The value low is assigned
either to cases where only manpower was used to conduct the attack or where manpower was combined
with an ordinary tool that can be accessed legally on an everyday basis. Weapons in this category are
straightforward in their handling and users do only need basic instructions. For example, I assign the
value low to an attack where fire accelerants or vehicles were used. The sophistication of the weapon is
also classified as low if manpower and an actual weapon are used, which is restricted in its accessibility
due to its semi-legal or illegal nature. Using those weapons is still fairly easy, requiring only basic
training. Events in which terrorist groups use handguns, for example, fall into this category. The value
high is assigned to weapons that require extensive training to be used successfully. Additionally, access
15I do not measure the capability on the group level, but focus on the observable characteristics of a terrorist attack.
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to those weapons is defined broadly as semi-legal or illegal due to the fact that the legal status of a
weapon depends on the local law. An example is the use of semi-automatic weapons or biological
agents in a terrorist attack. Figure 6.2 shows the distribution of the dependent variable.
The unit of analysis it the terrorist attack. The GTD reports up to four types and sub-types of
weapons that were used in each terrorist attack. I calculate the highest level of sophistication of weapon
for each attack to retrieve the dependent variable on the attack level. I code the sophistication of a
weapon based on the reported weapon type or sub-type. Only if the type of weapon is clearly identifiable
I assign the respective value. For attacks where the GTD reports the weapon as “unknown” or “other”,
I cannot code the sophistication of weapon. Thus, the variable is missing for those attacks. The detailed
coding procedure is provided in the appendix A.5.
Figure 6.2: Distribution of the operational capability
6.4.3 Independent variables
The independent variables account for the social capital of a terrorist group determined by the position
of a terrorist group in the overall network of terrorist groups. I use measures of the network analysis
as covariates in the regression analysis. I include the number of direct connections of terrorist groups
(degree centrality), the number of indirect connections (eigenvector centrality), and their access to struc-
tural holes (constraint). Those network statistics capture the power and control over individual terrorist
groups’ resources. Terrorist groups can be located in an advantageous position if they have many con-
nections to other terrorist groups, if they are connected to terrorist groups that are themselves well
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connected, or if they bridge two or more clusters of terrorist groups that would be otherwise disconnec-
ted. These measures provide information on the group level. I aggregate this information to the attack
level, as multiple groups are active in the same attacks based on the research design. While I sum up
the direct connection to aggregate degree centrality, I aggregate eigenvector centrality and constraint by
taking the mean over all groups committing an attack together.
I calculate the values of the independent variables using information provided by the GTD. The GTD
reports up to three names of perpetrating groups for each terrorist attack. The order of the perpetrators
does not convey any additional meaning, but that they are all reported to have carried out the attack by
the media.16
To calculate those centrality measures, I create an adjacency matrix representing the relations of all
groups that are part of at least one cooperation dyad; i.e., that is part of a joint attack at least once.
The value in the cell is coded 1 if a cooperative tie between two terrorist groups exists and 0 otherwise.
This results in a square matrix that is symmetric and undirected, as the perpetrators’ order in the GTD
holds no meaning. Furthermore, due to limited information, it is impossible to assess the distribution
of work between the two terrorist groups. We only know that there was operational cooperation. Most
importantly, undirected measures also reflect my understanding of resources being mutually beneficial
for both terrorist groups.
Figure 6.3 provides a visualization of the network studied. The nodes represent all terrorist groups
in the sample; the ties represent cooperative relationships during attacks aggregated over the entire time
frame of 1970 through 2010.17 Attaching the frequency of cooperation as edge attributes allows me
to plot the entire network of terrorist groups with the thickness of the ties illustrating the number of
interactions between two groups. The entire network is comprised of 205 unique terrorist groups that
are connected by a total of 632 ties.
The graph illustrates an uneven distribution of connections. Some terrorist groups are well connec-
ted with other terrorist groups, while others are only peripheral actors with few connections. Theses
differences are captured by the independent variables. Prior to the calculation of the network variables,
the graphical visualization provides a first intuition about the flow of resources. The inequality in net-
work connections implies that the network is not very well integrated hampering the flow of resources.
The heterogeneity in terms of access to resources is high in this network, implying that some terrorist
groups have substantially better access to network resources than others.
16While I acknowledge that media reports can report diverging perpetrators due to the lack of consistent information, the
co-mentioning of terrorist groups responsible for the same attack, provides one of the best proxies to date.
17This plot provides an overview over all instances of cooperation between 1970 and 2010. Not all terrorist groups are able
to cooperate with any other group displayed in this overview since it shows an aggregation over space and time.
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Figure 6.3: Overview of cooperation networks of terrorist groups
This is further reflected in a low density (0.3) of the network. The density score indicates the pro-
portion of all possible ties that are present (Crossley et al., 2015).18 It captures the possibility and speed
of resources diffusing within the network (Hanneman and Riddle, 2011, p. 342). Therefore, it provides
first intuition about how possible it is for resources to be moved through the network.
While the overall network structure provides preliminary intuition about the flow and accessibility
of resources, it is important to focus on local structures and positional attributes to explain why some
terrorist groups display higher levels of operational capability than others. The positional attributes
relate to the accessibility of resources. To account for that, I calculate a terrorist group’s degree and
eigenvector centrality as well as constraint. These variables measure access to resources in terms of
quantity and diversity as well as speed. According to my theory, terrorist groups that are located in a
favorable position within the network have superior access to social capital gained through the exchange
of resources that can enhance their operational capability. While degree is a count of direct connec-
tions, a terrorist group’s eigenvector centrality allows me to study the effect of indirect connections via
18Thus, it divides all present ties by all possible ties.
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well-connected terrorist groups (Bonacich, 1987). The terrorist group with the highest degree value is
FARC with a total of 66 direct connections to other terrorist groups. I argue that a terrorist group not
only benefits from its direct connections but also from indirect connections. The eigenvector centrality
accounts for the position of the partners within the cooperation network. This measure captures how
connected the exchange partners are themselves. A higher eigenvector centrality score corresponds with
a higher number of those indirect partners. The group with the highest eigenvector centrality is also
FARC.
Holland and Leinhardt (1976) propose that the closer inspection of local structures improves the
understanding of social networks. Social networks tend to cluster together in dense groups (Holland
and Leinhardt, 1970; Snijders et al., 2006; Watts and Strogatz, 1998). The goal of this chapter is to
link the operational capability to different opportunities to access resources from other terorist groups.
The network studied in this chapter is fragmented meaning that not all terrorist groups can reach any
other terrorist group.19 Thus, measures that relate the individual terrorist group not to the entire network
but to its immediate neighborhood are useful. I measure a terrorist group’s access to structural holes
with constraint. Network constraint measures a terrorist group’s lack of access to structural holes (Burt,
1992). As elaborated in the theory section, a structural hole presents the absence of ties between two
terrorist groups. Low measures of constraint are associated with greater access to structural holes. Put
simply: Terrorist groups that have low values of constraint have greater “bridging capital”, i.e., they
are located between terrorist groups that would otherwise be disconnected. Such a terrorist group can
benefit from its location in the network. Terrorist groups with high measures of constraint have redundant
ties. Those ties provide little novel resources. Regarding my theoretical argument, smaller constraint
is associated with more operational capability. The terrorist group with the highest constraint is Hizb-
I-Islami measuring a constraint value of 1.33, whereas the terrorist group that is least constrained is
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi with a value of 0.23.
These independent variables account for the social capital of a terrorist group determined by its
position in the network. I use network analysis measures as covariates in the regression analysis. In my
regression models, I include the number of direct connections of terrorist groups (degree centrality), the
number of indirect connections (eigenvector centrality), and their access to structural holes (constraint).
I argue that the effect of social capital gained through cooperation on the operational capability
depends on the organizational structure of the terrorist group. I measure the organizational structure by
its degree of centralization. I include the dummy variable central, which is 1 if all groups that are active
19Also, terrorist groups are not necessarily temporarily or spacially co-present in the network analyzed in this chapter.
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in the attack have a centralized organizational structure and 0 otherwise.20 For more detail on the coding
procedure of the organizational structure of terrorist groups see chapter 4.
6.4.4 Control variables
I include several control variables to capture alternative explanations of variation in a terrorist group’s
operational capability. The operational capability of a terrorist group is promoted and constrained by
environmental and organizational factors. As with the other independent variables, I link information
available on the group level to observations on the attack level. I aggregate by taking the mean value
of the variables for all groups that commit an attack together.21 Previous studies have utilized organ-
izational and country level data to study the behavior of terrorist groups (Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008;
Blomberg, Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2011; Libicki and Jones, 2008). Young and Dugan (2014) compile
one of the most extensive and comprehensive datasets on terrorist organizations as well as organiza-
tional and country level variables. I rely on their data to control for terrorist group‘s organizational and
environmental characteristics.
Environmental variables
I control for the number of other terrorist groups that are active in the same country and in the same year
as the focal terrorist group. Several studies attribute features of attacks to the competition and outbidding
between terrorist groups (Conrad and Greene, 2015; Nemeth, 2014; Young and Dugan, 2014). More
terrorist groups operating in the same country can have a positive effect on a terrorist group’s operational
capability. In an attempt to showcase their capabilities, terrorist groups need to invest resources in their
attacks. Only by appearing as the “fittest” terrorist group in the country it can distinguish itself from other
groups and attract recruits (Young and Dugan, 2014). I also control for state capacity. The operational
capability is directly linked to a state’s ability to counter terrorism and suppress a terrorist group’s
activities. I include logged GDP, which is commonly used as a proxy for the level of development in
a country and the state’s capabilities (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Hendrix, 2010). Following Young and
Dugan (2014, p. 9), I measure GDP in hundreds of thousands of dollars to render the coefficient easier
to interpret.22 I also account for the logged population size, as it might positively affect the capabilities
20The variable is zero if either all terrorist groups active in the attack have a decentralized organizational structure or if some
groups are decentralized and others are centrally organized. This provides a conservative measure of organizational structure.
21The same logic appies for variables measured on the country level. The logged GDP, for example, is taken from each
terrorist group’s primary country and then averaged over all terrorist groups committing an attack together.
22Some studies include the state material capabilities index (CINC) from the Correlates of War project to control for a state‘s
military capabilities (Greig and Enterline, 2017; Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, 1972). While GDP is a more general proxy for
what a state can manage to do, the CINC rather captures the military capabilities of a state. I do not include this measure in
my models as it introduces too many missing observations.
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of a state (Blomberg, Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2011). As a higher population size is related to smaller
operational capabilities of the terrorist group. Next, I control for militarized conflict in the country.
Using data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, I code a dichotomous variable that is 1 for a
conflict in a terrorist group’s primary country, and 0 otherwise (Allansson, Melander and Themne´r, 2017;
Gleditsch et al., 2002). Controlling for militarized conflict in a country also accounts for the definitional
and empirical ambiguity of terrorist groups. Oftentimes, the difference between a terrorist group and
a guerilla group is unclear.23 The definition of terrorism and terrorist groups in this dissertation is
strategic, highlighting that various actors can employ terrorism as a tactical choice. Finally, I include
region dummies created from the GTD. They capture region-specific effects. I code five regions - Asia,
America, Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, and one combining countries from the Middle East, Central Asia,
and North Africa. The reference category is America.
Organizational variables
Organizational variables can also affect a terrorist group’s operational capability. I control for a terrorist
group’s age to account for the possibility that older groups might be more experienced in conducting at-
tacks as well as acquiring and handling more sophisticated weaponry (Jackson, 2001). Older groups are
expected to have a larger operational capability. I calculate a terrorist group’s age based on the number
of years it has been included in the GTD. While this is the best proxy to date and has been used in stud-
ies before (Dugan, 2012; Young and Dugan, 2014), it is also biased. There is no systematic information
available regarding if and how long a terrorist group has been active before the GTD starts reporting
attacks in 1970. It is also possible that a terrorist group has been active before but has not conducted
reported attacks. This might be attributed to the reporting bias in media sources or the transformation of
an organization, for example from a rebel group to a group that uses terrorism. This bias can potentially
affect the results for terrorist groups conducting attacks around the starting year of 1970. The measure
should be more accurate for terrorist groups, whose entire life span is well within the timeframe of the
analysis. Table 6.1 provides descriptive statistics on all independent and control variables that are part
of the analysis.
23See chapter 2 for a detailed review of the debate.
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Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics
Number of attacks 13554
Numerical variables
Variable Mean Variance Max Min
Degree 14.06 21.46 158 1
Eigenvector 0.11 0.30 1 0
Constraint 0.79 0.21 1.33 0.23
logged GDP 3.84 0.81 6.08 0.82
logged Population size 9.89 1.22 13.96 6.87
Age 11.59 7.82 40 0
Groups per country 6.72 7.07 76 1
Factor variables
Variable Yes (1) No (0) In percent
Operational capability 10397 4116 71.6%
Centralized structure 11827 2686 81.5%
Conflict 12168 1801 12.4%
America 6879 7634 47.4%
Asia 3824 10689 26.3%
Africa 251 14262 1.7%
Europe 1319 13194 9.1%
MeCaNa 2240 12273 15.4%
6.4.5 Method
Figure 6.4 displayes the empirical logic illustrating the variables used to assess the theoretical frame-
work.
This chapter combines statistical analysis with social network analysis. Using both methods in
conjunction allows me to test innovative hypotheses, studying the effect inter-organizational relationship
patterns on differences in performance of individual organizations. This chapter aims to identify a
moderation effect of the organizational structure on the direct effect of cooperation including the network
position on the operational capability of a terrorist group. Thus, this analysis accounts for environmental
and organizational variables and assesses their joint effect on the performance of terrorist groups as well.
Figure 6.4 summarizes the empirical strategy used in order to match the theoretical framework.
As the dependent variable is a binary measure for the sophistication of the weapon used in an attack,
I specify logistic regression models to test my hypotheses. I first test the effect of social capital and the
organizational structure of terrorist groups separately before I test whether the effect of social capital on
operational capability is dependent on the organizational structure. In models 2 through 4 I assess the
impact of a terrorist group’s social network on the operational capability displayed in a terrorist group’s
attack. In my second model, I test the effect of a terrorist group’s direct connections and then move
on to assess a group’s indirect connections. To model a terrorist groups embeddedness in a network of
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terrorist groups, I focus on the terrorist group’s eigenvector centrality. The fourth model accounts for
a terrorist group’s access to structural holes measured by the constraint of a terrorist group. The fifth
model assesses the effect of the organizational structure on the operational capability observable in an
attack. In separate models, I test the moderation of the previous effects by the organizational structure
reported in table 6.3. I calculate predicted probabilities to evaluate the substantive effects.
Figure 6.4: Empirical strategy
6.5 Results
The goal of this analysis is to assess the correlation between a terrorist group’s social capital and its
operational capability displayed in its attacks. I find no support for hypothesis 1 postulating a correl-
ation between the direct network connections of a terrorist group and its operational capability. I find
statistically significant effects for the other main covariates. Tables 6.2 and 6.3 provide an overview of
the regression results.
I find support for hypothesis 2 relating the indirect connections of a terrorist group to the operational
capability displayed in an attack. The odds of attacks conducted by terrorist groups with many indirect
connections displaying high operational capability are 1.42 times higher compared to other attacks.
The effect size of a terrorist group’s eigenvector centrality is small. The predicted probability of an
attack displaying a high operational capability increases by roughly 6 percentage points from about 77%
to 83% when terrorist groups have many indirect connections (see figure 6.5). My findings support
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Table 6.2: Regression results of independent effects
Dependent variable:
OperationalCapability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Degree −0.001
(0.001)
Eigenvector 0.348∗∗∗
(0.085)
Structural Hole 0.644∗∗∗
(0.117)
Centralized 0.371∗∗∗
(0.053)
GDP (logged) −0.162∗∗∗ −0.162∗∗∗ −0.117∗∗ −0.132∗∗ −0.104∗
(0.054) (0.053) (0.055) (0.053) (0.054)
Population (logged) −0.481∗∗∗ −0.477∗∗∗ −0.503∗∗∗ −0.492∗∗∗ −0.455∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025)
Age −0.007∗∗ −0.006∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Conflict 0.720∗∗∗ 0.734∗∗∗ 0.705∗∗∗ 0.781∗∗∗ 0.713∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.099) (0.100)
Interaction 0.024∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Asia 0.407∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.605∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.087) (0.098) (0.086) (0.087)
Europe −1.394∗∗∗ −1.410∗∗∗ −1.376∗∗∗ −1.525∗∗∗ −1.454∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.118) (0.118)
Africa −1.397∗∗∗ −1.407∗∗∗ −1.265∗∗∗ −1.297∗∗∗ −1.252∗∗∗
(0.180) (0.179) (0.183) (0.181) (0.180)
MeCaNa 0.395∗∗∗ 0.380∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.070) (0.071) (0.070) (0.069)
Constant 5.774∗∗∗ 5.733∗∗∗ 5.820∗∗∗ 5.177∗∗∗ 5.024∗∗∗
(0.308) (0.309) (0.308) (0.324) (0.328)
Observations 13,554 13,554 13,554 13,554 13,554
Log Likelihood −7,187.532 −7,186.526 −7,179.033 −7,172.403 −7,163.296
Akaike Inf. Crit. 14,395.060 14,395.050 14,380.070 14,366.810 14,348.590
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 6.3: Regression results of moderation effect
Dependent variable:
OperationalCapability
(1) (2) (3)
Degree −0.001
(0.003)
Eigenvector 6.721∗∗∗
(0.874)
StructuralHole 0.046
(0.214)
Centralized 0.398∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗ −0.387∗
(0.066) (0.057) (0.202)
GDP log −0.110∗ −0.017 −0.022
(0.056) (0.056) (0.054)
Population log −0.447∗∗∗ −0.470∗∗∗ −0.453∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Age −0.007∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Conflict 0.729∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗ 0.769∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.101) (0.099)
Interaction 0.024∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Asia 0.466∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗ 0.712∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.102) (0.090)
Europe −1.474∗∗∗ −1.452∗∗∗ −1.709∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.119) (0.122)
Africa −1.273∗∗∗ −0.966∗∗∗ −0.968∗∗∗
(0.182) (0.185) (0.184)
MeCaNa 0.348∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.071) (0.071)
Degree:Centralized −0.002
(0.003)
Eigenvector:Centralized −6.448∗∗∗
(0.868)
StructuralHole:Centralized 1.069∗∗∗
(0.255)
Constant 4.944∗∗∗ 4.671∗∗∗ 4.490∗∗∗
(0.330) (0.333) (0.358)
Observations 13,554 13,554 13,554
Log Likelihood −7,161.261 −7,121.510 −7,132.021
Akaike Inf. Crit. 14,348.520 14,269.020 14,290.040
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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the importance of indirect connections regarding a terrorist group’s operational capability. A terrorist
group that interacts with well-connected terrorist groups can reap the benefits of those ties. My findings
complement the analysis by Horowitz and Potter (2014), who find that terrorist groups benefit more from
being connected to other terrorist groups who are centrally embedded themselves. It contradicts Phillips
(2013), whose results show that those indirect connections are not as important as direct connections for
explaining the longevity of terrorist groups.
Figure 6.5: Predicted probability of indirect connections
I also test whether the access to structural holes affects the operational capability of a terrorist group.
As elaborated above, terrorist groups that have access to structural holes are in a beneficial network pos-
ition, as they bridge the gap between two otherwise disconnected groups. In the context of my argument,
this means that terrorist groups in such a position can access resources from both actors. The access to
structural holes is evaluated with the measure of constraint. More precisely, low measures of constraint
indicate that a terrorist group has access to structural holes and can benefit from diverse resources. In
contrast, a terrorist group with high measures of constraint has multiple ties to the same partner(s). It is
constrained by the costs of cooperation while getting access to few novel resources. In order to support
the hypothesis that terrorist groups that access structural holes display a higher operational capability in
their attacks, the relationship needs to be negative. Lower values in constraint correspond to a higher
probability of displaying high operational capability. To interpret the substantive effect, I calculate pre-
dicted probabilities (see figure 6.6). The predicted probability of an attack displaying high operational
capability increases by about 12 percentage points from about 71% to 83% when constraint varies from
the minimum to the maximum value. Thus, hypothesis 3 cannot be supported.
152
Figure 6.6: Predicted probability of structural holes
Hypothesis 4 is supported. The odds for attacks displaying a high operational capability are 1.45
times higher for attacks conducted by terrorist groups that all have a centralized organizational struc-
ture compared to attacks that are conducted by terrorist groups of which at least one is decentralized.
Substantively, the predicted probability increases by about 7 percentage points from about 72% to 79%
when all terrorist groups are centralized.
Hypothesis 5 is only partly supported by the evidence. I find no statistical significant effect for the
interaction of organizational structure and the amount of direct connections to other terrorist groups. I
find statistically significant moderation effects for the amount of indirect connections of terrorist groups
as well as its access to structural holes.
All else equal, a one-unit change in eigenvector centrality increases the likelihood of attacks dis-
playing a high operational capability by 6.72 percentage points. In cases where all terrorist groups have
a centralized organizational structure, the likelihood of attacks displaying a high operational capability
increases by 0.53 percentage points.24 The interaction term is statistically significant, indicating that the
slopes for operational capability on eigenvector are significantly different for each level of the moder-
ation variable. In other words, the effect of eigenvector centrality decreases by 6.45 percentage points
if all terrorist groups that carry out the attack have adopted a centralized organizational structure. This
finding contradicts the hypothesis stating that terrorist groups that are well embedded within the network
benefit even more if they are centrally structured.
The substantive effects have to be interpreted tentatively. The results are biased by an unequal
distribution of observations. Concerning the eigenvector, almost all observations cluster in the lowest
and highest values of eigenvector centrality. Additionally, there are no attacks that are conducted by
24I acknowledge the small magnitude of the effect. The reasons for this finding are discussed towards the end of this section.
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Figure 6.7: Predicted probability of centralized structure
terrorist groups that are highly embedded and are not centralized.
When assessing a terrorist group’s constraint, the interaction effect is also statistically significant,
suggesting that the effect of a terrorist group’s access to structural holes on the operational capability
visible in an attack is different for attacks that are carried out only by centralized groups. The effect
of constraint increases by 1.07 percentage points for those attacks carried out by centralized groups.
This contradicts the hypothesized effect. I proposed that terrorist groups that are centralized are better
at efficiently managing resources. Being mindful of the small effect size, careful interpretation suggests
that those groups that have access to structural roles are not only in a more beneficial network position
but can increase this effect in case of being structured centrally.25 In testing hypothesis 3, I find that
attacks carried out by terrorist groups that are more constrained by their immediate neighborhood and
not in a position to bridge structural holes, are more likely to show high operational capability. While
the original hypothesis concerning the access to structural holes cannot be supported, the moderation of
such access by the organizational structure is supported by the results.
25According to my theoretical argument, I expect low constraint, i.e., high access to structural holes, to relate to attacks
showing high operational capability and high constraint, i.e., low access to structural holes, to relate to low operational capab-
ility displayed in attacks.
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Figure 6.8: Predicted probability of eigenvector on structure
Figure 6.9: Predicted probability of structural holes on structure
To summarize, I find that the position of a terrorist group within its social network matters just as
much as its organizational structure. I find no statistically significant effect for the amount of direct
connections to other terrorist groups (H 1) affecting the operational capability displayed in a terrorist
groups’ attacks. I do find statistically significant effects for the amount of indirect connections of a
terrorist group (H 2) affecting the operational capability displayed in a terrorist groups’ attacks. The
results indicate a relation between terrorist groups’ access to structural holes within the network and the
operational capability shown in their attacks (H 3). The effect is counter the hypothesized direction. The
relation between terrorist groups being centrally structured and the operational capability in attacks is
also sustained by the results (H 4). I find evidence for two interaction effects (H 5): First, between the
amount of indirect connections of a terrorist group and its organizational structure and second, between
a terrorist group’s access to structural holes and its organizational structure. For both interactions the
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direction of the effect is counter to the expected one.
The effect sizes are small across all models. Judging by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
the explanatory power of the covariates add little explanatory power to the model including only the en-
vironmental and organizational control variables. The best explanatory power has the model evaluating
the interaction between the organizational structure of the terrorist groups carrying out the attack and
the indirect connections of those groups. This highlights two points regarding the capability of terrorist
groups: it matters to whom a terrorist group is connected and combining environmental variables with
group-internal dynamics is paramount.
6.6 Conclusion
The goal of this chapter was to explore the mechanisms of how variation in operational capability of
terrorist groups can be explained by social capital. My results show that the social capital of a terrorist
group influences the operational capability displayed in the group’s attacks. I use metrics of social
network analysis to operationalize a terrorist group’s access to social capital that is generated within the
cooperation network. I find that it pays to be cooperating with a terrorist group that itself cooperates
extensively. Terrorist groups benefit from cooperating with another terrorist group that cooperates itself
as they can potentially access more and more diverse resources. My findings also indicate that the
organizational sturcture of a terrorist group moderates the effect of its social capital. I argued that the
managerial capacities that come with a centralized structure allow for more efficient resource allocation,
which should be reflected in what a terrorist group manages to do. The results support my argument
that terrorist groups are connected to other terrorist groups to access resources and that their resource
management is subject to internal constraints of their organizational structure.
The explanatory power of the models is poor. Uneven distribution of observations across the vari-
ables is one factor resulting in small effect sizes. Future research would benefit from improving data
collection, but also better operationalization. A lot of information is lost when aggregate variables. Pro-
jects could focus on a dynamic approach allowing for time-sensitive variance and network evolution
over time. Other network predictors might be helpful to further dissect the effect of a terrorist group’s
position within the network on its capabilities. Being part of a tight-knit clique of terrorist groups might
enable the members of this clique to do things they would not be able to implement otherwise. The
results do not support the hypothesis that those terrorist groups that are in a position to bridge two other-
wise unconnected groups in their immediate neighborhood perform with a higher operational capability.
However, terrorist groups that bridge two otherwise unconnected groups in the entire network might
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outperform others. This is a promising avenue for future research.
The network used in this chapter relies on two terrorist groups being responsible for the same attack.
Other operationalizations of cooperation are possible that change the make up of the network and, hence,
the predictors.
Cooperation and resource exchange between terrorist groups does not only happen when they con-
duct attacks together. In fact, it is to be expected that many instances of cooperation happen outside of
attacks. The following example can illustrate that predicament. In the early 2000s, FARC reached their
tactical limits in their struggle against the Colombian government. After peace negotiations failed and
the Colombian forces took control over the previously demilitarized zone, FARC adapted their strategy.
It increasingly changed their tactics to terrorist attacks in Colombian cities (Hodgson, McDonald and
Beaumont, 2001). Since this new strategy exceeded their internal capacities FARC leadership turned to
the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) for new weapons and technologies (Cragin et al., 2007).
In August 2001 three members of PIRA were arrested at Bogota airport while traveling with false pass-
ports.26 They were on their way back from FARC controlled Despeje, where they allegedly trained
FARC members in the use of various explosive devices (Ward and Hackett, 2003). This exchange en-
abled FARC to perform attacks with more sophisticated weapons resulting in higher intensity in terms
of lethality and frequency.27 This case illustrates the rationale of cooperation between terrorist groups.
In the analysis, I also need to aggregate over all instances of cooperation losing the time-variance
in the data as well. Until better data are generated, I need to follow in the traditions of other authors
researching cooperation between terrorist groups in a quantitative design (Asal, Ackerman and Reth-
emeyer, 2012; Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008; Horowitz and Potter, 2014; Horowitz, 2010; Karmon, 2005;
Phillips, 2013) being aware of the caveats and biases this introduces. This approach neglects to ac-
knowledge the dynamic character of cooperative relationships. It collapses instances of cooperation to
the group level, disregarding timelines and developments of relationships. Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell
(2011, p. 45) summarize this challenge stating that “the event network we see is not the potential struc-
ture defined by underlying relations, but an actualized instance that could change at any time and there-
fore does not tell us what other paths might have been possible.” Time-sensitive analysis could also help
to evaluate whether previous cooperation affects the likelihood of cooperating again in the future. Using
social network analysis to generate predictors conceptualizes the reality of terrorist groups as being con-
nected to other actors in their environment. In order to accumulate the necessary resources for an attack
they might rely on other factors, but their social capital and their internal managerial capacities play an
26The so-called Colombian Three: Niall Connolly, Martin McCauley, and James Monaghan.
27More than 400 members of the Colombian security forces were killed in an 18-month period (Cragin et al., 2007).
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important role as well.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
Terrorist groups cannot live on idealism alone (Adams, 1986). To carry out operations and sustain their
organization they need resources. This dissertation focused on the process of a terrorist group’s resource
generation process. It explored the questions of how terrorist groups can acquire resources from their
external environment and how resources are allocated within a terrorist group to be used in an attack.
I developed an argument that highlights the interaction of factors that are external and factors that
are internal to a terrorist group. I provided evidence for such an interaction in three empirical chapters.
In chapter 4, I focused on the interplay between external environmental and internal organizational
determinants affecting the organizational structure of a terrorist group. I found that in an environment
where the state has the ability and the willingness to repress, terrorist groups are less likely to adopt
a centralized structure. This finding is in line with previous research attributing a higher degree of
resilience to a decentralized structure, arguing that it is less likely to receive a fatal shock and also
better equipped to recuperate from disruption (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones, 2008). The findings also
highlight that it is important to pay attention to the function a terrorist group needs to carry out within
a country. Specific functions may require a specific structural design. During the Cold War, terrorist
groups were often utilized by a state as an illicit force, requiring the terrorist group to adopt a centralized
organization. I also claimed that terrorist groups may need to fulfill certain functions concerning their
constituency. I provided evidence suggesting that a terrorist group, which needs to coordinate between
multiple ethnic fractions is more likely to be centralized. I also tested the effect of ideology on the
organizational structure. Ideology is a publicly observable proxy for the goals of a terrorist group. The
evidence suggests that terrorist groups pursuing a maximalist ideology are less likely to be centralized.
Ideology has often been studied as a determinant of certain terrorist group behavior.1 However, it has
1The effect of ideology has been studied, for example, concerning its effect on cooperation partner selection (Moghadam,
2017), its effect on getting involved in organized crime (Hutchinson and O’Malley, 2007), or the intensity of terrorist attacks
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never been investigated in correlation with the structural set-up of a terrorist group.
In chapter 5, I explored both environmental and organizational determinants that drive a terrorist
group’s involvement in organized crime. In contrast to the other empirical chapters, this analysis utilized
an inductive machine learning approach. The evidence suggests that organizational factors out-perform
environmental ones, with group size and ideology being the most influential variables for leveraging
accurate predictions. In chapter 6, I investigated the specific interaction effect between resource acquis-
ition and allocation. I found that the connections to well connected terrorist groups and a centralized
structure independently increase the likelihood of a terrorist attack as this group is displaying a high
operational capability. Additionally, I found that the organizational structure does moderate the effect of
a terrorist group’s social capital.
Each chapter studied the resource generation process from a different angle. The focus rested on the
organizational structure that determines the allocation of resources and the terrorist groups interaction
with its environment. Each analysis provided evidence suggesting the interplay between external and
internal factors. In the remainder of this chapter, I summarize the main theoretical and empirical contri-
butions stemming from my findings. I conclude by outlining the political ramifications of my research
and avenues for future research.
7.1 Theoretical contribution
7.1.1 Focusing on the economic side of terrorism
In this dissertation, I focused on the economic activities of terrorist groups arguing that what they can
implement is a function of their resource endowments. I conceptualized terrorist groups as economic
entities that need to access available resources and manage them efficiently in order to use them in
their attacks. I labeled this acquisition and allocation, which make up the two steps of the resourcing
process. I achieved this by combining literature from terrorism research with that from management and
organizational research. By arguing that terrorist groups are ultimately economic entities, I was able to
customize concepts from management studies to the context of terrorism and terrorist groups.
I argued that during the resourcing process external factors characterizing the context in which a ter-
rorist group operates and internal features of terrorist groups play a significant role. In all three empirical
chapters, I analyzed the effect of a selection of these factors. I found that they have an independent ef-
fect but also affect each other. As such, the organizational structure of a terrorist group is determined by
environmental conditions. The organizational structure itself affects the performance of a terrorist group
(Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008).
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and moderates the effect of a terrorist group’s social capital on its performance.
7.1.2 Integrating the network and the organizational perspective on terrorism
I argued that focusing on the interaction between the organizational structure and access to external re-
sources is crucial. This dissertation integrates the external embeddedness of a terrorist group with its
ability to manage resources internally. Thereby, I combined two strands of research. One strand dis-
cusses the internal structure of organizations and its effect on the successful distribution of resources
within the organization. The second strand locates the organization within a network of organizations.
The central assumption of this approach is that an organization is affected by the connections it has to
other actors. With my approach, I am able to analyze the individual and combined effect of a terrorist
group’s individual attributes and its embeddedness within the network of terrorist groups. However, an
organization also requires ties connecting the different sub-unit, i.e., divisions, of the organization. Only
then can they successfully utilize resources. Organizations that lack this capacity do not benefit from the
acquired resources to the extent that other organizations do that possess this capacity. By utilizing con-
cepts developed in the field of organizational management, strategic management, and network theory,
I built what I call the “market model of terrorism.” In this model, I explained the behavior of terrorist
groups with their economic activities.
7.2 Empirical contribution
7.2.1 Integrating and processing data for large-n cross-sectional analysis with a global
scope
This dissertation advances terrorism research as it operationalized difficult to measure features of terror-
ist groups. It sustains the aspiration to conduct large-n empirical analyses to test a theoretical argument.
To that end, I integrated data from various sources, procesed them where necessary to run my analyses,
and complemented them with originally coded variables. Studying the behavior of terrorist groups is
difficult. They act covertly, making it challenging or nearly impossible to gather information on a large
scale. Therefore, it is necessary to identify proxies that can be measured and to improve the measure-
ment of variables. I integrated various data sources to operationalize the concepts of my studies. Since
I am interested in-group behavior, I needed to process the data. Most often, terrorism data is event data
cataloguing features of attacks. Depending on the concept, the most suitable aggregation strategy was
applied.
I studied the interaction between a terrorist group’s internal characteristics and external factors. To
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do that, I needed to locate a terrorist group within its specific context. I chose a terrorist group’s main
country of operation and used country-level variables to proxy external conditions to operationalize this
context. With this approach, I follow the approach by Young and Dugan (2014).
I originally coded four variables that are crucial for investigating the economic activities of terrorist
groups. First, I provided a novel classification of resources that reflects their properties as commodities.
By classifying resources based on their tradability, I integrated the terrorism literature with economic lit-
erature. In studies of strategic management, resources are not just differentiated between being tangible
and intangible, or used in operations or for the maintenance of the organization. Instead, my approach
views the resources as a commodity that can be used in business transactions to improve capacities and
the competitiveness of an organization (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). Classifying resources of terrorist
groups as tradable or non-tradable is both innovative and valuable as it provides information about the
overall capacities that a terrorist group has in a context of other actors. Second, I used the organiz-
ational structure as a proxy for efficient resource allocation mechanisms. This is key to open up the
“black box” terrorist group. Third, I used network analysis to measure a terrorist group’s access to ex-
ternal resources. This offers tremendous potential for quantifying resource exchange. Future research
can expand this approach by including not only terrorist groups, but also other actors with whom terror-
ist groups potentially trade assets. My coding of whether a terrorist group is involved in organized crime
or not can be a first indicator where to start and is my fourth originally coded variable. This data set can
be used to further study terrorist group behavior under specific conditions.
7.2.2 Classifying involvement in organized crime using a supervised machine learning
algorithm
This is the first study to evaluate the predictive importance of factors thought to be associated with
increased crime-terror interaction. To do this, I used an inductive machine learning approach using a
random forest classifier. The random forest algorithm utilizes an ensemble of individual decision trees
resulting in out of sample predictions of whether a terrorist group has engaged in organized crime. I
compared the results with the well-known logistic regression classification, which relied on strict func-
tional assumptions. I found that random forest classification performs better, suggesting that future
research should be open to such algorithms. The repeatedly mentioned complexity of observational data
concerning terrorist group behavior seems to be poorly captured by the regression modeling approach
when compared to the random forest.
I additionally assessed the out of sample predictive accuracy of environmental and organizational
variables said to drive the involvement in organized crime. It focused the attention on the importance
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of organizational variables that affect the involvement of terrorist groups in organized crime. Many
studies focus on environmental factors to explain the nexus between terrorism and crime (Eccarius-
Kelly, 2012; Flanigan, 2012; Freeman, 2011; Piazza, 2012; Williams, 2012). It is easier to collect data
on environmental factors than on group-internal variables. My research suggests that it is important not
to over-rely on the findings of studies that focus only on environmental variables. My findings indicated a
substantive impact of organizational variables that need to be considered when studying terrorist group’s
behavior.
7.3 Broader implications
7.3.1 Policy implications
My dissertation highlights the need to look behind the attack and investigate the activities of terrorist
groups in preparation of an attack.
Considering counter-terrorism’s ambition to prevent attacks, understanding the resourcing process of
terrorist groups is crucial, yet often overlooked. This dissertation focused on the economic activities that
make the attack possible. The threat posed by terrorist groups is a combination of the willingness and
the ability of a terrorist group to commit an attack. Oftentimes, counter-terrorism strategies are aiming
to fight the willingness, while being ill equipped to actually do so. My research informs approaches that
are tailored to undermine a terrorist group’s ability to commit an attack. Counter-terrorism strategies
are frequently designed based on the assumption that ideology is driving terrorist groups. Therefore,
it is the ideology that they target and try to destroy. However, this is hardly achieved through physical
force and might actually backfire by strengthening the terrorist group’s resolve and its support base
in the process (Kydd and Walter, 2006). My research provides insights informing policy makers and
counter-terrorism practitioners to focus on the economic bases of terrorist operations. It is difficult
to undermine the mostly clandestine economic networks and activities of terrorist groups. However,
focusing on destroying ideology proves more and more ineffective and needs to be revised. My work
contributes to the line of research that is dedicated to the economics of terrorism (e.g., Adams, 1986; ,
N.d.; Vittori, 2011; Shelley, 2014; Clarke, 2015). Based on this research, counter-terrorism researchers
and practitioners can devise a response that undermines the resourcing activities of terrorist groups, thus
threatening their operational prowess and longevity.
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7.3.2 Future research agenda
This dissertation provided important insights into the economic activities of terrorist groups. Its find-
ings and caveats suggest several avenues for future research. My findings suggest that the organiza-
tional structure of a terrorist group moderates the effect of its resource acquisition. Future research can
build on this finding by further investigating the interaction between the organizational design and the
environment. Exploring which organizational design leads to which outcomes under specific environ-
mental conditions can enhance our theoretical and empirical precision and can inform counter-terrorism
strategies. Understanding the outcome, i.e., what we observe a terrorist group does, as the result of
organizational processes in a specific context can help to identify the terrorism threat more realistically
instead of inferring it from ideology and propaganda. I developed an original classification of resources
based on their tradability. Future research can explore the economic market of terrorism, where ter-
rorist groups among other actors exchange resources in order to increase their respective capabilities.
As case studies (e.g., Liang, 2015; Horgan and Taylor, 1999, 2003; Eccarius-Kelly, 2012) have shown,
illicit actors behave similar to firms, which trade surplus to enhance their performance (Ricardo, 1951).
The classification provided in this dissertation allows researchers to conduct comparable analyses both
global in scale or studying specific cases and also regarding other types of illicit actors.
This research still suffers from small effect sizes. Future research can develop measures that better
operationalize the concepts in this dissertation. Measuring group-internal variables is difficult due to
the clandestine character of terrorist groups. As my research shows the crucial role of group-internal
mechanisms determining a terrorist group’s behavior and affecting the impact of environmental factors,
future research should focus on identifying and measuring those mechanisms. This confirms previous
research attributing a vital role to the environmental conditions, in which a terrorist group operates.
Those studies have been driven, in part, by the relatively easy data access regarding those environmental
conditions. While important, this strand of research tells only half of the story. This dissertation makes
an advance to complement this research by exploring the role of group-internal factors.
IAppendix A
Appendix
A.1 List of terrorist groups and originally coded variables
I originally code the organizational structure of terrorist groups and their involvement in organized crime.
Table A.1 provides a list of all terrorist groups that are analyzed in chapter 4. The table reports the name
of each terrorist group along with its organizational structure and primary country. The organizational
structure is originally coded and marks the structural design, which a terrorist group adopted in its first
year.
Table A.2 provides a list of all terrorist groups that are analyzed in chapter 5. There are some terror-
ist groups which are part of both samples. In table A.2, I report whether a terrorist group is involved in
organized crime or not.
Table A.1: List of terrorist groups, their organizational structure, and primary country
Group name Organizational structure Primary country
1 1920 Revolution Brigades Centralized Iraq
2 Abdullah Azzam Brigades Centralized Egypt
3 Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) Decentralized Philippines
4 Achik National Volunteer
Council (ANVC)
Centralized India
5 Adan Abyan Islamic Army
(AAIA)
Decentralized Yemen
6 Afrikaner Resistance
Movement (AWB)
Decentralized South Africa
II
7 Ahlu-sunah Wal-jamea
(Somalia)
Decentralized Somalia
8 Aitarak Militia Centralized East Timor
9 Al Jehad Centralized India
10 Al Jihad Centralized Egypt
11 al-Ahwaz Arab People’s
Democratic Front
Centralized Iran
12 Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade Decentralized Israel
13 Al-Badr Centralized India
14 al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya (IG) Centralized Egypt
15 Al-Ittihaad al-Islami (AIAI) Decentralized Somalia
16 Al-Mansoorian Centralized India
17 Al-Qa‘ida Centralized Afghanistan
18 Al-Qa‘ida in Iraq Decentralized Iraq
19 Al-Qa‘ida in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP)
Centralized Yemen
20 Al-Qassam Brigades Decentralized Israel
21 Al-Shabaab Centralized Somalia
22 Al-Shabaab al-Mu’minin Decentralized Yemen
23 All Tripura Tiger Force
(ATTF)
Centralized India
24 Amr Bil Maroof Wa Nahi
Anil Munkir
Centralized Pakistan
25 Animal Liberation Front
(ALF)
Decentralized United Kingdom
26 Ansar Al Sunnah (Palestine) Centralized Israel
27 Ansar al-Islam Centralized Iraq
28 Ansar al-Sunna Centralized Iraq
29 Armed Forces Revolutionary
Council (AFRC)
Centralized Sierra Leone
30 Armed Islamic Group (GIA) Centralized Algeria
III
31 Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq Centralized Iraq
32 Awami League Centralized Bangladesh
33 Besi Merah Putih Militia Centralized East Timor
34 Black Widows Centralized India
35 Bougainville Revolutionary
Army (BRA)
Centralized Papua New Guinea
36 Burma Communist Party Centralized Myanmar
37 Cinchoneros Popular
Liberation Movement
Centralized Honduras
38 Colonel Karuna Faction Centralized Sri Lanka
39 Combat 18 Decentralized United Kingdom
40 Communist Party of Nepal-
Unified Marxist-Leninist
(CPN-UML)
Centralized Nepal
41 Congolese National
Movement- Lumumba
(MNCL)
Centralized Democratic Republic of the
Congo
42 Conspiracy of Cells of Fire Decentralized Greece
43 Deccan Mujahideen Decentralized India
44 Democratic Front for the
Liberation of Rwanda
(FDLR)
Centralized Democratic Republic of the
Congo
45 Dima Halao Daoga (DHD) Centralized India
46 Earth Liberation Front (ELF) Decentralized United States of America
47 Egyptian Tawhid and Jihad Decentralized Egypt
48 Force 17 Centralized Israel
49 Forces for the Defense of
Democracy (FDD)
Decentralized Burundi
50 Forest Brothers Centralized Azerbaijan
51 Great Eastern Islamic
Raiders Front (IBDA-C)
Decentralized Turkey
IV
52 Grupo de Combatientes
Populares
Centralized Ecuador
53 Hamas (Islamic Resistance
Movement)
Centralized Israel
54 Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HuM) Decentralized India
55 Harkat ul Ansar Decentralized India
56 Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami Decentralized India
57 Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (HT) Decentralized Uzbekistan
58 Hizb-I-Islami Centralized Afghanistan
59 Hizballah Centralized Lebanon
60 Hizbul al Islam (Somalia) Decentralized Somalia
61 Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) Centralized India
62 Huthis Decentralized Yemen
63 Indian Mujahideen Decentralized India
64 Informal Anarchist
Federation
Decentralized Italy
65 Islamic Army in Iraq
(al-Jaish al-Islami fi al-Iraq)
Centralized Iraq
66 Islamic Jihad Group (IJG) Decentralized Uzbekistan
67 Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU)
Decentralized Uzbekistan
68 Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) Centralized Iraq
69 Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) Centralized India
70 Jamaat-E-Islami
(India/Pakistan)
Decentralized Pakistan
71 Jamiat ul-Mujahedin (JuM) Centralized India
72 Jammu and Kashmir Islamic
Front
Decentralized India
73 Jaysh al-Muslimin (Army of
the Muslims)
Centralized Afghanistan
74 Jemaah Islamiya (JI) Decentralized Indonesia
V75 Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM)
Decentralized Sudan
76 Karbi Longri North Cachar
Liberation Front (KLNLF)
Decentralized India
77 Karenni National Progressive
Party
Centralized Myanmar
78 Kata’ib al-Khoul Decentralized Russia
79 Kurdistan Freedom Hawks
(TAK)
Decentralized Turkey
80 Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(PKK)
Centralized Turkey
81 Lashkar-e-Islam (Pakistan) Centralized Pakistan
82 Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Decentralized Pakistan
83 Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) Centralized India
84 Lebanese National
Resistance Front
Centralized Lebanon
85 Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA)
Centralized Uganda
86 Mahdi Army Centralized Iraq
87 Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF)
Centralized Philippines
88 Movement for the
Emancipation of the Niger
Delta (MEND)
Decentralized Nigeria
89 Mujahedeen Army Decentralized Iraq
90 Mujahideen Youth
Movement (MYM)
Centralized Somalia
91 Muttahida Qami Movement
(MQM)
Centralized Pakistan
92 National Council for Defense
of Democracy (NCDD)
Decentralized Burundi
VI
93 National Democratic Front
of Bodoland (NDFB)
Centralized India
94 National Liberation Army
(Ecuador)
Centralized Ecuador
95 National Liberation Army
(NLA) (Macedonia)
Centralized Macedonia
96 National Liberation Front of
Tripura (NLFT)
Decentralized India
97 National Socialist Council of
Nagaland-Isak-Muivah
(NSCN-IM)
Centralized India
98 National Socialist Council of
Nagaland-Khaplang
(NSCN-K)
Centralized India
99 Nepal People’s Army Centralized Nepal
100 Niger Delta People’s
Volunteer Force (NDPVF)
Decentralized Nigeria
101 Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) Decentralized Nigeria
102 Ogaden National Liberation
Front (ONLF)
Decentralized Ethiopia
103 Oromo Liberation Front Centralized Ethiopia
104 Palestinian Islamic Jihad
(PIJ)
Centralized Israel
105 Party for the Liberation of
the Hutu People
(PALIPEHUTU)
Centralized Burundi
106 Patriotic Morazanista Front
(FPM)
Centralized Honduras
107 People’s Committee against
Police Atrocities (PCPA)
Decentralized India
108 People’s Liberation Front of
India
Centralized India
VII
109 People’s Revolutionary
Army (ERP)
Decentralized Colombia
110 People’s Revolutionary Party
of Kangleipak (PREPAK)
Centralized India
111 People’s United Liberation
Front (PULF)
Decentralized India
112 Popular Resistance
Committees
Centralized Israel
113 Quintin Lame Centralized Colombia
114 Real Irish Republican Army
(RIRA)
Decentralized United Kingdom
115 Red Hand Defenders (RHD) Decentralized Ireland
116 Revolutionary Bolivariano
Movement 200
Decentralized Venezuela
117 Revolutionary Nuclei Decentralized Greece
118 Revolutionary Struggle Decentralized Greece
119 Revolutionary United Front
(RUF)
Decentralized Sierra Leone
120 Ricardo Franco Front
(Dissident FARC)
Decentralized Colombia
121 Riyadus-Salikhin
Reconnaissance and
Sabotage Battalion of
Chechen Martyrs
Decentralized Russia
122 Salafist Group for Preaching
and Fighting (GSPC)
Decentralized Algeria
123 Shan State Army Centralized Myanmar
124 Sipah-e-Sahaba/Pakistan
(SSP)
Decentralized Pakistan
125 Special Purpose Islamic
Regiment (SPIR)
Decentralized Russia
126 Students Islamic Movement
of India (SIMI)
Decentralized India
VIII
127 Sudan People’s Liberation
Army (SPLA)
Centralized Sudan
128 Takfir wal-Hijra
(Excommunication and
Exodus)
Decentralized Somalia
129 Taliban Centralized Afghanistan
130 Tanzim Centralized Israel
131 Tawhid and Jihad Decentralized Iraq
132 Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
(TTP)
Centralized Pakistan
133 Terai Army Decentralized Nepal
134 The Extraditables Decentralized Colombia
135 Tupac Amaru Revolutionary
Movement (MRTA)
Decentralized Peru
136 Turkish Communist
Party/Marxist (TKP-ML)
Centralized Turkey
137 United Liberation Front of
Assam (ULFA)
Centralized India
138 United People’s Democratic
Solidarity (UPDS)
Centralized India
139 United Popular Action
Movement
Centralized Chile
140 United Self Defense Units of
Colombia (AUC)
Decentralized Colombia
141 White Legion (Georgia) Decentralized Georgia
142 White Wolves Decentralized South Africa
143 White Wolves (UK) Decentralized United Kingdom
144 Young Communist League Centralized Nepal
IX
Table A.2: List of terrorist groups involved in organized crime and their organizational struc-
ture
Group name Organized crime Organizational structure
1 23rd of September
Communist League
No Decentralized
2 2nd of June Movement No Decentralized
3 Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades No Decentralized
4 Abu Nidal Organization
(ANO)
Yes Centralized
5 Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) Yes Decentralized
6 Action Directe No Decentralized
7 African National Congress
(ANC)
No Centralized
8 Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade Yes Decentralized
9 Al-Fatah No Centralized
10 Al-Gama’at al Islamiyya
(IG)
Yes Centralized
11 Al-Qaeda Yes Centralized
12 Al-Qaeda in Iraq Yes Decentralized
13 Alex Boncayao Brigade
(ABB)
Yes Centralized
14 All Tripura Tiger Force
(ATTF)
Yes Centralized
15 Amal Yes Centralized
16 Animal Liberation Front No Decentralized
17 Ansar al-Islam Yes Centralized
18 Ansar al-Sunnah Yes Centralized
19 Argentine Anticommunist
Alliance (AAA)
No Centralized
20 Armed Forces of National
Resistance (FARN)
Yes Centralized
21 Armed Islamic Group (GIA) Yes Centralized
X22 Armed Revolutionary
Independence Movement
(MIRA)
No Decentralized
23 Armed Revolutionary Nuclei
(NAR)
No Centralized
24 Armenian Secret Army for
the Liberation of Armenia
Yes Centralized
25 Balochi Liberation Army
(BLA)
Yes Decentralized
26 Basque Fatherland and
Freedom (ETA)
Yes Centralized
27 Black Liberation Army No Decentralized
28 Black Panther Group
(Palestine)
No Decentralized
29 Black September Yes Centralized
30 Breton Liberation Front
(FLB)
No Centralized
31 Chukakuha (Middle Core
Faction)
No Decentralized
32 Cinchoneros Popular
Liberation Movement
No Centralized
33 Committee of Solidarity with
Arab and Middle East
Political Prisoners (CSPPA)
No Centralized
34 Communist Combattant
Cells (CCC) (Belgium)
No Decentralized
35 Communist Party of India -
Maoist (CPI-M)
Yes Centralized
36 Communist Party of Nepal -
Maoist (CPN-M)
Yes Centralized
37 Continuity Irish Republican
Army (CIRA)
No Decentralized
XI
38 Democratic Front for the
Liberation of Palestine
(DFLP)
No Centralized
39 Devrimci Halk Kurtulus
Cephesi (DHKP/C)
Yes Centralized
40 Earth Liberation Front (ELF) No Decentralized
41 Ejercito Revolucionaria del
Pueblo (ERP) (Argentina)
No Centralized
42 Eritrean Liberation Front No Centralized
43 Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front (FMLN)
Yes Centralized
44 February 28 Popular League
(El Salvador)
No Centralized
45 First of October Antifascist
Resistance Group (GRAPO)
No Centralized
46 Free Aceh Movement
(GAM)
Yes Centralized
47 Free Papua Movement
(OPN)
No Centralized
48 Front for the Liberation of
Lebanon from Foreigners
(FLLF)
No Centralized
49 Front for the Liberation of
the Enclave of Cabinda
(FLEC)
No Centralized
50 Fuerzas Armadas de
Liberacion Nacional (FALN)
Yes Decentralized
51 Guatemalan National
Revolutionary Unity
(URNG)
No Centralized
52 Guerrilla Army of the Poor
(EGP)
No Centralized
XII
53 Hamas (Islamic Resistance
Movement)
Yes Centralized
54 Hezbollah Yes Centralized
55 Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) Yes Centralized
56 International Revolutionary
Action Group (GARI)
No Decentralized
57 Iparretarrak (IK) No Centralized
58 Irish National Liberation
Army (INLA)
No Decentralized
59 Irish People’s Liberation
Organization (IPLO)
Yes Decentralized
60 Irish Republican Army
(IRA)
Yes Centralized
61 Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) No Decentralized
62 Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) Yes Centralized
63 Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) Yes Centralized
64 Jama’atul Mujahideen
Bangladesh (JMB)
Yes Centralized
65 Jamaat-E-Islami
(Bangladesh)
Yes Centralized
66 Jammu and Kashmir Islamic
Front
No Decentralized
67 Jemaah Islamiya (JI) Yes Decentralized
68 Jewish Armed Resistance
(JAR)
No Decentralized
69 Jewish Defense League
(JDL)
Yes Centralized
70 Justice Commandos for the
Armenian Genocide
No Decentralized
71 Kach No Decentralized
72 Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA)
Yes Centralized
XIII
73 Kurdistan Freedom Hawks
(TAK)
No Decentralized
74 Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(PKK)
Yes Centralized
75 Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) No Decentralized
76 Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) Yes Centralized
77 Lebanese National
Resistance Front
No Centralized
78 Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE)
Yes Centralized
79 Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA)
Yes Centralized
80 Loyalist Volunteer Forces
(LVF)
Yes Decentralized
81 M-19 (Movement of April
19)
No Decentralized
82 Macheteros No Centralized
83 Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic
Front (FPMR)
No Centralized
84 Maoist Communist Center
(MCC)
No Centralized
85 Maximiliano Gomez
Revolutionary Brigade
No Decentralized
86 Montoneros (Argentian) Yes Centralized
87 Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF)
Yes Centralized
88 Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF)
Yes Centralized
89 Movement for Emancipation
of Niger Delta (MEND)
No Decentralized
90 Movement of the
Revolutionary Left (MIR)
(Chile)
No Centralized
XIV
91 Mozambique National
Resistance Movement
(MNR)
No Centralized
92 National Democratic Front
of Bodoland (NDFB)
Yes Centralized
93 National Liberation Army of
Colombia (ELN)
Yes Centralized
94 National Liberation Front of
Tripura (NLFT)
No Decentralized
95 National Patriotic Front of
Liberia (NPFL)
No Centralized
96 National Socialist Council of
Nagaland
No Centralized
97 National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola
(UNITA)
Yes Centralized
98 New Armenian Resistance No Decentralized
99 New People’s Army (NPA) No Decentralized
100 November 17 Revolutionary
Organization (N17RO)
No Decentralized
101 Official Irish Republican
Army (OIRA)
No Centralized
102 Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO)
Yes Centralized
103 Palestinian Islamic Jihad
(PIJ)
No Centralized
104 Pattani United Liberation
Organization (PULO)
No Centralized
105 Peasant Self-Defense Group
(ACCU)
Yes Decentralized
106 People’s Liberation Army
(India)
No Centralized
XV
107 People’s Liberation Forces
(FPL)
No Centralized
108 People’s Revolutionary
Army (ERP)
No Decentralized
109 People’s Revolutionary
Organization
No Centralized
110 People’s War Group (PWG) Yes Centralized
111 Polisario Front No Centralized
112 Popular Forces of April 25 No Decentralized
113 Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP)
No Centralized
114 Popular Liberation Army
(EPL)
Yes Decentralized
115 Popular Resistance
Committees
No Centralized
116 Popular Revolutionary Army No Centralized
117 Real Irish Republican Army
(RIRA)
Yes Decentralized
118 Rebel Armed Forces of
Guatemala (FAR)
No Decentralized
119 Recontras (Recontras 380) No Decentralized
120 Red Army Faction
(Baader-Meinhof Group)
No Decentralized
121 Red Brigades No Centralized
122 Red Flag (Venezuela) No Centralized
123 Red Hand Commandos No Decentralized
124 Red Hand Defenders (RHD) No Decentralized
125 Resistenza Corsa (RC) No Decentralized
126 Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC)
Yes Centralized
127 Revolutionary Cell No Decentralized
XVI
128 Revolutionary Nuclei No Decentralized
129 Revolutionary People’s
Struggle (ELA)
No Decentralized
130 Revolutionary United Front
(RUF)
No Decentralized
131 Shining Path (Sendero
Luminoso)
Yes Centralized
132 Spanish Basque Battalion
(BVE)
No Decentralized
133 Sudan People’s Liberation
Army (SPLA)
No Centralized
134 Taliban Yes Centralized
135 Tawind and Jihad Yes Decentralized
136 Terra Lliure (TL) No Decentralized
137 Tupac Amaru Revolutionary
Movement (MRTA)
No Decentralized
138 Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army
(EGTK)
No Decentralized
139 Tupamaros (Uruguay)
(MLN)
No Centralized
140 Turkish Communist Party /
Marxist (TKP-ML)
Yes Centralized
141 Turkish People’s Liberation
Army (TPLA)
No Decentralized
142 Turkish People’s Liberation
Front (THKP-C)
No Centralized
143 Ulster Freedom Fighters
(UFF)
Yes Centralized
144 Ulster Volunteer Force
(UVF)
Yes Centralized
145 United Freedom Front (UFF) No Decentralized
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146 United Liberation Front of
Assam (ULFA)
No Centralized
147 United Popular Action
Movement (Lautaro Faction)
No Centralized
148 United Self Defense Units of
Colombia (AUC)
Yes Decentralized
149 Weather Underground No Decentralized
150 Zimbabwe African
Nationalist Union (ZANU)
No Centralized
151 Al-Sa’iqa No Centralized
152 al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP)
No Centralized
153 Ananda Marga Yes Decentralized
154 Ansar al-Sunnah Army No Centralized
155 Anti-terrorist Liberation
Group (GAL)
No Centralized
156 Arab Communist
Organization
No Centralized
157 Armenian Revolutionary
Army
No Decentralized
158 Asbat al-Ansar Yes Decentralized
159 Ber Satu Yes Decentralized
160 Black Star No Decentralized
161 Breton Revolutionary Army
(ARB)
No Decentralized
162 Charles Martel Group No Decentralized
163 Che Guevara Brigade No Centralized
164 Clandestini Corsi No Decentralized
165 Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Yes Decentralized
166 Harkat ul-Mujahedin No Decentralized
167 Indigenous People’s Federal
Army (IPFA)
No Decentralized
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168 Informal Anarchist
Federation
No Decentralized
169 Islamic Army in Iraq No Centralized
170 Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan
Yes Centralized
171 Jamiat ul-Mujahedin (JuM) No Centralized
172 Japanese Red Army (JRA) No Decentralized
173 Lautaro Youth Movement No Decentralized
174 Lebanese Armed
Revolutionary Faction
(LARF)
No Decentralized
175 May 15 Organization for the
Liberation of Palestin
No Decentralized
176 Purbo Banglar Communist
Party (PBCP)
No Decentralized
177 Revolutionary Struggle Yes Decentralized
178 Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs’
Brigade
No Decentralized
179 Salafist Group for Call and
Combat (GSPC)
Yes Centralized
180 Tigray Peoples Liberation
Front (TPLF)
Yes Centralized
181 Ulster Defence Association
(UDA)
Yes Centralized
182 United National Liberation
Front (UNLF)
Yes Centralized
183 United People’s Democratic
Solidarity (UPDS)
No Centralized
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A.2 Logistic regression results
Three logistic regression models were fit to examine variable significance and importance. Table A.3 dis-
plays the results. The first model uses every variable outlined in the data and operationalization section.
The second model uses only organizational factors, and the third model uses only environmental factors.
Comparing model log likelihood, the organizational model explains a greater amount of variation than
the environmental factor model does. The AIC statistics also indicates that organizational variables are
substantively better than environmental variables at explaining variation in criminal activity.
Examining the fully fitted model, the logistic regression results in three statistically significant pre-
dictors. The centralized group structure dummy variable is significant at the 10%-level. Substantively,
the logit coefficient indicates a positive relationship between centralized organizational structure and
involvement in criminal activity. The coefficient estimates a 1.82 increase in the odds of a terrorist
organization being classified as having involvement in criminal activity when it has a centralized or-
ganizational structure. This finding is interesting, as it contradicts theoretical and anecdotal expectations
about the relationship between decentralized organizational structure and criminal involvement. Namely
the expectations concerning the strategic incentive of centralized structures to avoid high-risk activities.
Group size is statistically significant and conforms to the expectations held in the literature. Group
size has a positive relationship with involvement in criminal activity. The regression coefficient indic-
ates an average classification odds increase of 1.44 as organizations increase in group size. Finally, the
religious ideology dummy variable is statistically significant and indicates a strong positive relation-
ship with criminal involvement; religious groups have a 14.8 odds increase in being classified as having
criminal involvement. This finding is difficult to reconcile with both intuition and theoretical expecta-
tions. One would expect religious groups to shy away from illicit activities. Yet, this finding suggests
the opposite. While not statistically significant, the nationalist ideology dummy indicates the expected
relationship as found in the literature. Interestingly, none of the environmental variables are statistically
significant in the full model. Nevertheless, military spending and logged GDP are significant in the
environment model.
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Table A.3: Results
Dependent variable:
crime
(1) (2) (3)
Centralized Structure 0.662 0.597
(0.414) (0.393)
No. of Bases 0.049 −0.007
(0.189) (0.177)
Polity 0.044 −0.031
(0.048) (0.039)
Military Spending 0.046 0.122
(0.104) (0.083)
No. of Other Groups 0.011 0.005
(0.018) (0.014)
Attack Diversity 2.974 1.852
(2.515) (2.202)
Population (logged) 0.021 0.111
(0.165) (0.128)
Real GDP (logged) 0.026 −0.148
(0.196) (0.149)
Group Size 0.377∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.095)
Casualties/ TransAttack 0.010 0.037
(0.233) (0.217)
Leftist Ideology 0.938 0.830
(1.339) (1.283)
Religious Ideology 2.720∗∗ 2.636∗∗
(1.376) (1.305)
Nationalistic Ideology 1.190 1.223
(1.327) (1.269)
Group Age 0.013 0.015
(0.013) (0.013)
Constant −5.787∗ −4.453∗∗∗ −0.567
(3.224) (1.443) (2.015)
Observations 183 183 183
Log Likelihood -94.766 -96.177 -117.751
Akaike Inf. Crit. 219.533 212.354 247.503
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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A.3 Distributional comparison between panel measures and aggregated
crosssections
Table A.4: Mean and variance scores across measure types
Variable Panel mean Panel variance(SD)
Cross-section
mean
Cross-section variance
(SD)
Number of Bases 1.6 1 1.6 0.99
Polity Score 4.8 5.8 4.5 5.4
ln (Military Spending) 3.4 3.7 1.9 1.9
Competition 16.5 12.1 17.7 12.3
ln (Population) 10.4 1.4 10.4 1.4
ln (Real GDP) 8.7 1.1 8.7 1.2
Attack Diversity 0.03 0.12 0.04 0.07
Transnational Casualties/ Attack 0.16 0.57 0.51 0.86
A.4 Tenfold cross validation estimation of out-of-sample accuracy
Equation used for estimating tenfold cross validation accuracy. K is for each fold, while Err represents
the classification error rate for each fold. The results corroborate the comparison in the main text (boot-
strap validation). The random forest (75.2%) is roughly 6% more accurate in classifying out of sample
cases when compared to the logistic regression (68.9%) (Figs. A.1 and A.2).
CVk =
1
k
k∑
i=1
1− Erri
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Figure A.1: Tenfold cross validation accuracy for random forest classifier
Random Forest average cross validation accuracy: 75.2%
Average false positive rate (fpr): 10.5%
Average false negative rate (fnr): 14.2%
Figure A.2: Tenfold cross validation accuracy for logistic regression
Logistic Regression average cross validation accuracy: 68.9%
Average false positive rate (fpr): 15.5%
Average false negative rate (fnr): 14.2%
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A.5 Coding of sophistication of weapon based on weapon type
Table A.5: Coding of sophistication of weapon
Category Subtype Sophistication of weapon
Biological weapons [no corresponding weapon subtype] 1
Chemical weapons 1 = Poisoning 1
Radiological weapons [no corresponding weapon subtype] 1
Nuclear weapons [no corresponding weapon subtype] 1
Firearms 2 = (Semi-) automatic weapon 1
3 = Handgun 1
4 = Rifle/ Shotgun (non-automatic) 1
5 = Unknown Gun Type na
6 = Other Gun Type na
Explosives/ Bombs/
Dynamite 7 = Grenade (not RPGs) 1
8 = Mine 1
9 = Mail Bomb (letter, package, parcel) 1
10 = Pressure Trigger 1
11 = Projectile (rockets, mortars, RPGs, etc.) 1
12 = Remote Device (trigger, control, detonate) 1
13 = Suicide Borne IED 1
14 = Time Fuse 1
15 = Vehicle 1
16 = Unknown Explosive Type na
17= Other Explosive Type na
28 = Dynamite/ TNT 1
29 = Sticky Bomb 1
Fake Weapons [no corresponding weapon subtype] 0
Incendiary 18 = Arson/ Fire 0
19 = Flame Thrower 1
20 = Gasoline or Alcohol 0
Melee 21 = Blunt Object 0
22 = Hands, Feet, Fists 0
23 = Knife or Other Sharp Object 0
24 = Rope or Other Strangling Device 0
26 = Suffocation 0
27 = Unknown Weapon Type na
Vehicle [no corresponding weapon subtype] 0
Sabotage Equipment [no corresponding weapon subtype] 1
Other [no corresponding weapon subtype] na
Unknown [no corresponding weapon subtype] na
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